

THE
PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY
IN EUROPE

BY

ROBERT FLINT

PROFESSOR OF MORAL PHILOSOPHY AND POLITICAL ECONOMY
UNIVERSITY OF ST ANDREWS

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