THE DEVELOPMENT OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

WITH OTHER LECTURES AND ESSAYS

BY

ROBERT ADAMSON

M.A., LL.D.

SOMETIME PROFESSOR OF LOGIC AND RHETORIC IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW

EDITED BY

W. R. SORLEY

M.A., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN THE UNIVERSITY OF CAMBRIDGE

60160
10/9

IN TWO VOLUMES—VOL. II.

WILLIAM BLACKWOOD AND SONS
EDINBURGH AND LONDON
1903

CONTENTS OF VOLUME II.

PART I.

OCCASIONAL ADDRESSES AND ESSAYS.

I.

PAGE

INAUGURAL ADDRESS IN THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW . 3

II.

GIORDANO BRUNO 23

III.

PSYCHOLOGY AND EPISTEMOLOGY 45

IV.

KANT'S VIEW OF PSYCHOLOGY 66

V.

PHILOSOPHY AND THE SOCIAL PROBLEM . . . 78

VI.

THE BASIS OF MORALITY 97

VII.

THE REGENERATION OF GERMANY 117

PART II.

PRINCIPLES OF PSYCHOLOGY.

A. GENERAL ANALYSIS.

CHAPTER I.—THE PROVINCE OF PSYCHOLOGY.

Difficulties involved in the definition of psychology
as the science of mind, ... 161
as the science of the phenomena of consciousness . . 161
A terminus in the defining process marked by the latter term 162
Consciousness as all that of which one is aware at any given moment, or as the total series of such momentary states . 163
Twofold distinction required
(*a*) between the objective facts and the modification of the subject's existence which constitutes his perception of them (=distinction between outer and inner) . . 164
(*b*) the same distinction as holding good for the subject himself, between the state of consciousness and its reference to something other than itself . . 164
Question as to the primary character of this distinction 164
Resultant suggestion as to the peculiarity of the psychological treatment of facts 165
The material of psychology—
(*a*) the immediate experiences 165
(*b*) the process by which the distinction between subject and object is developed 165
Consequent distinction between psychology and epistemology 165
Definition of psychology 166

CHAPTER II.—PRESENTATIONISM, AND THE SUBJECT-REFERENCE.

General analysis of the inner life : three important conceptions
The doctrine of faculties 167
Psychical atomism 167
The conception of development 167

The first conception without significance for modern psychology 168
The second conception 168
(1) the doctrine of Herbart 168
(*a*) its metaphysical presuppositions . . . 168
(*b*) its explanation of mental process . . . 169
(2) The association psychology 171
its inadequate explanation
of the apprehension of relations 171
and of the special character of the emotions . . 171
Ward's criticism of 'presentationism' and counter-theory of subjective reference 172
The *rôle* assigned to Attention 172
The description of presentations as 'objects' . . . 173
Objective character of sense-presentations an after-growth 174
The distinction of feelings from presentations in primitive consciousness 175
Criticism of Ward's view 176
(*a*) whether feelings can be attended to, revived, and associated, that is, have the general characteristics of presentations 177
(*b*) whether facts justify the distinction of presentations (as objective) from attention and feeling (as subjective) . 179
Brentano's distinction of presentation from judgment and from feeling 180
The criterion of the subjective according to Kant . . 180
The distinction of subjective and objective not applicable, with any definite meaning, to the primitive consciousness 181
Inadequacy of the second main conception . . . 183

CHAPTER III.—MENTAL DEVELOPMENT.

The third main conception: that psychology has to trace the development of mind 185
Hegel's conception of the development of mind as tending to an end fixed from the outset 185
fundamentally identical with the Aristotelian doctrine . 185
The notion of End: two possible views—
(*a*) the transcendental: that the notion of end is absolutely valid, and efficient in the production of its own manifestations 186
(*b*) the critical or empirical: that the notion is of subjective

validity only and limited in application to our practical experience 188
The laws of change or development 188
(α) merely descriptive 189
(β) the doctrine of an ultimate end known beforehand not included in them 189
Mental life a development 190
Cause of development not predetermined . . . 190
The notion 'implicit' 190
What is specific in the notion of end not implied in development 191
Application to mental life of the notion of development thus freed from the implication of end or purpose . . 192

CHAPTER IV.—THE PRIMARY FACTORS OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

I. General character of the content 195
The inquiry as guided by the conception of development . 195
The difficulty—that the series of states of consciousness cannot be regarded either as making up a self or as existing without a self—a result of the false objectification of 'states of mind' 197
The distinguishable features in immediate experience . 198
Qualitative differences 198
Our names for these derived from mature experience . 199
Qualitative distinctness and variation of intensity possessed by both sensations and feelings . . . 199
Sensations distinguished
(α) by their origin being connected with stimulation of some part of the body 200
Inadequacy of this method 200
(β) by their function in the subsequent development of mind 200
II. Feeling 201
The distinction of feelings as subjective from sense-presentations as objective a derivative distinction . . 201
View of feeling as a secondary fact dependent on other components of consciousness 202
This dependence found in developed experience . . 202
But bodily pain—if not also bodily pleasure—primary in character 202
And the observed dependence not a simple relation . 202

Feelings (*i.e.*, pleasure-pain) independent in nature and only explicable by reference to some independent organic process 202
Insufficiency of Wundt's reasons for holding that pleasure-pain does not exhaust the qualitative characteristics of feeling as primary experience . . . 203
Theories of feeling : two main types—
(1) Pleasure and pain connected with their conditions in conscious experience : the teleological theory . . 205
The theory which connects pleasure with unimpeded exercise of attention, and pain with its restriction . 207
The theory which connects pleasure and pain with expansion and repression of the self . . . 208
(2) Pleasure and pain connected with physiological processes distinct from, though perhaps related to, those underlying sense-presentations . . . 208
the changes which determine feeling being probably diffused in character, perhaps due to the state of nutrition of the organs directly connected with sensation 209
The formal feelings 210
Connexion of feeling and action 211
III. Willing 212
The essential elements of a voluntary action, according to Wundt 212
Factors involved in the process of willing—
(*a*) the series of sensations involved in movement . . 216
(*b*) the movement not prefigured in the primitive sense-impulse 216
(*c*) regular series in the changes in our experience . . 217
Influence of the feelings on this mechanism . . 217
The inner effects of the process 218
in attention 218
in association 219
Gradual growth of the process of willing . . . 220
The 'feeling of activity' 221

B. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THINKING.

CHAPTER I.—THINKING AS A MENTAL FACULTY.

View of thought as a distinct faculty connected with the difference of notion, judgment, and reasoning, from the simpler materials of knowledge 222

Statement of this view by Hamilton and Mansel crossed by a different view 223
Mansel's 'psychological judgment' 224
Hamilton's statement that comparison is involved in the simplest act of mind 225
Similar view of the process of knowledge as being of the nature of analysis
in the Leibnizian School 227
and in Condillac 228
The objective reference of the logical products disregarded by both 229

CHAPTER II.—LOTZE'S DOCTRINE OF THINKING.

Lotze's doctrine: that thinking is a specific activity of the soul of a higher grade than that called forth in sensation or in perception 231
The specific functions of thinking—
(1) reference to the objective—exhibited at a stage of thinking prior to the notion proper 231
(2) as exhibited in the logical products—imposing form on the given material 232
Distinction of thinking from lower mental processes—
(1) activity of thinking described as the process of relating as contrasted with the isolated impressions and ideas . 232
(2) more general description of thought as the seeking for grounds or reasons as contrasted with the mechanical nexus of fact 232
Reconciliation of these diverse representations perhaps sought by consideration of the processes intermediate between mechanism and thought; namely
(*a*) mere identity of the perceiving subject . . . 234
(*b*) unity of the subject in association and reproduction . 235
(*c*) unity of the subject in the translation of sense-impressions into intuitions of space and time 235
Pre-logical processes of thought 237
(*a*) first grade: objectification 238
Objectivity and Universality 239
(*b*) second grade (relatively passive) 242
(α) Position 242
(β) Distinction 242
(Ground for the antithesis between these and the mechanism of sense and idea) . . . 243

(γ) Comparison 245
The 'first universal' and the concept . . . 245
Implication of subjective activity in Lotze's account of comparison 246
Criticism of the isolation of these processes from the mechanism of sense and idea 247

CHAPTER III.—THE KANTIAN DOCTRINE.

Kant's doctrine (in the main unpsychological): that the function of thought is the formation of the conception of 'object' 251
The question for psychology: whether the distinction between subjective and objective is due to a unique activity of mind 251
Reasons for a negative answer—
(*a*) the view not required for Kant's philosophical theory . 252
(*b*) its inconsistency with experience . . . 252
Two sides of Kant's doctrine ultimately identical—
(1) objective reference of thought 252
Kant's criticism of Leibniz 252
Criticism of Kant's view 253
complexity of the notion of object . . . 254
relation of this developed notion to the simpler modes of representation of objective reference . . 254
(2) relation of thought to self-consciousness . . . 255
Self-consciousness dependent upon thought, but itself neither simple nor primitive 255

CHAPTER IV.—SURVEY OF DEVELOPED THINKING.

Developed functions of thought shown in
(1) distinctions running through mature experience . . 257
thinking distinguished from presentations as (*a*) subjective activity, (*b*) purposive, (*c*) relating given material . 257
(2) the characteristic products of thinking: notion, judgment, reasoning 258
Lines of consideration to be followed 259

CHAPTER V.—ANALYSIS OF THINKING.

Reasoning in its various forms 260
The disjunctive syllogism 260
Primitive and developed forms of the disjunctive proposition 261
Complexity of the disjunctive judgment even in its least developed form 261
The hypothetical judgment 262
The connexion in idea of antecedent and consequent only relatively distinct from the more concrete representations of connexions in time and space . . . 263
The hypothetical judgment and reasoning . . . 263
The categorical judgment 264
Distinction of universal and individual judgments of fundamental importance from the psychological point of view 264
Attitude of mind involved in the universal judgment . 265
The simplest type of judgment without qualitative distinction 266
Reference in the universal judgment to objective fact . 266
The common distinction between idea and judgment . 267
View of this distinction as resting on a fundamental difference in the attitude of consciousness towards the content apprehended 268
The function of judging being the reference of a given content to objective reality . . . 269
The question as to the justification for assuming that objective reality is in any way a primitive element in experience 269
The cognate distinction between the parts of speech and the sentence 271
The apprehension of the objective 272
The various forms of the judgment based on this consciousness at its different stages 272
What combination of experiences in the inner life gives the primitive distinction between subjective and objective 273
The difference between sensuous perceptions and idea the simplest form of that distinction . . . 273
The rudimentary form of judgment thereby rendered possible indicated in the interpretation of any portion of sentient experience as a sign . . 275
this involving
(*a*) distinction of ideas and actual facts . . . 275
(*b*) a certain sense of continuity 275

The apprehension of the real world of perception as a common point of reference for the experiences of a number of percipient subjects . . . 275
involving
(*a*) contrast between immediate sense-perception and the reality apprehended thereby . . . 276
(*b*) recognition by the individual subject of other existences generically identical with his own . . 276
New aspect thus given to perceived reality, and larger significance acquired by the interpretation of signs 276
Origin of language 277
Psychological consequences of philological inquiry . 279
Psychological condition under which the use of verbal signs may have originated . . . 280
Objective reference not peculiar to thinking . . . 281
Limitations of Kant's view 281
(*a*) the separation of the formal from the material elements of nature impossible 282
(*b*) the representation of nature as a systematic whole a gradual development from the primitive distinction between the sentient subject and an order of fact distinct from his perceiving 282
Summary view of the nature of thinking . . . 282

CHAPTER VI.—PROBLEMS IN THE THEORY OF THINKING.

I. Inter-relation of the products of thinking . . . 283
The notion judgment and reasoning not in an ascending series of complexity, but different developments from a common origin 283
II. Objectivity and universality 284
Objectivity in the sense of independence of the individual act of thinking necessarily possessed by the universal . 285
Aspects involved in the recognition of the objective in perception—
(1) independence of the particular act of apprehending . 285
(2) generality (being common to all percipient minds) . 285
Objectivity of fact and objectivity of truth . . 285
Divergence of thinking from perception . . . 286
The transition as consisting in a re-arrangement of data, and dependent on the supply of concrete material . 286
(Distinction of self and not-self) 287

Appearance of thinking due to the separation of relations from related contents 288
The common opposition of perceiving and thinking in respect to Time 288
III. Thinking and self-consciousness 289
Development of thought dependent upon
(1) distinction of ideas from sense-perceptions . . 290
(2) unification of each series . . . 290
Thinking objective as regards its content, but pre-eminently subjective as a process 290
Relation of the reflective to the primitive form of self-consciousness 291
IV. The Categories 292
General attitude to Kant's analysis 292
The distinction between category and Idea not ultimate . 293
Thought as reflective consciousness 293
Abstraction from condition of time to be found in the simplest acts of thought 294
Analysis and synthesis as correlative aspects of thought 295
The category of Causality and the principle of the Adaptation of nature to the human mind . . . 296
Objections to the distinction between them drawn by Kant 296
The conception of the Uniformity of nature . . . 297
Its variable content illustrated by the difficulties in the logical treatment of reasoning 298
Uniformity not susceptible of discursive proof, because involved in the structure of our intelligence . . 299
These ultimate conditions characteristics of the concrete material of experience 300
V. Thought and Reality 300
Thinking not identical with the structure of reality, but one form in which reality is manifested . . . 300
The question as to the complete intelligibility of reality . 300
The Aristotelian doctrine of the individual . . 301
The distinction between the That and the What no ground for limiting the interpretative function of thought 301
VI. The notion of Development 302
The view of development as the unfolding of what is already contained (Aristotle and Hegel) . . 302
Contradiction in this view of development when applied to the practical sphere 303
Same difficulty on the theoretical side . . . 304
Special difficulty in the notion of development: the fusion of identity and difference 305

Question whether the same notion of development is applicable to all concrete forms of existence . 306
The conception of a pre-existing plan . . . 307
A type of agency other than the mechanism of nature not required for the notion of development . . . 307
VII. The Positivist view of Thought 307
The limitation of knowledge to co-existences and sequences (Comte) 308
a type of knowledge which is extremely abstract 308
and specially (if not exclusively) applicable to external perception 308
The method adopted in Comte's later work for dealing with the facts of the inner life . . . 309
VIII. Form and matter 310
General result: impossibility of severing form from matter 310
This general position a deduction from Kant's work . 310
No ultimate justification for Kant's antithesis between pure generality of thought and indeterminate particularity of perception 311

CHAPTER VII.—CONCLUSION.

Importance of the practical type among our primary notions . 312
Primitive thinking (or the natural order of thinking) . . 313
The complex individual its starting-point . . . 313
Agency conceived through muscular effort, and as purposive 313
The reverse order put forward by developed thinking . . 314
No incompatibility between the two representations . . 315
Gradual alteration in content of the primitive categories of practice through increase of perceptive experience and of analytic power 315
Experience itself the sole criterion of the worth of the notions by which it is interpreted 316

INDEX 319