
Deleuze's Rethinking of the Notion of Sense

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Abstract

Drawing on Deleuze's early works of the 1960s, this article investigates the ways in which Deleuze challenges our traditional linguistic notion of sense and notion of truth. Using Frege's account of sense and truth, this article presents our common understanding of sense and truth as two separate dimensions of the proposition where sense subsists only in a formal relation to the other. It then goes on to examine the Kantian account, which makes sense the superior transcendental condition of possibility of truth. Although both accounts define sense as merely the *form of possibility* of truth, a huge divide cuts across a simple formal logic of sense and a transcendental logic: transcendental logic discovered a certain genetic productivity of sense, such that a proposition always has the kind of truth that it merits according to its sense. In pursuit of this genetic productivity of sense, Deleuze applies different models of explanation: a Nietzschean genealogical model of the genetic power of sense, and in *The Logic of Sense* a structural model combined with elements of Stoic philosophy. This article follows Deleuze in setting up a new and very complex notion of sense, which he radically distinguishes from what he terms 'signification', that is, an extrinsic, linguistic or logical, condition of possibility. Rather, sense has to be conceived as both the *effect* and the intrinsic *genetic element* of an extra-propositional sense-producing machine.

Keywords: Deleuze, Frege, Kant, Nietzsche, signification, sense, effect, event, incorporeals

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I. The Fregean Account of Sense and Truth

In his famous essay ‘On Sense and Reference’ (1892), Gottlob Frege introduces the following phraseology: ‘A proper name (word, sign, sign combination, expression) *expresses* its sense, *stands for* or *designates* its reference’ (Frege 1993: 27). He goes on to examine what the sense of a sign and what its reference is. According to him, the reference of a sign is the definite object that the sign designates, while the sense of a sign contains the ‘mode of presentation’ of the object. There can be different modes of presentation for the same object. As such there are also different signs for the same object, that is, signs with different senses but with the same reference. Frege’s most famous example is that of the ‘morning star’ and the ‘evening star’, which are two signs with different senses yet referring to the same planet Venus. Now Frege treats propositions in a similar way (28). Propositions have two dimensions, the dimension of sense and the dimension of reference.¹ The sense that a proposition expresses is the *thought* contained in the proposition. ‘Thought’ is understood as the ‘objective content, which is capable of being the common property of several thinkers’ (28), no matter what language they speak and regardless of the desires and beliefs they individually connect with this thought. The reference of a proposition is generally sought by inquiring after the reference of its components. Considering cases in which components of the proposition have no reference, Frege discovers that the lack of reference of a part of the proposition has no bearing upon the sense of the whole proposition but it leaves the question of its reference in abeyance. He cites the example: ‘Odysseus was set ashore at Ithaca while sound asleep’ (28). Poetry or fiction provides plenty of these examples, that is, propositions that contain proper names without a reference. However, as Frege states, it is only in works of art that we are satisfied with the dimension of sense and do not seek to advance to the question of reference, but in other cases we press on: ‘It is the striving for truth that drives us always to advance from the sense to the reference’ (29). The dimension of reference is the locus where the question of the truth and falsity of a proposition, that is, its truth-value, is decided. This is why Frege says that the reference of a proposition, if it has one, ‘is either the True or the False’ (29). By making the truth-value constitutive for the reference of a proposition, Frege stipulates a strangely detached relation between sense and the question of truth and falsity. As Frege concludes: the truth-value of a sentence ‘must remain unchanged when a part of the sentence is replaced

by an expression having the same reference' (30). That is to say, although the sense of a proposition might be altered by the substitution of one expression by another, the truth-value of the whole proposition remains the same, provided that the substituted expression has the same reference as the one it replaces. In other words, truth and falsity remain to some extent unaffected by sense. On the other hand, a proposition with no sense cannot be true, and in this respect the requirement of sense is a necessary condition for a proposition to be true. Sense is a 'condition of truth' insofar as it contains a number of logical conditions, which define a grammatically well-formed expression. But sense is by no means a sufficient ground for truth: there are propositions that make perfect sense from the point of view of their form of expression, but that are nonetheless false. An example would be the proposition 'A decahedron is a regular geometrical figure.' It is impossible to find a referent for the whole proposition (decahedrons are nonregular), but still the proposition contains a thought that makes sense and could mistakenly be regarded as true. Thus, in grasping the sense of a proposition, one cannot be assured of its truth-value. The question of truth and falsity is decided only with regard to the dimension of reference, independent from the dimension of sense.

Deleuze's objection to these conceptions of sense and truth and their relation with one another is twofold: having discovered sense as the condition of truth, the relation of the condition to the conditioned is on the one hand too loose and on the other hand too intimate. Let us unfold Deleuze's position step by step.

The relation between the condition and the conditioned is too loose because both terms of the relation remain more or less independent from one another. While sense is indifferent to what it conditions, the conditioned itself, that is, truth, remains unaffected by the condition, which is supposed to render it possible. Sense is only the *formal condition of possibility* of truth (Deleuze 1990: 18/29).² That is to say, it can only determine the logical conditions under which a proposition would be true. It cannot exclude the case of false propositions that make sense. As Deleuze says: sense retains 'an extension larger than that which is conditioned, sense does not ground truth without also allowing the possibility of error' (Deleuze 1994: 153/199). Thus Frege's conception of sense cannot materially account for the truth-value of a proposition. In order to determine the truth-value of a proposition, we have to turn to the dimension of reference. There is in fact no way to pass from sense to reference, that is, the truth-value. One can certainly deduce

from one proposition further propositions by means of grammatical transformation rules or semantic implications of concepts, distributed within the original proposition. For instance, given the proposition that a person x is a widower, we can conclude from this that x is a man, that x was married, and that the wife of x has died. However, in inferring these further propositions we remain on the same level, the level of signification, and never cross over to the level of denotation or truth. In effect, 'signification can never exercise its role of last foundation, since it presupposes an irreducible denotation' (Deleuze 1990: 18/29). Hence, although sense is discovered as a condition of truth, it amounts only to a formal condition of possibility for a proposition to be true.

The second part of Deleuze's objection actually follows from the first. In making sense the condition of truth, an essential step was made to establish a ground for a 'critique' of truth. However, the critical project is doomed to fail not only because the ground remains larger than the grounded (first objection), but also because the ground is thought *in the image* of the grounded (see Deleuze 1990: 105/128, 123/149). The condition *resembles* the conditioned from the point of view of its logical form. That is to say, within the conditioned or those propositions that we hold to be true (for example, scientific propositions describing objective states of affairs) we already find inscribed the logical form of identity of the concept as well as logical forms of the relations of concepts with one another. We then extract the logical forms of the propositional facts and stipulate them as the formal conditions of possibility for a proposition being true in relation to an objective state of affairs.

According to Deleuze, we are trapped in a circle: 'One is perpetually referred from the conditioned to the condition, and also from the condition to the conditioned' (Deleuze 1990: 19/30). This is to say that the condition is nothing but the *form of possibility* of the conditioned, and the form of possibility is fabricated retroactively in the image of the conditioned. Deleuze states that

by whatever manner one defines form, it is an odd procedure since it involves rising from the conditioned to the condition, in order to think of the condition as the simple possibility of the conditioned. Here one rises to a foundation, but that which is founded remains what it was, independently of the operation which founded it and unaffected by it. (Deleuze 1990: 18–19/30)

It should be noted, however, that Deleuze is not rejecting a whole tradition of linguistic analysis and philosophy of language. He is rather trying to complement it by adding a new dimension to the proposition,

and calling this new dimension 'sense', whilst referring to Frege's dimension of sense as the dimension of signification. Deleuze maintains that the dimension of signification is not sufficient to ground truth, and the dimension of denotation or reference can ground truth only in rare cases, namely when the proposition is assumed to be ready-made and isolated from the context of living thought. As Deleuze says, 'there is only a single case where the designated stands alone and remains external to sense: precisely the case of those singular propositions arbitrarily detached from their context and employed as examples' (Deleuze 1994: 154/200). However, as soon as we place a proposition in the context of living thought, that is, in relation to a problem, we will see how sense is engendered in the particular determination of the problem and its conditions and how this sense already implicates a truth, which cannot be detached from the genesis of sense.

Before we turn to Deleuze's account of sense and truth, we will first look at the Kantian definition of sense and Deleuze's rejoinder that the Kantian critique merely replaces the formal possibility with transcendental possibility. According to Deleuze, 'Kant invented two new forms of possibility, the transcendental and the moral' (Deleuze 1990: 18/30). In the following section, we will thus present the Kantian account of sense and truth and then apply Deleuze's criticism to the case of Kant.

II. Kant's Transcendental Logic of Sense

As it is well known, Kant draws the 'clue to the discovery of all pure concepts of the understanding' (Kant 1998: A76/B102) from the Aristotelian table of logical forms of judgement.³ He recognises the importance of the logical forms of judgement as the formal condition of possibility for a proposition to be true. Thus Kant claims that 'the formal aspect of all truth consists in agreement with the laws of the understanding' (A294/B350). This is to say that certain laws of the understanding, for example the principle of non-contradiction, must hold for all cognitions posed in propositional form. In this way, general logic provides a necessary formal criterion of truth.⁴ However, Kant goes much further than general logic can ever go. He explains that *general logic* only considers the logical form of our cognitions and their relation with one another, hence it abstracts from all content, that is, from any relation of our cognitions to the object (A55/B79). *Transcendental logic*, by contrast, has to do with pure concepts of the understanding insofar as they are related a priori to objects. Therefore transcendental logic

provides a further criterion of truth: namely the requirement that pure concepts can be constructed in the formal intuition of space and time and thus be related to an object; for without the relation to a possible object of experience, a cognition will completely lose its content and hence all truth.⁵

Kant's invention of the transcendental has a revolutionary effect: truth is no longer simply a matter of adequation with an external state of affairs, as it is suggested from the point of view of an empirical consciousness. To put it differently, the Kantian invention of the transcendental contradicts the simple assumption that the locus of truth for a proposition is the dimension of denotation or reference. The idea that (1) a proposition is true, if and only if what is said or expressed applies to the designated object or state of affairs it refers to, and that (2) a successful reference makes a proposition true, while an unsuccessful reference makes a proposition false, grounds a conception of truth which presupposes the existence of a reality exterior to sense. Kant's revolutionary move is to make truth dependent on sense, which is to say that a true cognition necessarily points beyond itself to an object or state of affairs that can no longer be posited in reality exterior to sense. In fact, Kant renders sense a superior condition of truth, but he does so only at a high cost: namely that of *interiorising* the relation between cognitions and the manner in which they relate to objects or states of affairs. This means that for Kant the outside world is not truly exterior: it remains relative to the a priori conditions of the transcendental subject. In other words, for something to have a sense, that is, to be an object for us, it has to be related to the transcendental conditions that constitute sense. There is nothing beyond this world constituted by the conditions of transcendental consciousness, that is, nothing that we can understand or make sense of. Anything that falls outside the transcendental scheme or structure, that is, that which cannot be constructed in space and time, and ordered according to a priori conceptual rules, is not a possible object for us. One could say that Kant's transcendental philosophy is a *logic of sense*: he stipulates the transcendental conditions for something to have a sense, that is, to be an object for us.

Therefore, it follows that from the point of view of transcendental logic the proposition 'A decahedron is a regular geometrical figure' is nonsensical, that is, without any sense. Since it is impossible to construct a regular decahedron in space, the proposition cannot be related to a possible object of experience, hence it has no content, that is, no sense. It is important to note that while the proposition can be said to have a sense from the point of view of general logic, transcendental logic

dispels this proposition altogether. The same happens with a proposition like the following: 'The width of Navidson's house inside exceeds the width of the house as measured from the outside by a quarter of an inch.'⁶ From the point of view of formal logic, there is nothing wrong with this proposition. However, we are dealing with a transcendental impossibility: a house the interior of which is greater than its exterior is an impossible object. Not only can it not be constructed in space, it also contradicts the a priori condition of community. The category of community provides that the coordinated parts in an aggregate determine each other reciprocally. In the case of the house, in which the inside exceeds the outside, there is no reciprocal determination of parts. Thus the proposition cannot be related to a possible object of experience and therefore has no content, no sense. The same kind of transcendental impossibility applies in cases when something appears without any preceding cause, for instance, the sudden apparition of an angel. Such a thing would also be no possible object of experience. We could easily extend the list of examples; what is important to note, however, is that in the Kantian transcendental logic nothing escapes the transcendental conditions of sense. We cannot talk reasonably about an object that contradicts the a priori conditions of experience. To put it positively: whatever proposition we hold to be true, the referent of this proposition has to satisfy the transcendental conditions of sense. In this way, sense is made a superior condition of truth.

To sum up, Kant raises himself above the ordinary dimension of the proposition, the dimension of reference as the locus of truth, and introduces the dimension of sense as a superior condition. In *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze praises transcendental philosophy for discovering sense as the form of a genetic productivity (Deleuze 1990: 105/128): according to the transcendental principle, 'a proposition always has the truth, the part and the kind of truth which it merits, and which belongs to it according to its sense' (96/117). However, Deleuze shows by the example of Husserl how the transcendental account of a genetic power of sense fails: although transcendental philosophy considers a genesis of sense, the notion of sense remains muddled because it is confused with the dimensions of the proposition, from which it has to be distinguished (98/120).

It is not only the dimension of signification that is given ready-made, whenever sense is conceived as a general predicate; and it is not only the dimension of denotation that is given in the alleged relation between sense and any determinable or individualizable object whatsoever. It is the entire

dimension of manifestation, in the position of the transcendental subject, which retains the form of the person, of personal consciousness, and of subjective identity, and which is satisfied with creating the transcendental out of the characteristics of the empirical. (Deleuze 1990: 98/119)

Thus, Deleuze's criticism that we have already encountered still obtains and can be applied to Kant: Kant seeks to provide a transcendental foundation for a proposition to be true, but the transcendental conditions that he stipulates are fabricated *in the image of* the conditioned. In other words, the Kantian approach imports the characteristics of the conditioned into the account of the condition, that is, the transcendental is modelled upon subjective and psychological facts, or how things seem to our empirical consciousness. As Deleuze says at various places, Kant simply traces the transcendental from the empirical (Deleuze 1994: 135/176–7, 144/187). Consequently, the Kantian transcendental conditions produce exactly the propositions of knowledge that they are supposed to ground, because they have been abstracted from the form of the propositions of our empirical consciousness in the first place. According to Deleuze, there is a fatal *circularity* involved to the extent that experience is both presupposed as a fact and legitimised retroactively as the only possible form of experience.

Deleuze further argues that the Kantian transcendental conditions of possibility are 'too large' in relation to what they condition; they represent 'too broad a mesh in relation to what they claim to capture or regulate' (Deleuze 1983: 50/56).⁷ They are only conditions of *possible* experience, not of *real* experience (Deleuze 1994: 154/200). The crucial point here is that Kant only provides an account of extrinsic conditioning. This is to say that the Kantian transcendental account depends upon the conformity of the manifold of sense data with the transcendental conditions. The diversity of the world is thus pre-judged and reduced to the objects conditioned by a given field of representation. Deleuze objects that the Kantian attempt to foundation only secures our traditional ways of thinking in accordance with the logic of representation.

By contrast, Deleuze demands that the relation between the condition and the conditioned be one of *intrinsic genesis*, and not of extrinsic conditioning (Deleuze 1994: 154/200). Furthermore, he demands that we must not think of the condition in the image of the conditioned (Deleuze 1990: 105/128, 123/149). It must be rather *something heterogeneous and unconditioned* that is capable of providing a *real*

foundation, that is, not as a transcendental form of possibility but as an *internal principle of genesis*.

In the following section we will discuss Deleuze's own notion of sense, which he sharply distinguishes from the Kantian conception of sense as the necessary relation to a possible object of experience. For Deleuze, sense is produced in a sub-representative domain, instead of being imposed by a superior, linguistic or logical, order of representation. In order to keep these two senses apart, Deleuze introduces a distinction between sense and signification: 'signification refers only to concepts and the manner in which they relate to the objects conditioned by a given field of representation; whereas sense is like the Idea which is developed in the sub-representative determinations' (Deleuze 1994: 155/201). Following Deleuze, this sub-representative domain can be understood as both being (the 'being of the sensible', 140/182) and thought ('the unconscious of pure thought', 155/202). In *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze will explain the way in which terrible movements, that is, psychic or spatio-temporal dynamisms working within the sub-representative field, give rise to a double genesis: the genesis of the act of thinking within thought and the ontological genesis of species, individuated things and their relations.

III. Deleuze's Use of a Nietzschean Model of the Genetic Power of Sense

Drawing on structuralism and also on Nietzsche's idea of sense production, Deleuze develops his own conception of an intrinsic genesis of sense by making sense the *effect* of the determination of problems. As a starting point we will take up some of Deleuze's thoughts on Nietzsche.

Deleuze summarises Nietzsche's account of sense in his paper 'Conclusions on the Will to Power and the Eternal Return', which he gave at a conference on Nietzsche at the Abbey of Royaumont in 1964:

A thing never has only one sense. Each thing has several senses that express the forces and the becoming of forces at work in it. Still more to the point, there is no 'thing', but only interpretations hidden in one another, like masks layered on the other . . . Nietzsche invents a new conception and new methods of interpretation: . . . by replacing the simple relation between sign and sense with a complex of senses, such that every interpretation is already the interpretation of an interpretation *ad infinitum*. (Deleuze 2004a: 118/164)

For Nietzsche, things are *signs* or *symptoms* of a state of forces or 'will to power'. On Deleuze's reading, it is important not to understand the

will to power as a will that wants power and struggles for recognition. Rather, the will to power designates the differential relationship of forces, which differ not only with regard to their quantity but also with regard to their quality. The quality of a force, that is, its being either an active or reactive type of force, is determined through the difference in quantity with related forces. Following Deleuze's analysis, reactive forces are forces of adaptation, of conservation and obedience, while active forces are those that go to the limit of what they can do and are willing to undergo transformations. Active forces are spontaneous, expansive and creative inasmuch as they give new interpretations and directions. In sum, the will to power expresses the dynamic and differential relations of active and reactive forces that are in a state of combat. Whenever some forces take hold of a thing, they bestow a fresh interpretation to it, that is, determine a new meaning or purpose 'through which any previous "meaning" or "purpose" are necessarily obscured or even obliterated' (Nietzsche 1968a: 513). According to Nietzsche, the entire history of a thing can be read as a 'continuous sign-chain of ever new interpretations and adaptations' (513) whereby each interpretation is the result of a combat of forces. What is important for Deleuze here is that these combats never result in a neutralisation or equalisation of the differences of forces and their internal heterogeneity. On the contrary, what returns is only a *disequilibrium* of forces. There is no final end, no ultimate goal to such processes of differentiation and combat: it is an infinite becoming. Therefore, the sense of a thing is always a *plurality* of senses that expresses the various processes of transformation, resistance or appropriation inflicted on the thing. As Nietzsche says: 'The form is fluid, but the "meaning" [*Sinn*] is even more so' (514).

Thus the meaning or sense of a thing varies as a function of the forces, or the will to power that appropriate it. Moreover, truth for Nietzsche is not an invariant or perspective-independent value: it has to be related to the forces that lurk beneath the surface and determine the sense of a thing or a concept. In his notes from 1887, which are contained in the posthumously published collection of notes entitled *The Will to Power*, Nietzsche says: "'Truth" is therefore not something there, that might be found or discovered – but something that must be created and that gives a name to a process, or rather to a will to overcome that has in itself no end' (Nietzsche 1968b: 298).

Deleuze praises Nietzsche for bringing the conceptions of sense and truth in relation to forces. He agrees that sense is the product of a complex process and not something already given, inherent in a thing

or concept. In his essay 'On Nietzsche and the Image of Thought' from 1968 Deleuze characterises sense as

an 'effect', an effect produced, whose laws of production must be uncovered. . . . This is one of structuralism's essential ideas, unifying authors as different as Lévi-Strauss, Lacan, Foucault, and Althusser: the idea of sense as an effect produced by a specific machinery, a physical, optic, sonorous effect, etc. (Deleuze 2004b: 137)

Deleuze concedes that his conception of sense has affinities with that of the structuralist tradition, but nevertheless it is not the same. For Deleuze, the machinery that produces sense is not a given static structure but rather a dynamic differentiation of forces such as Nietzsche's will to power. However, Deleuze finally goes beyond Nietzsche, because Nietzsche's genealogical method is still too much lodged within history, that is, the effectuation of historical, socio-political forces. He will add the dimension of virtuality and determine processes of a static genesis or pure becoming that arise in the virtual. A detailed elaboration of the virtual can be found in *The Logic of Sense*, but already in *Difference and Repetition*, Deleuze defines sense as the product of virtual Ideas or problems. As he explains there, the Idea or problem is constituted of sub-representational differential elements which have no sense themselves but which produce sense through their reciprocal relations. Thus sense is constituted in the problem or the Idea, and truth is engendered as the limit object of the production of sense. 'Limit' must be understood in the mathematical sense of the early geometrical phase of differential calculus: the limit as something that is continuously approached but never reached. In this way truth is a limit concept, or a limit object of an infinite genetic series of interpretations (see Deleuze 1994: 154/200). In summary, Deleuze says in *Difference and Repetition*:

What is essential is that there occurs at the heart of problems a genesis of truth, a production of the true in thought. Problems are the differential elements in thought, the genetic element in the true. We can therefore substitute for the simple point of view of conditioning a point of view of effective genesis. (Deleuze 1994: 162/210)

For Deleuze, the 'problem' is thus a differential structure endowed with an intrinsic genetic power to generate sense. Although the problem can be incarnated in propositional form and in the empirical world, it belongs to an extra-propositional and sub-representative realm. This means that the problem and its conditions remain often unconscious and

have to be made explicit. For it is only in relation to a certain problem that a question becomes possible and a proposition acquires sense.

In order to better understand the way in which sense is produced through the determination of a problem and its conditions and how truth is engendered as the limit of the process of sense production, let us consider an example, the example of Kant. The underlying problem in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason* can be specified and rendered explicit in propositional form as the question 'What can I know?'. Kant examines our faculties of cognition, defines for each faculty a proper domain for its exercise, and determines the rules of their collaboration in a united common sense. Limits are drawn and illegitimate uses are denounced. However, in his book on Nietzsche, Deleuze challenges the Kantian critique, claiming that 'there has never been a more conciliatory or respectful total critique' (Deleuze 1983: 89/102). Kant merely called the claims to knowledge and to morality into question, but he never questioned the values of true knowledge and true morality themselves. In other words, the higher interests of reason (true knowledge, true morality, true religion) remain sacred. However, following Deleuze (and Nietzsche), the ideals of truth and reason to which Kant devoted himself only conceal the work of established forces, in particular, the State with its territorial claims and imposition of law and order, the Church with its moral authority, and all the prevalent interests and values. 'Kant claims to be beholden to the requirements of truth and reason; but beneath these requirements of reason are forces that aren't so reasonable at all: the state, religion, all the current values' (Deleuze 2001: 69).

Thus Kant's immanent critique of reason by reason itself does not satisfy the demands of a radical immanent critique that abandons transcendent and extrinsic ends of reason. Instead of liberating us from metaphysical convictions, the belief in a transcendent realm of truth, essences or Ideas, Kant simply replaces the fetters by subjugating us to reason and its interests. We are told that we are free when we obey the demands of reason, since it is we who are giving the orders. In this way, reason persuades us to continue being docile (see Deleuze 1983: 92/106). Following Deleuze's and Nietzsche's analysis, Kant successfully installed the priest and legislator within us (93/106) and thus the power of the State and the Church remain unchallenged.

As we can see, Deleuze considers the Kantian question 'What can I know?' in relation to its implicit conditions that betray a conservative and moral motivation of the Kantian project. In Nietzschean terms, these implicit conditions are forces, such as the State and the Church, which are at work in an unimpeded manner and constitute the underlying

extra-propositional and sub-representative problem, determining its sense and pointing the way to its solution. Deleuze, however, coins the term of the *dogmatic image of thought*, which replaces the terminology of forces and their effects with that of conditions and postulates producing illusions. It is important to note that the term 'image of thought' does not merely designate a deceptive image or illusion, that is, an ideology that covers up true thought. Rather, thought itself is produced by the image of thought, which acts like a specific machinery *coding* thoughts in accordance with some normative form. As Claire Parnet explains in *Dialogues*, co-authored with Deleuze:

'Images' here doesn't refer to ideology but to a whole organisation which effectively trains thought to operate according to the norms of an established order or power, and moreover, installs in it an apparatus of power, sets it up as an apparatus of power itself. The Ratio as tribunal, as universal state, as republic of spirits (the more you are subjected the more you are legislators, for you are only subject . . . to pure reason). (Deleuze and Parnet 1987: 23/31)

Thus for Deleuze, the image of thought has to be considered as a productive machine or apparatus of power that is installed by established forces. It is true that in his early work of the 1960s Deleuze has not yet found the concepts of 'machine', 'coding' and 'apparatus of power'—these concepts will be developed later during the collaboration with Félix Guattari—but he does speak of the image of thought as an established order (that is, the order of representation) and analyses it in terms of a series of postulates that determine what it means to think and what the ultimate goals of thought are. These postulates need not operate visibly; more often they remain unconscious forming implicit subjective presuppositions, which are essentially prephilosophical or non-philosophical in nature. This means that they are already at work when we start to think, although we may not always be aware of it.

In *Difference and Repetition* in particular, Deleuze analyses how the dogmatic image of thought has influenced philosophers in the way they determine their problems and anticipate their solutions. Kant as well fell prey to the dogmatic image of thought, which postulates an affinity between thought and truth and also presupposes the logic of representation which entails the identity of concepts and their logical relations in judgements. In short, when Kant laid out his problem concerning the possibility of knowledge and its limits, he did so under the presupposition of the dogmatic image of thought. The postulates of the dogmatic image of thought were already implicitly at work as the underlying extra-propositional and sub-representative problematic

structure, generating the sense of the Kantian question ‘What can I know?’. Hence the general solution that Kant developed, that is, his account of objective knowledge, necessarily satisfies this conditional problematic structure. As Deleuze says at several places: ‘*We always have as much truth as we deserve in accordance with the sense of what we say*’ (Deleuze 1994: 154/200).

The example of Kant illustrates how the truth that he seeks (such as true knowledge) is dependent on the manner in which the problem and its conditions are laid out. It is important to note that the conditions are part and parcel of the problem, that is, they belong to it intrinsically. Whenever we ignore the conditions, under which a question, such as the Kantian question ‘What can I know?’, is raised, we ‘forget’ the underlying extra-propositional and sub-representative problem that generates sense, and we are left with an abstract general solution.

Once we ‘forget’ the problem, we have before us no more than an abstract general solution, and since there is no longer anything to support that generality, there is nothing to prevent the solution from fragmenting into the particular propositions which constitute its cases. (Deleuze 1994: 162/211)⁸

For Deleuze, the art of posing problems requires bringing to light the conditions that work implicitly at a subconscious level, generate the sense of what we think or say and determine the ultimate goal of thought. In the case of Kant we can see how the conditions and postulates of the dogmatic image of thought produce a transcendental logic of representation, that is, a logic that relates the dimension of sense to the a priori mental structure of the transcendental subject.

IV. Deleuze’s Structural Model of a Genesis of Sense

It might have been noticed that throughout this article we have not yet discussed the Deleuzian concept of the event.⁹ This is so because it plays a minor role in *Difference and Repetition* and is fully developed only in *The Logic of Sense*. Nevertheless already in *Difference and Repetition* the concept of event is mentioned and it appears that we have to understand Deleuzian Ideas-problems in terms of events.¹⁰ Following Deleuze’s analysis, ‘problems are of the order of events’ (Deleuze 1994: 188/244) and he distinguishes ‘real events on the level of the engendered solutions, and ideal events embedded in the conditions of the problem’ (189/244). Parallel to this distinction between real (or actual) and ideal (or virtual) events, Deleuze introduces in *The Logic of Sense* two

different readings of time: Chronos and Aion. Chronos is defined as the time of the present which encompasses past and future as horizons relative to the present. According to Deleuze, Chronos designates the empirical or physical aspect of time, insofar as Chronos captures the physical changes in things, their interactions and mixtures. Aion, on the contrary, is defined as a 'virtual time' that slips away from the present by extending indefinitely into the past and the future. Aion is the time of pure events. This distinction between Chronos and Aion is crucial because it allows Deleuze to assign the phenomenon of sense an autonomous status, that is, a kind of independence from the combat of historical and empirical forces. It allows Deleuze to surpass Nietzsche's genealogical method, which is still a form of historical explanation, and to assess sense from a new perspective that regards sense as a surface-effect. In *The Logic of Sense* Deleuze advocates a 'geographical method' for looking at things and he distinguishes three dimensions: the depths of states of life or bodily states of affairs, the heights of 'lofty' Ideas (Platonic or Kantian), and the surface of sense or incorporeal events (see Deleuze 1990: 132/157–8). It is under the impact of Stoic philosophy that Deleuze ties together the logical or linguistic notion of sense and the metaphysical notion of incorporeal events. He will thus define sense as an event. Events are never fully exhausted in any actual space and time (Chronos); instead, they extend indefinitely into the past and the future and therefore belong to Aion or virtual time. To unpack this further let us briefly look at the Stoic physics and the central role it plays for their logic of sense.

Unlike Plato, Aristotle and their schools, the Stoics believed that bodies are the only things that exist and are capable of acting and of being acted upon. However, it is important to note that the Stoics held a very broad notion of 'body': for instance, they argued that bodies also comprise souls on the grounds that causal interaction is possible only between bodies, and since there is causal interaction between soul and body, the soul must be a body.¹¹ On the same grounds the Stoics also took knowledge, thoughts or virtues (such as wisdom or justice) as bodies.

Apart from this bodily realm of existents, the Stoics distinguished a second realm of non-existent somethings, or incorporeals, which, although they cannot be said to be or exist (infinitive *einai*), nevertheless subsist (infinitive *hyphistasthai*). In other words, incorporeals are not beings but rather a way of being, an *effect* resulting from the interaction of bodies. According to Stoic physics, bodies act as causes to one another, thereby giving rise, not to a new property as we might assume,

but to an incorporeal effect. As the sceptic Sextus Empiricus explains in his work *Against the Professors*:

The Stoics say that every cause is a body which becomes the cause to a body of something incorporeal. For instance the scalpel, a body, becomes the cause to the flesh, a body, of the incorporeal predicate ‘being cut’. And again, the fire, a body, becomes the cause to the wood, a body, of the incorporeal predicate ‘being burnt’. (Long and Sedley 1987: 333)

In this quotation we can already see how Stoic physics lays the ground for a new logic that has to deal with incorporeals or incorporeal predicates. In our days we would probably call it a logic of facts or events. However, as the French scholar Émile Bréhier notes in his 1928 book *La Théorie des incorporels dans l’ancien Stoïcisme*:

In one sense, they [the Stoics] are as far as possible from a conception such as that of Hume or Stuart Mill who reduce the universe to facts or events. In another sense, however, they make possible such a conception by radically separating that which no one before them had – two planes of being: on the one hand, profound and real being, force; on the other hand, the plane of facts which play themselves out at the surface of being, and which constitute a multiplicity of incorporeal beings, without bounds and without end. (Bréhier 1962: 13; my translation)¹²

That which distinguishes the Stoic logic of facts or events from modern and contemporary ideas that conceive objective reality, that is, the universe and every single object as a synthesis of facts, is the Stoic insistence on the relation of attribution or predication of facts to real, corporeal bodies. Reality, or to put it more precisely, existence is corporeal: it comprises the realm of bodies that act and are acted upon. Only the effect that one body brings about in another is incorporeal. For this reason, the Stoics invented the realm of incorporeal predicates or attributes to bodies. As Bréhier argues, the incorporeal attribute that arises as an effect of the causal interaction between bodies coincides with the logical predicate of the proposition: the Stoics used the same word *κατηγορημα* (*katagorema*) for both and regarded the verb as its proper expression (Bréhier 1962: 21, 19). Like certain Megarian philosophers, the Stoics interpreted propositions containing the copula *is* and a predicate adjective not as a relation between classes of objects (an object and its property) but as an act constituted by the penetration of bodies (20).¹³ For instance, the proposition ‘the iron is hot’ finds its proper expression in the proposition ‘the iron heats’. The red-hot iron is the incorporeal effect of the mixture of two bodies, the fire and the iron.

Thus Stoic logic is concerned with incorporeal predicates or attributes, that which is expressed in a proposition or said by a word. As Sextus Empiricus reports, the Stoics held the opinion

that three things are linked together, 'the signified' [*semainomenon*], 'the signifier', and 'the name-bearer'. The signifier is an utterance, for instance 'Dion'; the signified is the actual state of affairs [*pragma*] revealed by an utterance, and which we apprehend as it subsists in accordance with our thought, whereas it is not understood by those whose language is different although they hear the utterance; the name-bearer is the external object, for instance, Dion himself. Of these, two are bodies—the utterance and the name-bearer; but one is incorporeal [*asomaton*]—the state of affairs signified [*semainomenon pragma*] and sayable [*lekton*], which is true or false. (Long and Sedley 1987: 195–6)

At first sight, the Stoic distinction between 'the signified', 'the signifier' and 'the name-bearer' seems to parallel the modern Fregean distinction between 'sense', 'sign' or 'proposition', and 'reference'. However, following Frege, the 'sense' of a proposition is an objective *thought* which is understood and shared by a community of speakers, no matter what beliefs and desires they connect with it and what language they speak. Clearly, Frege presupposes that a thought can be translated into different languages, thereby keeping the same objective content. The crucial point, following Frege, is that sense is completely mind-dependent. On the contrary, the Stoics believe that as an incorporeal attribute expressed by a word or proposition, sense is something added to the object or state of affairs that makes it appear differently, that is, in another aspect or mode. In other words, there is an irreducible distinction between an object or state of affairs (*pragma*) and a state of affairs *signified* (*semainomenon pragma*), which lies precisely in the fact of being signified by a word or proposition added to the object as an incorporeal attribute. This incorporeal attribute they also call sayable (*lekton*). Sayables are neither physical bodies nor properties of bodies, neither are they thoughts, since for the Stoics thoughts are also corporeal bodies. Sayables are inexistent, yet they subsist in between bodies and language as incorporeal attributes. In Bréhier's reading, Stoic logic has to be considered as deeply non-Fregean. Dealing with incorporeal attributes, Stoic logic refers to a new ontological plane, which is the realm of sense or events.

Bréhier's monograph on Stoicism is of great importance for our purposes here, since Deleuze's conception of sense discussed in *The Logic of Sense* evolves out of the encounter with Stoic philosophy not

least through that monograph (Butler 2005: 129). Sense, for Deleuze, has to be conceived as sense-effects or sense-events that subsist as real, virtual phenomena. They are outside being, or in Deleuze's words, they are an 'impassive extra-Being which is sterile, inefficacious, and on the surface of things: *the ideational or the incorporeal can no longer be anything other than an "effect"*' (Deleuze 1990: 7/16–17). Sense-events or sense-effects are sterile and inefficacious, because as inexistent incorporeals they cannot act or be acted upon. Hence, Deleuze, like the Stoics, draws a qualitative distinction between the realm of causal interaction between bodies or forces, and the realm of impassive incorporeal events or sense. He also distinguishes sense from the realm of language. Being an incorporeal double of the proposition, sense is independent of both affirmation and negation and is also unaffected by the modes of the proposition. This means that sense is entirely neutral.¹⁴ However, to say that sense is an incorporeal or neutral 'double' of the proposition should not be misunderstood: for Deleuze, the process of doubling up the proposition which express it does not imply 'an evanescent and disembodied resemblance' (125/151) to the state of affairs which are denoted by the proposition. Instead, Deleuze insists both that sense is inseparable from its status of a neutral double and that it is 'something unconditioned' (123–4/149), capable of giving rise to an unconditioned and heterogeneous synthesis. The problem, which Deleuze tries to solve here, is to reconcile the sterility and neutrality of sense with the power of genesis (see Deleuze 1990: 32/45, 95–6/116–17). On the one hand, he wants to maintain the *impassibility* of sense-events which allows him to dissociate the sense-event from its temporal actualisations (100/122). This is to say that sense-events essentially belong to Aion, a virtual time, which is distinct from Chronos, the time of physical changes, interactions and mixtures between bodies, whence it follows that sense-events are characterised by a certain autonomy or independence from historical, political forces or bodily states of affairs. On the other hand, Deleuze does not want to abandon the idea of a *genetic power* of sense, both 'in relation to the proposition itself, insofar as the expressed sense must engender the other dimensions of the proposition (signification, manifestation, and denotation)' (95–6/116) and also in relation to the process of determination of bodies and their mixtures.

How can Deleuze combine the impassibility of sense with the power of genesis? In trying to respond to this problem Deleuze introduces as a first step 'a double causality: that of bodies, states of affairs, and mixtures, but also that of the quasi-cause which represents the state

of organization or disorganization of the incorporeal surface' (Deleuze 1990: 108/131). The relation of quasi-causation, which is supposed to hold only between incorporeal sense-events on the surface of things, gives rise to a so-called 'static genesis'. Deleuze distinguishes a logical static genesis and an ontological static genesis.¹⁵ In the logical static genesis, he aims to show that sense generates the proposition and its three dimensions: *reference* to or *denotation* of individuals or states of affairs; *manifestation* of the person and the person's beliefs, feelings, opinions; and finally *signification* as the form of possibility of true propositions. For this reason, he ties sense together with the 'problem', defined as 'an ideational objectivity or ... a structure constitutive of sense' (120/145), as he has previously done in *Difference and Repetition*. However, he now confers all the characteristics of sense that we have encountered as elements of Stoic incorporeals upon the 'problem'. The problem 'is not propositional' (122/147); it 'is neutral with respect to every mode of the proposition' (123/148), it is 'independent of both the negative and the affirmative' (123/148), 'it inheres, subsists, or persists in propositions and blends with extra-being' (123/148). Above all, 'the synthesis of the problem with its own conditions constitutes something ideational and unconditioned' (122/147). Following Deleuze, 'sense is thus expressed as the problem to which propositions correspond insofar as they indicate particular responses, signify instances of a general solution, and manifest subjective acts of resolution' (121/146). The problem is thus defined as 'expressed sense' (122/148) and as a genetic element that generates the logical proposition and its dimensions.

The ontological static genesis is much more complicated, because Deleuze has to deal with a seemingly outright contradiction: 'How can we maintain both that sense produces even the states of affairs in which it is embodied, and that it is itself produced by these states of affairs or the actions and passions of bodies (an immaculate conception)?' (Deleuze 1990: 124/149). Deleuze suggests that it is 'in a different way that sense is produced by bodies' (124/149). Sense is no longer a surface effect of the interaction of *individuated* bodies (such as a knife and the flesh of a body, or a piece of iron and fire, and so on). Instead bodies are taken now 'in their undifferentiated depth and in their measureless pulsation' (124/149–50). We are dealing now with an impersonal and pre-individual 'transcendental field' to use Sartre's term, but this field is not to be determined as that of a consciousness.¹⁶ Rather, it is an intensive milieu or potential prior to the determination of bodies, persons or consciousness. This original intensive depth or transcendental field organises surfaces and produces sense, and sense in its turn 'brings

about individuation and all that ensues in a process of determination of bodies and their mixtures' (126/151) by means of its relation to the quasi-cause. It seems that the quasi-cause is the crucial element by means of which sense inherits its genetic power. We therefore have to examine in greater detail what the relation of quasi-causality between incorporeal sense-events or sense-effects means.

In fact, already the Stoics considered a kind of relation between incorporeal event-effects in their doctrine of destiny. For the Stoics, all things happen by destiny, and they describe destiny as an inescapable ordering and sequence of causes.¹⁷ This sequence of causes is not to be understood as a series in which each term is the effect of the previous term and the cause of the following, but as a connection of cause to cause. Destiny is thus the plurality of causes and their rational ordering in the world. It is now compelling to think of the plurality of event-effects also as related to one another: although the Stoics have split the chain of cause and effect by qualitatively distinguishing corporeal causes and impassive incorporeal effects, there certainly is a causal chain A–B–C, in the sense that the body A is a cause *to* the body C of which the effect B has come to be predicable as an incorporeal attribute. Given these two premises, the ordered series of corporeal causes on the one hand and the peculiar causal nexus between causes and effects on the other hand, there seems to follow a certain relation of event-effects as well. This is precisely how Bréhier argues: the Stoic concept of destiny concerns a relation between corporeal beings and not between events. However, 'because the events are the effects of these causes, it is certain that they are therefore related to one another. No matter how heterogeneous they are, they all depend on destiny which is unique' (Bréhier 1962: 35; my translation). Deleuze picks up on this, declaring that there is 'a bond of effects' (Deleuze 1990: 6/15), the laws of which 'perhaps express in each case the relative unity or mixture of bodies on which they depend for their real causes' (6/15).¹⁸ Deleuze further interprets this relation between event-effects by means of the modern concept of structure and comes to speak of it as a surface organisation of at least two heterogeneous series that resonate with one another in their distance. The resonance of series is effectuated by a paradoxical element, intervening as nonsense or as an aleatory point, and which Deleuze also calls the 'quasi-cause' (95/116). Without indulging too much in details, we can already see that Deleuze envisages here a new type of causation, that is, a structural causation among sense-events or sense-effects, which are made to resonate by a paradoxical element (nonsense), which traverses the series.¹⁹ The paradoxical element is something that

evades precise determination, but it is not nothing since it functions by bringing together the series or elements of a structure and making them resonate through their distance. It can even be an empty space, as for instance the vacuity in a flower arrangement according to the Japanese art of *ikebana*, which miraculously constitutes the whole structure and bestows it with a living breath. As Deleuze says, 'the void is itself the paradoxical element, the surface nonsense, or the always displaced aleatory point whence the event bursts forth as sense' (137/162). Deleuze conceives of sense and nonsense no longer simply as opposites, but as complementary elements, which are related to one another in the structural organisation of an incorporeal surface, endowed with the genetic power to produce spatio-temporal actualisations of sense-events. 'Nonsense and sense have done away with their relation of dynamic opposition in order to enter into the co-presence of a static genesis' (141/166).

In summary, Deleuze envisages in *The Logic of Sense* a structural quasi-causality that obtains only among sense-events and makes them communicate with one another: 'each one communicates with the other through the positive characters of its distance and by the affirmative character of the disjunction [the disjunction of divergent series]' (Deleuze 1990: 175/205). He thus looks at the genetic productivity of sense in a new way: sense is not only the effect of the interaction of corporeal, historical or political forces or states of affairs. It also partakes in the structural organisation of an incorporeal surface and is attached to a quasi-causality that is independent of the causal interaction between bodies (see Deleuze 1990: 169/198). As a consequence, Deleuze's reading of Nietzsche's will to power undergoes a fundamental change: while he had previously described the will to power as a relation of (historical or political) forces, he now interprets it as an 'affirmative synthetic disjunction' (174/204) of incorporeal sense-events or sense-effects following very special laws of structure. Nietzsche's inner world of the will to power thus becomes 'a Dionysian sense-producing machine, in which nonsense and sense are no longer found in simple opposition, but are rather co-present to one another within a new discourse' (107/130).

V. Conclusion

In following the general lines of Deleuze's work of the 1960s, we have seen how in various stages a new Deleuzian concept of sense takes shape. Deleuze insists that sense is a fourth dimension of the

proposition that shall not be confused with signification, denotation or manifestation (Deleuze 1990: 19/30). Traditionally, sense has been conceived as signification, that is, as a condition of the possibility of truth. Thus formal logic regards sense as a necessary formal condition for a proposition to be true. But sense and truth remain in a strangely detached manner, insofar as the sense of a proposition tells us nothing about its truth-value. Transcendental logic, on the other hand, defines sense as a superior condition of possibility of truth. This means that a proposition always has the truth that it merits in accordance with the condition of sense, that is, its possibility of being constructed in space and time and related to an object of experience. However, Deleuze objects that transcendental philosophy is not capable of assuring a real genesis, since the condition of sense is firstly fabricated in the image of the conditioned, and secondly gives rise only to a genesis of possible experience, which is not a true genesis but rather a purely extrinsic, conceptual conditioning. In a first approach to this problem of genesis, Deleuze aligns with Nietzsche in thinking sense as a plurality of senses that vary in accordance with the forces, or the will to power, that take hold of a thing. Sense is thus the effect of a differential relation of historical, social or political forces. In *The Logic of Sense*, however, Deleuze goes beyond Nietzsche in defining sense as a surface effect that obeys laws of structure that are no longer bound to the depths of existent forces. As we have seen, Deleuze discovers a ‘double causality’ which not only comprises the causality of bodies and forces, but also a ‘quasi-causation’ between incorporeal sense-events. The Stoic notion of incorporeal sense-events combines a physical notion of sense with a linguistic notion. It is here where Deleuze finally finds something heterogeneous and unconditioned that merges neither with the state of affairs that a proposition denotes, neither with the desires or beliefs of the person who manifests him- or herself in the proposition, nor with the concepts and the logical and semantic relations that compose the dimension of signification of a proposition. Incorporeal sense-events are this heterogeneous and unconditioned extra-being that subsists outside bodily states of affairs and language, and that gives rise to an internal ‘static genesis’, which not only produces the proposition and its dimensions (signification, denotation and manifestation), but also the individuation of bodies and consciousness. In sum, Deleuze’s own logic of sense implies a notion of sense which is irreducible to a logico-linguistic phenomenon or condition of possibility. Following Deleuze, sense has to be understood as a real and incorporeal something that partakes in a surface organisation or machine fuelled by a disjunctive

synthesis, or in other words, 'a system of echoes, of resumptions and resonances' (170/199) between series of sense-events.

Notes

1. In the third series of *The Logic of Sense*, Deleuze presents a more detailed account, according to which a proposition has three dimensions: denotation (or reference), manifestation and signification. However, for the point we want to make here, Frege's distinction between sense and reference suffices.
2. Note on references to books by Deleuze: in the body of the text the reference to the page number is given as follows: the first page number refers to the English translation, the second number to the original French edition.
3. Note on references to Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*: the first page number refers to edition A, that is, the first German edition from 1781, the second number to edition B, that is, the second revised German edition from 1787.
4. See Kant 1998: A 59–60/B 84: 'these criteria [of truth] concern only the form of truth, i.e., of thinking in general, and are to that extent entirely correct but not sufficient. For although a cognition may be in complete accord with logical form, i.e., not contradict itself, yet it can still always contradict the object. The merely logical criterion of truth, namely the agreement of a cognition with the general and formal laws of understanding and reason, is therefore certainly the *conditio sine qua non* and thus the negative condition of all truth; further, however, logic cannot go, and the error that concerns not form but content cannot be discovered by any touchstone of logic.'
5. See Kant 1998: A62/B87; see also A277/B333, B149.
6. The example is taken from the novel *House of Leaves*, written by Mark Z. Danielewski (2000).
7. See also Deleuze 1994: 68/94.
8. In his early book *Empiricism and Subjectivity*, using the example of Hume, Deleuze demonstrates the way in which we miss Hume's problem when we simply consider and criticise his so-called theory of atomism and theory of associationism. We then have turned Hume's philosophical theory into an abstract general solution and fragmented it into particular theories that are disqualified from the beginning as 'shifty projects'. Deleuze counters that a philosophical theory is 'an elaborately developed question' and 'to criticize the question means showing under what conditions the question is possible and correctly raised ... the question is always about the necessary development of the implications of a problem and about giving sense to philosophy as a theory. In philosophy, the question and the critique of the question are one; or, if you wish, there is no critique of solutions, there are only critiques of problems' (Deleuze 1991: 105–6/118–19).
9. The concept of the event is truly one of Deleuze's most important concepts. In his 1988 interview with Raymond Bellour and François Ewald, 'On Philosophy', Deleuze says: 'I've tried in all my books to discover the nature of events; it's a philosophical concept, the only one capable of ousting the verb "to be" and attributes' (Deleuze 1995: 141/194).
10. See Deleuze 1994: 187/242–3: 'Ideas are by no means essences. In so far as they are the objects of Ideas, problems belong on the side of events, affections, or accidents rather than on that of theorematized essences.'
11. Thus Nemesius, a Platonist, reports on Cleanthes, head of the Stoic school in Athens: '(1) He [Cleanthes] also says: no incorporeal interacts with a body, and

- no body with an incorporeal, but one body interacts with another body. (2) Now the soul interacts with the body when it is sick and being cut, and the body with the soul; thus when the soul feels shame and fear the body turns red and pale respectively. (3) Therefore the soul is a body' (Long and Sedley 1987: 272).
12. Part of this citation is quoted by Deleuze in *The Logic of Sense* (1990: 5/14).
 13. The Megarian school of philosophy, founded by Euclid of Megara (c. 450–380 BC), had a great influence on Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, who was said to have studied under Euclid's pupils and successors. In particular, Megarian logic, developed by the Megarian philosophers (or 'Dialecticians' as they were also called) Diodorus and Philo, can be seen as a precursor to Stoic logic.
 14. Deleuze discusses the paradox of the neutrality of sense in *The Logic of Sense* (1990: 32–5/46–9). It should be noted that Deleuze, although he refers to the notion of sense (that is, sense as an ineffectual, neutral double of the proposition) as a *paradox*, it does not follow that he strictly denies this definition of sense. He rather modifies and enhances the definition of a neutralised double by insisting that sense is not to be conceived as 'an evanescent and disembodied resemblance, an image without flesh' (125/151) and that sense should not be 'deprived of its generative power' (Deleuze 1994: 156/203). He obviously wants to distance himself from Husserl's notion of sense, sense as *noema* (see Deleuze 1990: 122/147).
 15. We cannot follow here Deleuze's account of the static genesis with its two different stages in all the details (see, for example, Deleuze 1990: 115–16/140–1). A detailed explanation would require the introduction of further Deleuzian concepts, such as 'differentials' and 'singularities', as well as a discussion of his reading of Leibniz. Instead, we will have to content ourselves with giving the idea of Deleuze's static genesis and examine its novelty in comparison to the concept of genesis that we have previously encountered in relation to Nietzsche.
 16. Deleuze is referring to Sartre's 1937 essay 'The Transcendence of the Ego'; see Deleuze 1990: 98–9/120, 102/124.
 17. See Long and Sedley 1987: 336–7 and their translations of citations by Aetius, Gellius and Cicero.
 18. See also Deleuze 1990: 169/198: 'Destiny is primarily the unity and the link of physical causes among themselves. Incorporeal effects are obviously subject to destiny, to the extent that they are the effect of these causes.'
 19. See also Deleuze 1990: 174/204: the communication of events 'consists of the erection of a paradoxical instance, an aleatory point with two uneven faces, which traverses the divergent series as divergent and causes them to resonate through their distance and in their distance'.

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