A Brief History of Analytic Philosophy

From Russell to Rawls

By Stephen P. Schwartz
Contents

Preface xi

Introduction: What is Analytic Philosophy?

Leading Analytic Philosophers 6

1 Russell and Moore 8

Empiricism, Mathematics, and Symbolic Logic 8

Logicism 12

Russell on Definite Descriptions 20

G. E. Moore's Philosophy of Common Sense 27

Moore and Russell on Sense Data 30

Moore's and Russell's Anti-Hegelianism 33

Summary 38

2 Wittgenstein, the Vienna Circle, and Logical Positivism 46

Introduction 46

Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus 48

Historical Note: The Vienna Circle and their Allies 58

The Elimination of Metaphysics and the Logical Positivist Program 59

The Demise of the Vienna Circle 68

The Influence of the Logical Positivists 69

3 Responses to Logical Positivism: Quine, Kuhn, and American Pragmatism 76

Introduction 76

The Demise of the Verifiability Criterion of Meaningfulness 78

Quine's Rejection of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction 82

Quinean Empiricism without the Dogmas 86

American Pragmatists after Quine: Nelson Goodman, Richard Rorty, and Hilary Putnam 101
## Contents

### 4 Oxford Ordinary Language Philosophy and Later

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Attack on Formalism – Strawson and Ryle</strong></td>
<td>124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophy of Language – Austin and Wittgenstein</strong></td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Philosophy of Mind – Ryle, Strawson, and Wittgenstein</strong></td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Rejection of Sense Data Theory</strong></td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Legacy of Ordinary Language Philosophy</strong></td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 5 Responses to Ordinary Language Philosophy: Logic, Language, and Mind

**Part 1: Formal Logic and Philosophy of Language**

- Gödel and Tarski
- Davidson
- Grice
- Carnap – *Meaning and Necessity*
- Chomsky

**Part 2: Philosophy of Mind**

- Functionalism
- Objections to Functionalism – *Bats and the Chinese Room*
- Anomalous Monism
- The Problem of Mental Causation

### 6 The Rebirth of Metaphysics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Modal Logic</strong></td>
<td>204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Possible Worlds</strong></td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problems with the Canonical Conception of Possible Worlds</strong></td>
<td>216</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Transworld Identity and Identification</strong></td>
<td>223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Modal Version of the Ontological Argument</strong></td>
<td>229</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 7 Naming, Necessity, and Natural Kinds: Kripke, Putnam, and Donnellan

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>239</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Traditional Theory of Meaning and Reference</strong></td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Kripke’s and Donnellan’s Criticism of the Traditional Theory: Names and Descriptions</strong></td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Natural Kind Terms</strong></td>
<td>247</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Problems for the New Theory of Reference</strong></td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Applications of the New Theory of Reference to the Philosophy of Mind</strong></td>
<td>257</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>The Social, Cultural, and Institutional Basis of Meaning and Reference</strong></td>
<td>260</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### 8 Ethics and Metaethics in the Analytic Tradition

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Introduction</strong></td>
<td>264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>G. E. Moore’s Principia Ethica</strong></td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Contents

- The Non-Cognitivism of C. L. Stevenson  
  Page 269
- The Universal Prescriptivism of R. M. Hare  
  Page 272
- The Return to Substantive Ethics  
  Page 275
- Questioning the Fact/Value Divide  
  Page 278
- Peter Singer and Animal Liberation  
  Page 281
- John Rawls' Theory of Justice  
  Page 285

### 9 Epilogue: Analytic Philosophy Today and Tomorrow  
  Page 299
  - Analytic Philosophy since 1980  
    Page 299
  - What is the Future of Analytic Philosophy?  
    Page 321

References  
Page 327
Index  
Page 337