

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT INTERNATIONALISM

**ITS ACTION IN EUROPE AND WORLDWIDE
FROM POST WORLD WAR II
UNTIL THE 1990s**

**VOLUME II: THE DEVELOPMENT (1945-1979)
THE ROLE OF PARTIES, MOVEMENTS, PEOPLE**



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Adenauer's Ideas on Europe and Western European Integration Policy within the Context of Private and Political Networks

Michael GEHLER

University of Hildesheim, Germany

Preliminary Remarks

For no other chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany is the state of contemporary history research so excellently verified and documented as for Konrad Adenauer. Not only are there his memoirs¹, editions of his letters², chats over tea with journalists³, and discussions about the CDU/CSU parliamentary faction⁴, there are also comprehensive biographies⁵, monographs on specific question areas, and extensive specialised literature as well as specific essays on Adenauer's policy

¹ K. Adenauer, *Erinnerungen*, Vol. 1, 1945-1953, Stuttgart, DVA, 1965; Vol. 2, 1953-1955, Stuttgart, DVA, 1966; Vol. 3, 1955-1959, Stuttgart, DVA, 1967, Vol. 4, 1959-1963, Fragmente, Stuttgart, DVA, 1968.

² H.P. Mensing (ed.), *Adenauer. Briefe 1945-1947; 1947-1949; 1949-1951; 1951-1953; 1953-1955; 1955-1957; 1957-1959; 1959-1961; 1961-1963; 1963-1967*, II Bde, Rhöndorfer Ausgabe/Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Berlin, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich, Siedler, 1983-2006.

³ H. J. Küsters, (ed.), *Adenauer. Teegespräche*, Vol. 1, 1950-1954, Berlin, Siedler, 1984; Bd. 2, 1955-1958, Berlin, Siedler, 1986; Vol. 3, 1959-1961; Berlin, Siedler, 1988; Vol. 4, 1961-1963, Rhöndorfer Ausgabe/Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus Reihe 2, Berlin, Siedler, 1992.

⁴ G. Buchstab, *Adenauer: "Es mußte alles neu gemacht werden" Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstandes 1950-1953*, Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 8, Stuttgart, DVA, 2nd edition, 1986; Id. (ed.), *Adenauer: "Wir haben wirklich etwas geschaffen" Die Protokolle des CDU-Bundesvorstandes 1953-1957*, Forschungen und Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 16, Düsseldorf, Droste, 1990.

⁵ H.-P. Schwarz, *Adenauer. Der Aufstieg: 1876-1952*, Stuttgart, DVA, 1986; Id., *Der Staatsmann: 1952-1967*, Stuttgart, DVA, 1991; H. Köhler, *Adenauer. Eine politische Biografie*, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin, Propyläen, 1994.

Biography, Mayor of Cologne, and His Early Behaviour towards Issues of Europe (1876-1949)

Adenauer's life was filled with biographical, personal, and family breaks, aside from the political breaches of 1918-1919, 1933, 1945, and 1949. Konrad Adenauer was born on the 5th of January 1876, the son of a master baker who went on to become a civil servant in Cologne. Moulded by the Catholic middle class, his early development was shaped by francophilia and a spontaneous devoutness that was connected with the rejection of the Protestant, Prussian world during the period of Kaiser Wilhelm. One of his principles in life was to make something of himself through his own initiative. After completing his studies in jurisprudence, Adenauer became a junior attorney and, starting in 1906, as a city councilman in Cologne. He sided with the centre party (Zentrum).

Adenauer experienced the "collapse" of three German states: the ends of the empire of Kaiser Wilhelm in 1918, the Weimar Republic in 1933, and the so-called "Third Reich" in 1945. Establishing order, tranquility, and stability were the essential goals of his policy.

From 1917 to 1933, he served as the mayor of Cologne and was a member and president of the Prussian State Parliament. During the Weimar period, Adenauer was already among the most prominent German politicians. The role of mayor and his advocacy for European matters such as sister cities and cooperation at the communal level are notable features. Pierre Pflimlin (Strasbourg), Willy Brandt (Berlin), or Jacques Chirac (Paris) can serve as examples of this. Adenauer was a member of the Paneuropean Union that was founded by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi in 1922. In the 1920s, he launched the expansion of Cologne into the "Metropolis of the West". He developed a special feeling for and understanding of French security interests as evidenced by his pleading for the creation of a German state on the Rhine, with a view towards the Rhineland issue, in order to prevent an annexation of the areas on the left bank of the river after the First World War. Denounced by the Nazis as a "separatist" and removed from his office in 1933, he defended himself in court against all accusations. As a result of the opportunism of many Germans with respect to national socialism, Adenauer had doubts about their political maturity. This mistrust, which he felt towards people in general, continued to follow him later on in his role as chancellor, with respect to his countrymen. He spent part of 1934 in prison, and in the wake of the assassination attempt on Hitler on the 20th of July 1944, he was once again arrested and detained for several months, although he managed to flee and survive.

rope is a fact [...] The part of Germany that is not occupied by Russia is an integrated part of Western Europe⁸.

Within this context, Adenauer spoke not for a separation of the Rhineland and Westphalia, but rather for their economic interweaving with France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. With England, he even viewed a "union of Western European states" as a desirable goal. For Germany itself, he was not thinking of a centralised united state, but rather a federal state⁹. Half a year later, on the 16th of March 1946, he emphasised in his private correspondence with Wilhelm Sollmann that "the danger is great. Asia is on the banks of the Elbe"¹⁰.

But in spite of all of the recorded findings and existing preferences, just how open the international situation was, and the question of Germany's position in 1945 and 1946, became clear for Adenauer when he was wondering if a "perpetual neutrality" according to the Swiss model should not be offered. In December 1946, he still believed that "the majority of the German people would be in agreement if we were neutralised under international law [sic!] like Switzerland"¹¹. Those were considerations which his biographer Schwarz described as "astonishing ideas".

On top of that, a document from the 17th of February 1947 refers to Adenauer's openness that was present at the time in issues of Germany's foreign policy orientation. In a letter to Dr. Otto Elsaesser of the Europa-Verlag publishing house in Freiburg/Breisgau, with whom he was not on very close terms, he emphasised:

Whether with the foreign policy situation at the moment it is correct to touch upon the question of the neutralisation of Germany is not yet completely clear to me... It cannot be overlooked that a neutral state must defend its own neutrality, possibly with armed force. If its neutrality is merely guaranteed by other states, if it is not put in a position itself to stand up for its own neutrality, then this consists of a genuine neutralisation. But I do not believe that with the Allies, the idea of giving Germany the power to defend its neutrality currently has any prospects for success. And I could also understand that. With the Allies, the fear would be entertained that Germany had not yet provided sufficient evidence of a genuine love of peace in order to be able to give it the independence that lies within neutralisation. As a goal of German policy, I would thoroughly welcome a complete neutralisation of that kind. Even if the goal is not immediately attainable, it should not

⁸ H.-P. Schwarz, *Adenauer*, p. 466.

⁹ *Ibidem*.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, p. 467.

¹¹ *Ibidem*, p. 552.

- anticommunism,
- gaining trust,
- influence and equal rights,
- the dismantling of questionable bodies of traditions, and
- the prospects for economic prosperity through the creation of a social market economy.

But from where did his early ideas about Switzerland stem from, or his favourable attitude with regards to neutrality (from which Adenauer then strayed, starting in 1947-1948)? There was early contact in Switzerland with a man by the name of Johann Jakob Kindt-Kiefer, who had invited discussion between French and German representatives, which was to take place in a “closed circle” in Switzerland. The subject of the meetings was to be “current Franco-German relations”¹⁷. A “closer connection” was to be established “for the purpose of a mutual exchange of ideas about the programmatic goals of the Christian Democratic Union in the individual countries of Europe”. Also in mind was the coordination of views and desires with regard to the Marshall Plan¹⁸.

Johann Jakob Kindt, a Protestant¹⁹, “visionary”, and “convinced European”²⁰, grew up in a worker’s dwelling in Dillingen in the Saarland. He studied in Berlin, where he received a doctorate in the arts in 1936, and in Paris, where he earned a doctorate in law in 1939. After his studies, he lived as an exile in Switzerland. During his period as a student at the Sorbonne, he got to know Georges Bidault²¹, who would later go on to become France’s foreign minister (1944-1946, 1947-1948, and 1953-1954), prime minister (1949-1950), and defence minister (1951-1952), as well as chairman of the *Mouvement Républicain Populaire* (the Popular Republican Movement or MRP, 1949-1952). As a result of his marriage to the daughter of Hans Kiefer, a Swiss manufacturer of window frames and roller shutters, Johann Jakob Kindt carried a hyphenated name. He had the corresponding material possibilities “to support Catholic emigration in Switzerland and in the end to pursue his own comprehensive journalistic tendencies”. The active man had published pamphlets on social, philosophical, and religious questions and concerns, such as “*Eidgenossenschaft im neuen Europa*”, “*Katholische*

¹⁷ ACDP, Victor Koutzine und Johann Jakob Kindt-Kiefer an Bruno Dörpinghaus, 13th of September 1947, I-009-017.

¹⁸ ACDP, Vertrauliche Aktennotiz für Herrn Dr. Josef Müller, 1. März 1948, I-009-017.

¹⁹ R. Jungnickel, *Kabale am Rhein. Der Kanzler und sein Monsignore*, Weimar, Wartburg, 1994, pp. 11-12, p. 93.

²⁰ P. Chenaux, *Une Europe Vaticane?*, pp. 128-129.

²¹ R. Jungnickel, *Kabale am Rhein*, pp. 11-12, 65.

ical differences that had arisen between Kindt-Kiefer and Wirth while in exile led to personal tensions, which culminated in mutual suspicions, accusations, and denunciations²⁸. In early 1947, a break occurred between the pair²⁹. As a result, Kindt-Kiefer initiated contacts in France for Adenauer, who at the time was the chairman of the CDU in the British occupation zone of Germany and president of the Parliamentary Council. Arnulf Baring writes of Kindt-Kiefer being "temporarily influential with Adenauer"³⁰. A personal relationship developed between the two that can be described as friendly. Adenauer appreciated the hospitality that Kindt-Kiefer had provided him in Switzerland, which, within that context, had provided him with valuable contacts³¹. Henning Köhler emphasises that the former courted the latter and also made use of his connections for the financing of vacation trips for his children, even though he knew of the obscure business practices involved³². By the time differences of opinion and conflicts were arising between Wirth and Adenauer after 1945, which dated back to intraparty and political differences in the 1920s, Kindt-Kiefer had already broken off his connection with the former chancellor³³. Through the summer of 1948, the Allied Military Government had refused Kindt-Kiefer entry into Germany as a result of his close connection with Wirth, the "man of Rapallo" and because of his "energetic, public condemnation of the Morgenthau Plan and the Allies' collective guilt thesis" in May 1945³⁴.

Through Kindt-Kiefer, Adenauer also came into contact with the second inspiring force of the Geneva Circle, Victor Koutzine³⁵. He was

²⁸ "Schreiben Bernd Gisevius an den Hauptvorstand des 'Demokratischen Deutschland', 2. Juni 1945", "Schreiben der Arbeitsgemeinschaft 'Demokratisches Deutschland' in der Schweiz, Johann Kindt-Kiefer an Bernd Gisevius, 5. Juni 1945, 2. Juni 1945", in Archiv für Zeitgeschichte des Instituts für Geschichte der ETH Zürich, Bestand Bernd Gisevius, Korrespondenz III 10.

²⁹ BAR, J. J. Kindt-Kiefer an Bundesrat Philipp Etter, 27. Juni 1959, E 4320 (B) 1973/17, C. 2.8349; U. Hörster-Philipp, *Joseph Wirth*, pp. 653-656.

³⁰ A. Baring, *Außenpolitik in Adenauers Kanzlerdemokratie. Bonns Beitrag zur Europäischen Verteidigungsgemeinschaft*, München, Wien, Zürich, Schöningh, 1969, p. 6.

³¹ "Brief Adenauers an Kindt-Kiefer, 27. März 1948", in *Konrad Adenauer. Briefe über Deutschland 1945-1955*, selected and introduced by Hans Peter Mensing, Berlin, Siedler, 1999, pp. 75-76.

³² H. Köhler, *Adenauer*, p. 458.

³³ H. Küppers, *Wirth*, pp. 316, 319-323.

³⁴ BAR, J. J. Kindt-Kiefer an Bundesrat Philipp Etter, 27. Juni 1959, E 4320 (B) 1973/17, C. 2.8349.

³⁵ "Tagung des Kontaktausschusses in Genf, 13th February 1950", in AKVI, BPL, Konvolut BMfUnterricht 1946-50, Mappe NEI.

with the "Four Power" conferences or foreign minister conferences⁴⁴. A first informal meeting was organised on the 16th and 17th of November 1947 in St. Niklausen on Lake Lucerne. Although German representatives in the form of former exiles in Switzerland (Kindt-Kiefer, Rudolf von Moers and Alois Stegerwald) were in fact present, the participation of a German delegation from the CDU/CSU did not come about, with the exception of Bruno Dörpinghaus, as a result of difficulties in procuring visas and receiving permissions to travel abroad. The French representatives included the MRP MP Pierre Pflimlin and Jean Morin, a member of Bidault's cabinet. The second meeting took place on the 21st and 22nd of March 1948, with the first formal participation of the German Christian Democrats. In addition to Konrad Adenauer, who then went on to meet Bidault for the first time in the autumn of 1948⁴⁵, the German delegates included Heinrich von Brentano, Jakob Kaiser, Josef Müller (known as "Ochsensepp", or "Joe the Ox") and Fritz Schäffer⁴⁶. Adenauer "exceptionally" welcomed the meetings "in view of the entire Western European situation and furthermore in view of the fact that it is precisely the Christian politicians who have to lead in this situation"⁴⁷.

The motives for the decisions and contents of the meetings are easy to guess:

First, Switzerland as a neutral state was suitable as a preferred meeting place for the secret services and for confidential encounters, not only during clashes, but also after the Second World War.

Second, because of its central location, Geneva was favourably situated geographically⁴⁸, and as the seat of the League of Nations, which had in the meantime been liquidated, it nevertheless still provided a certain international flair. Kindt-Kiefer and Koutzine organised the group lunches and evening meetings in the Hotel La Résidence, which accommodated the international VIPs during the League of Nations

21.) 31. Januar 1955; 22.) 10. Oktober 1955 in Gehler, M./Kaiser, W., "Nouvelles Équipes Internationales und Genfer Kreis", pp. 198-206.

⁴⁴ "Koutzine an Bidault, 15. Mai 1949", in AN, 457 AP 59, Mappe Notes Koutzine.

⁴⁵ H.-P. Schwarz, *Adenauer. Der Aufstieg*, pp. 558-560, here p. 560; P. Chenaux, *Une Europe vaticane?*, p. 130.

⁴⁶ B. Dörpinghaus, "Die Genfer Sitzungen", pp. 541-544.

⁴⁷ Doc. No. 939: "Adenauer an führende christliche Politiker in Belgien und den Niederlanden, Schreiben an Căuwelaert u.a., 26. August 1948", in H. P. Mensing (ed.), *Adenauer Briefe 1947-1949*, Adenauer Rhöndorfer Ausgabe, Stiftung Bundeskanzler-Adenauer-Haus, Berlin, Siedler, 1984, pp. 302-303.

⁴⁸ R. Papini, *L'Internationale Démocrate-Chrétienne*, p. 74.

ties. In addition, coalition partners had to be found for cooperation against the communist threat, but also for efforts to solve the Saarland⁵⁵ problem.

It was with great care that the different currents in the CDU were registered on the part of France, as was the uncertainty with regard to the political future of Germany. There existed *eighth* a lively interest in a Western-oriented Christian Democrat movement in Western Germany with a united front⁵⁶. The role of Adenauer's opponents, both within and outside the party, such as Kurt Schumacher, Heinrich Brüning, Jakob Kaiser, Reinhold Meier, or Joseph Wirth, were closely observed⁵⁷.

Ninth, Christian Democrats from other European countries also viewed the rapprochement with the "arch enemy" as the *conditio sine qua non* for a successful defence against the Soviet threat. Belgian and Dutch representatives supported the normalisation of Western German-French relations as something to be taken for granted.

Tenth, the fear of the Bolshevik threat was a uniting factor. The formation of the Geneva Circle was also the result of the beginning of the Cold War. This made the integration of the western part of Germany into a categorical imperative. Starting in 1949, Koutzine attempted to swear "everyone together" at the level of the leading party representatives in the direction of the "cooperation of Western Europe with Western Germany"⁵⁸. The guiding principle of Adenauer's Germany policy of "no agreement with the Soviet Union", which he increasingly perceived as a terrible Asian enemy power⁵⁹, completely corresponded with the program of the Geneva Circle.

At the Geneva meeting in March 1948, Jean Morin, a member of the cabinet of the prime minister and later foreign minister Bidault, had already intimated that the French government had engaged a commission of industrialists to examine to what extent an interweaving of

⁵⁵ B. Dörpinghaus, "Die Genfer Sitzungen", p. 544, pp. 561-562.

⁵⁶ Archives Nationales (AN), Paris/Archives Privées Bidault, "Compte rendu d'une rencontre à Geneve, Conseil de la République, 1. July 1948", 457 AP 59, Mappe Notes Koutzine.

⁵⁷ AN, Note 'Jakob Kaiser et la Politique d'Adenauer', Koutzine an Monsieur le Président, 22. Januar 1950, 457 AP 59, Mappe Notes Koutzine; Bericht 'Après la victoire d'Adenauer', 20. September 1953, *ibidem*.

⁵⁸ ACDP, Koutzine an Dörpinghaus, 5. November 1949, I-009-017.

⁵⁹ B. Dörpinghaus, "Die Genfer Sitzungen", p. 557; G. Niedhart, N. Altmann, "Zwischen Beurteilung und Verurteilung: Die Sowjetunion im Urteil Konrad Adenauers", in J. Foschepoth (ed.), *Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2nd edition, 1990, pp. 99-117, here pp. 100-101, 102, 110-111.

“bridge builders”. According to Müller, Bichet was to have received a letter from Adenauer, stating that no one could now represent the CDU/CSU who had not been expressly empowered by him to do so⁶⁵. Koutzine and his circle were incessantly occupied, demonstrably through the 1950s, with fears about what would happen with Western Germany if *der Alte* [“the old man”] from Rhöndorf (the place where Adenauer lived) would ever leave the political stage⁶⁶. To a degree, these were not unsubstantial – these fears contributed to the relevance and cohesion of the circle in the view of the non-German participants. From a meeting memo of the vice-mayor of Vienna, Lois Weinberger, it emerges that in the battles for the direction of foreign policy among the German Christian Democrats, Adenauer won the upper hand over Kaiser, and the latter was pushed back to the second ranks:

The German minister of intra-German relations, Jakob Kaiser, who had prepared himself in Zurich for possible participation in the Geneva Conference, did not come to Geneva. The other German representatives apparently did not desire his involvement because he has taken a radical position in the matter of the Saarland, which was especially handled in Geneva and was also discussed in advance between German and French representatives, which in the view of Adenauer and his friends could disturb the urgently necessary understanding between France and Germany⁶⁷.

From another source, it emerges that Adenauer saw a future danger not in German communists, but rather in a new German nationalism that could connect itself with the East⁶⁸. In the face of this idea of a latent threat, he searched for understanding and support. Both of these were granted to him without any problem in Geneva. In October 1948⁶⁹ and in

⁶⁵ J. Müller, *Bis zur letzten Konsequenz. Ein Leben für Frieden und Freiheit*, München, Süddeutscher Verlag, 1975, pp. 360-362, here p. 361.

⁶⁶ AN, Archives Privées Bidault, Note ‘Je suis allé en Allemagne la semaine dernière’, 16. Mai 1955, 457 AP 59, Mappe Notes Koutzine.

⁶⁷ *Tagung des Kontaktausschusses in Genf*, 13. Februar 1950, in AKVI, BPL, Konvolut BMfUnterricht 1946-50, Mappe NEI; E. Kosthorst, *Jakob Kaiser. Bundesminister für gesamtdeutsche Fragen 1949-1957*, Stuttgart, Berlin, Köln, Mainz, Kohlhammer, 1972, pp. 312-354, here p. 320-323.

⁶⁸ ACDP, Il y a une économie intégrée dans l’économie soviétique en Allemagne orientale et une économie intégrée dans l’Allemagne occidentale. C’est un état de fait auquel on ne peut rien changer. Pour Adenauer, ce ne sont pas les communistes allemands qui pourront constituer un danger pour demain, mais un nationalisme allemand tourné vers l’Est. Protokoll Genfer Kreis, 29. Juni 1948, I-009-017.

⁶⁹ P. Chenaux, “Les Démocrates-Chrétiens”, p. 96; W. Kaiser, “Begegnungen”, p. 150.

the acceptance of the Federal Republic into the Council of Europe, since the federal government needed the certainty of not being rejected in the event of its application to join⁷⁵.

As early as 1949, the "Geneva Circle" had already reached its high point with the prominent figures of its political participants. Because of COMISCO (the Committee of the International Socialist Conference) activities – regular meetings of the socialist parties of Western Europe with a functioning coordination office – the circle seemed to continue to have a justification for its existence, but on the part of the leading integrationist Christian Democrats, their intention was primarily to profile the "Christian Democrat international" that existed at the time, the *Nouvelles Équipes Internationales* (NEI), which up to that point had not formed any "absolute union" of the parties. In July 1950, the Secretary General of the *Österreichische Volkspartei* (the Austrian People's Party, or ÖVP), Felix Hurdes, repeatedly criticised the lack of Christian Democrat activities and the fact that "something could only be undertaken if the opponents (in particular the Socialists) had already undertaken something". He found it to be regrettable that "at this point, we are restrained by the activity of COMISCO, even though there is constantly pressure for activity from some with foresight, and as a result of the founding of the NEI in 1946 [sic!], we were ahead of the Socialists by a nose in and of ourselves" He called "most emphatically for intense cooperation between the Christian Democrat parties at the international level" Hurdes received support from the Luxembourgian representative Lambert Schaus and from the German Heinrich von Brentano⁷⁶.

By the summer of 1949, after the inauguration of the Council of Europe, the further destiny of the Geneva information circle was already under discussion. Kindt-Kiefer outlined two tendencies: *firstly*, the wish for the continuation of current activities through improvement and intensification, and *secondly* the creation of an "organisme officiel et visible"⁷⁷.

In the wake of the normalisation of bilateral and international relations in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the Geneva Circle began to lose significance. For Adenauer, though, changing its working methods was not up for discussion. He was in any case in favour of the creation of a permanent office in Geneva. In the end, he wanted to know whether the

⁷⁵ ACDP, Gesprächsprotokoll, 21st November 1949, I-009-017.

⁷⁶ "Niederschrift über die 'Präsidentenbesprechung' anlässlich der Sitzung des Exekutiv-Komitees, 3. Juli 1950 in Brüssel", in Archiv des Karl von Vogelsang Instituts (AKvVI), Bundesparteileitung (BPL), Konvolut BMf Unterricht 1946-50. Mappe NEI.

⁷⁷ ACDP, Wortprotokoll von der Genfer Sitzung, 10. Juni 1949, I-009-017.

greatest value on these discussions”⁸². But Adenauer himself no longer had to rely upon the circle for the implementation of his policy of German-French understanding.

Federalism or Supranationality? Adenauer, Hallstein, McCloy, and Monnet and the Preparations and Negotiations for the Schuman and Pleven Plans (1950-1954)

In early 1949, intensified private discussions began, and in March 1950, Paris sent a delegation to the Ruhr in order to reach a consensus about the Saarland exports to Southern Germany, which was to be understood as a conscious overture to agreements following the model of 1926⁸³. At approximately the same time, Adenauer put forth a proposal at a meeting with Koutzine for the standardisation of the German-French coal, steel, and chemical sectors, which the latter then immediately forwarded on to his MRP confidants in Paris:

Au cours de ma dernière entrevue avec le Chancelier Adenauer, ce dernier m’a fait part des ses réflexions concernant la proposition la plus pratique et la plus concrète, susceptible de faire entrer le rapprochement franco-allemand dans le stade de la réalisation. [...] Pour commencer utilement la réalisation du rapprochement franco-allemand, il est capital de commencer par l’examen de la situation réciproque dans les trois industries clés: sidérurgie, charbon, industrie chimique. Pour examiner toutes les questions intéressant les trois branches en question dans les deux pays, il faudrait organiser une réunion officieuse à la quelle prendraient part trois ou quatre experts de chaque coté. Cette réunion, encore une fois, strictement officieuse, pourrait avoir lieu n’importe où, à Genève si vous le désirez. Le premier entretien devrait avoir pour objet un simple examen comparé de la situation précise dans les trois branches, des possibilités de production, des conditions d’exploitation, etc. [...] Puis, à la seconde étape, on pourra voir dans quelle mesure il serait possible d’arriver à une entente mutuelle pour éviter une lutte franco-allemande sur les marchés. D’après Adenauer, une telle réunion serait un premier pas concret et réaliste vers l’entente franco-allemande et par là, vers la réalisation de l’unité économique et politique de l’Europe occidentale⁸⁴.

⁸² ACDP, Protokoll über die Besprechung des Genfer Kreises am 24. März 1952, Karl Graf Sprei, I-172-31.

⁸³ J. Gillingham, “Die Französische Ruhrpolitik und die Ursprünge des Schuman-Plans. Eine Neubewertung”, in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 35, 1987, pp. 1-24; *Id.*, “Zur Vorgeschichte der Montan-Union Westeuropas Kohle und Stahl in Depression und Krieg”, in *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte*, 34, 1986, No. 3, pp. 381-405, here p. 404.

⁸⁴ Archives de France/Archives Privées Bidault, *Proposition du Chancelier Adenauer, Koutzine an Monsieur le Président*, 22. März 1950, 457 AP 59, Mappe Notes Kou-

From 1952 to 1957, he served as Secretary General of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, as well as an official in Monnet's "Action Committee for the United States of Europe". He later served from 1976 to 1981 as the first president of the European University Institute (EUI) located in Florence, Italy⁸⁸.

Hallstein himself had organised a prison university while in a US prisoner of war camp in 1945, had reopened the University of Frankfurt in 1946, and held a visiting professorship at Georgetown University in Washington DC in 1948. Adenauer appointed him to be undersecretary in the Foreign Ministry in 1950 as head of the West German delegation for the Paris negotiations on the "Schuman Plan", for which he had signatory authority under his own responsibility. Six states joined together in April 1951 to create a common coal and steel policy in the form of the European Coal and Steel Community. The treaty on the ECSC entered into force in 1952. Also belonging to Adenauer's Schuman Plan network, in addition to Hallstein, Kohnstamm, and Monnet, was the head of the Italian ECSC delegation and Christian Democrat Paolo Emilio Taviani⁸⁹.

Starting from the 25th of June 1950, the Korean War led to an increase in value of the international position of the Federal Republic of Germany, forcing France to yield in the matter of German rearmament⁹⁰. In early September 1950, and thus still before the meeting of the NATO council in New York – one subject of which was a German defence contribution – Kindt-Kiefer was sent to Bidault in Paris in order to give the French an understanding of West German rearmament. His task consisted in "dispelling French mistrust with respect to the supposed American sway in Bonn, particularly since earlier on [...] a close German-French connection had been agreed upon". Adenauer offered the

⁸⁸ A. G. Harryvan, J. van der Harst, *Max Kohnstamm. A European's Life and Work*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 2011; M. Segers, *Tussen Verzoening en Verval. De Nationale Standpuntbepaling van de Bondsrepubliek Duitsland Gedurende de Beraadslagingen en on der Handelingen over de Verdragen van Rome*, PhD, Radboud, Universiteit Nijmegen, 2006; *Id.*, *De Europese Dagboeken van Max Kohnstamm, August 1953-September 1957*, Amsterdam, Boom, 2008, pp. 7-28; *Id.*, *Diep Spel. De Europese Dagboeken van Max Kohnstamm, September 1957-Februari 1963*, Amsterdam, Boom, 2011, pp. 15-51.

⁸⁹ P. Acanfora, "The Italian Christian Democratic Party within the International Christian Democratic Organisations: Nationalism, Europeanism, and Religious Identity (1947-1954)", in *Journal of Modern Italian Studies*, 15, 2010, No. 2, pp. 200-231, here pp. 214-216, p. 219.

⁹⁰ R. Poidevin, "Die Europapolitischen Initiativen Frankreichs des Jahres 1950-aus einer Zwangslage Geboren?", in L. Herbst, W. Bühner, H. Sowade (eds.), *Vom Marshallplan zur EWG*, pp. 257-262, here pp. 260-261.

l'intégration de l'Allemagne occidentale est plus importante que la restauration de l'unité de l'ancien Reich⁹⁴.

This confidential transmission of fundamental declarations and basic programs of policy towards Germany was suitable for having a trust-building effect with a view towards the French requirements for security. With their instrumental function, they also corresponded to Adenauer's innermost convictions⁹⁵.

On the 18th of April 1951 Adenauer and Schuman exchanged two official documents about the Saarland which were oriented towards, among other things, the agreement that had been reached in Geneva: the final resolution of the matter only through a peace treaty and no recognition of the current circumstances as a result of the signing of the ECSC treaty⁹⁶.

However, the discussion that dragged on about the ratification of the European Defence Community (EDC) in France caused West German representatives to view the Geneva Circle in a less and less favourable light. With regard to the EDC, assessments were issued on the part of France, that were overly optimistic and caused doubts to arise as to Bidault's reliability and the influence of his political sphere. In September 1953, one year before the failure of the EDC, Koutzine led Lenz to believe that the process would be achieved in the parliament with a majority of thirty to forty votes, which was the conviction "of all of our friends"⁹⁷. Therefore, in 1954, Adenauer made more intensive use of direct possibilities for contact – through the CDU/CSU faction chairman Heinrich von Brentano – with socialists and MRP members in Paris. Von Brentano went on to report to the chancellor on July, 12th about his discussions with, among others, Teitgen and the latter's unbroken optimism with regard to the chances of the EDC being ratified⁹⁸.

Another topic of discussion was the differences between the CDU and the MRP, as well as the question of what was to be done so that "the European movement does not slip out of our grasp", which meant

⁹⁴ Archives de France, Paris, Archives Privées Bidault, Notes Koutzine/Nemanoff. Hellblaue Mappe Koutzine 1951, Bericht 'La Tactique du Chancelier Adenauer' Victor Koutzine à Georges Bidault 1951, 457 AP 59.

⁹⁵ J. Foschepoth, "Westintegration statt Wiedervereinigung. Adenauers Deutschlandpolitik 1949-1955", in *Id.* (ed.), *Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2nd edition, 1988, pp. 29-60.

⁹⁶ U. Lappenküper, "Der Schuman-Plan", here p. 437.

⁹⁷ ACDP, Victor Koutzine an Otto Lenz, 14th September 1953, I-172-74.

⁹⁸ "Brentano an Adenauer, 13. Juli 1954", in A. Baring, *Sehr verehrter Herr Bundeskanzler! – Heinrich von Brentano im Briefwechsel mit Konrad Adenauer 1949-1964*, Hamburg, Hoffmann & Campe, 1974, pp. 137-141, here pp. 138-139.

expressed the same year by the break between Kindt-Kiefer and Adenauer.

In 1953-1954, Adenauer's chief worry was not the posture of the British and Americans with respect to West Germany, which he believed to have committed to its Western course, but rather the attitude of the French. An undated memo from his advisor Blankenhorn speaks of a thus far well-informed source, according to whom, France's former foreign minister Bidault had been making efforts since 1951 for a French-Russian understanding¹⁰¹.

Within the framework of the meeting of the Political Commission of the NEI in Paris on the 1st of March 1954, MRP Secretary General André Colin (in office 1944-1955) informed his German partisan counterpart that the domestic political coalition against the EDC in France, consisting of communists, socialists, and Gaulists, was in the process of growing and had aroused intense propaganda against the integration project. However, the Socialist Party demonstrated a strong majority for the European Army, while the view of the faction was "very much divided". With the French public, the mood for the EDC was overall more scattered than in parliament. The CDU representatives in the NEI were made aware that a strong domestic political campaign against the MRP was also going on. On the other hand, it was Bidault who was to be thanked, as a result of his "firm posture in Berlin", (related to the Four-Power Foreign Ministers' Conference in January and February 1954), for having contributed to an increase in trust of the MRP. The government's position was established on the social issue. What the West German NEI representatives were most interested in, though, was seeing the EDC project enter into force. With regards to the question of the timing of the ratification, Colin was of the opinion that it was necessary to wait for the Indochina Conference in Geneva. The East Asia conference on Korea and Indochina was to take place from the 26th of April to the 21st of July 1954 in Geneva. In the foreign policy committee of the *Assemblée Nationale*, a weak majority against the EDC was represented under the leadership of the socialist Jules Moch. In order to be successful, the debate would have to take place before the vacation

¹⁰¹ Quotation N. Katzer, "Eine Übung im Kalten Krieg" *Die Berliner Außenministerkonferenz von 1954*, Köln, Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994, fn. 20, p. 267; see also R. Pfeiffer, *Eine Schwierige und Konfliktreiche Nachbarschaft – Österreich und das Deutschland Adenauers 1953-1963*, London, Münster, Hamburg, LIT-Verlag, 2003, pp. 19-33; *Id.*, *Kein guter Beginn. Das Konfliktreiche Deutsch-Österreichische Verhältnis im Jahr 1954*, in K. Wüstenbecker, *Geschichte ist Vielfalt. Natur – Gesellschaft – Wissenschaft. Festgabe für Peter Krüger Anlässlich Seines 65. Geburtstages*, Münster, LIT, 2001, pp. 81-98.

resigning, in the face of his policy towards Europe being smashed to splinters¹⁰⁵.

However, the chancellor was kept well informed by his networks about the domestic French political balance of power, and he noted in a timely fashion the growing problems with regard to the acceptance of the EDC, above all else with respect to his fear of French-Russian unity. During the years following the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952-1953, he could repeatedly count on his contacts in the Monnet-Kohnstamm network. Among these, at the latest starting from when the ECSC treaty entered into force, was also the German representative to the Coal and Steel Community and vice-president of the High Authority, Franz Etzel. These confidants and the CDU/CSU-MRP networks, to which Adenauer had access in the phase of the spring and summer of 1954 through Otto Lenz and Franz Josef Strauß, were, however, no longer capable of averting the political catastrophe of the rejection of the EDC by the French national assembly¹⁰⁶. In the end, Adenauer kept the possibility of the Federal Republic of Germany's membership to NATO and the WEU open, as an alternative reserve position.

Europe Policy and Integration Policy between Pragmatism and Realism (1955-1958)

At the London Nine-Power Conference from the 28th of September to the 3rd of October 1954, Belgium, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States all settled on a final agreement which formed the framework for the setting up of armed German programs and established their integration into the Western European defence system, forming the basis for the Paris Pacts of the 23rd of October 1954. They recommended NATO membership for the Federal Republic of Germany, which in return thereupon officially renounced the production or use of atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, heavy armaments, long-range and remote-controlled missiles, and large warships and submarines. At the same time, associated with this for the Federal Republic of

¹⁰⁵ "Tagebuchnotizen Heinrich Krone, 30th August, 26th September 1954", in R. Morsey, K. Repgen (eds.), *Untersuchungen und Dokumente zur Ostpolitik und Biographie*, Mainz, Matthias Grünewald Verlag, 1974, p. 135; K. Gotto, "Die Sicherheits- und Deutschlandfrage in Adenauers Politik 1954/55", in B. Thoß, H.-E. Volkmann (eds.), *Zwischen Kaltem Krieg und Entspannung. Sicherheits- und Deutschlandpolitik der Bundesrepublik im Mächtesystem der Jahre 1953-1956*, Boppard/Rhein, Harald Boldt, 1988, p. 143.

¹⁰⁶ "Reunion du 'Cercle de Geneve', le 18 octobre 1954 à Paris, Aide-Memoire des positions adoptées", in Papiers A.E. de Schryver, KADOC, 7.2.8.1./1.

transatlantic alliances on the continent was established for decades. One consequence of this epoch-making decision is the fact that to this day, only a relatively modest military dimension exists in the EU. The Atlantic alliance remains the last resort for Europe's security and defence.

In spite of the disruption to the idea of integration by the rejection of the EDC in France, which signified a severe setback for the unification of Western Europe, it was possible within a few months for a new and above all firmer attempt at integration to come into being which, within only two years, led to the breakthrough of the founding of both EURATOM and the EEC. It was the Belgian socialist Paul-Henri Spaak who, in early April 1955, proposed to the foreign ministers of the ECSC states the convening of a conference of delegates which would jointly consider how the further development and the future of the European Coal and Steel Community could be shaped in order to provide new momentum to the process of European integration. As goals, he named the expansion of ECSC areas of competence to the remaining energy areas as well as to transportation, and the formation of a special organisation within the ECSC for the peaceful use of atomic energy. His Dutch counterpart Jan Willem Beyen pleaded for replacing the methods of additive partial integration with a "horizontal" integration of the entire European economy under a common guiding authority. His goal was a comprehensive common market, the core of which would be a customs union with the step-by-step dismantling of internal duties and common external tariffs¹¹⁰.

With the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community in 1952, Adenauer functioned, through his confidantes Hallstein and Etzel via Kohnstamm and Monnet, as an increasingly active and equal co-arranger of Western European integration policy. The foreign ministers of the six ECSC states finally agreed in Messina on the goal of a unified economic area in the form of a customs union with common institutions and a step-by-step coordination of economic and social policies. For Adenauer, the agreement was another step in the right direction, particularly since in his view, the anchoring of the Federal Republic of Germany in the West still did not in any way seem to be consolidated to its fullest extent. Stronger ties and a supranational decision-making centre ought to provide a remedy¹¹¹.

¹¹⁰ F. Knipping, *Rom, 25. März 1957. Die Einigung Europas*, München, DTV, 2004, pp. 84-85.

¹¹¹ W. Loth, "Deutsche Europa-Konzeptionen in der Gründungsphase der EWG", in E. Serra (ed.), *Il Rilancio dell'Europa e i Trattati di Roma: actes du Colloque de Rome, 25-28 mars 1987*, Brüssel, Bruylant, pp. 585-602, here pp. 586-587.

of the participating states¹¹⁵. Instead, he was extremely keen on the functional proposal that had been launched from London for a large Free Trade Area (FTA) that would be based upon intergovernmental cooperation – much to the displeasure of Adenauer.

Adenauer followed the debates within the party, but in particular the controversial debate on methods between the German Foreign Ministry and the Economics Ministry. From a loftier observation point, he let the hustle and bustle run its course, and he did not participate in the dispute about the correct methodology for integration¹¹⁶. In addition, there were three more groupings in the continuing debates on principle: the federalist sphere of the former undersecretary and commission president Hallstein, which dreamed of a European federal state, the francophile circles within the Foreign Ministry under von Brentano with a view towards a closer German-French union, and the hyperactive lobby of Erhard in the economics ministry, which wanted to see the British FTA project realised with a merger of the EEC and EFTA¹¹⁷.

With the fundamental establishing of the political priority of integration, Adenauer remained open to various approaches, but he clearly assigned greater importance to political integration over the interests of economics and foreign trade. While in the fundamental dispute over liberal free trade integration or political market integration, Erhard supported the Macmillan project of the “Large Free Trade Area” (FTA) with a loose institutional structure, Adenauer tended toward a core-European solution with a more strongly institutional anchoring.

The chancellor reacted to Erhard with regard to their conflicting interests: with reference to the policy-making power of the chancellor (Art. 65 of the German constitution), he implemented a “clear, positive German position with regard to European integration”, which signified in detail:

- implementation of the resolutions from Messina;
- integration first of all among the ECSC states (and therefore without the United Kingdom);

¹¹⁵ Concerning the controversy between institutionalists and functionalists see H. J. Küsters, *Die Gründung der Europäischen Wirtschaftsgemeinschaft*, Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1982, pp. 64-67.

¹¹⁶ M. Segers, “Der Streit um die deutsche Europapolitik in den 1950er Jahren”, in H. J. Küsters (ed.), *Deutsche Europapolitik Christlicher Demokraten*, forthcoming 2013.

¹¹⁷ U. Lappenküper, *Die deutsch-französischen Beziehungen 1949-1963*, Vol. 2, München, Oldenbourg, 2001, pp. 1480-1542.

usual pragmatism. "I would like to propose to you [...]", he wrote on the 20th of January to Foreign Minister von Brentano, "that the cabinet resolves to appoint as the representative of the Federal Republic the foreign minister for political matters and the economics minister for economic matters"¹¹⁹.

Adenauer understood how to delegate. In the sense of a division of labour in the integration policy on a *divide et impera* basis, he repeatedly reminded the CDU/CSU faction in the Bundestag that they should comprehensively be occupied by topics that were relevant to Europe policy, above all else the energy policy, by means of the creation of corresponding committees and expert groups. As Adenauer formulated it to the faction chairman Heinrich Krone, the Federal Republic of Germany could not assume responsibility for the fact that "the coordination of energy policy is not sufficiently looked after and it is not adequately represented in the European committees"¹²⁰.

In his final years in office, his networking efforts were no longer of great importance for Adenauer as they had been in the first three phases. With de Gaulle, he communicated right away at the same level. In their discussions during September and November 1958, which were both personal and deeply touching, a great degree of common convictions were established. At his private estate in Colombey-les-deux-Églises, the French president assured the German chancellor that he would stand by the existing treaties (the EEC and EURATOM) that were signed by France on the 25th of March 1957, before he took office, and which had entered into force in January 1958. In Bad Kreuznach, he promised to not invoke any of the exit clauses of the EEC treaty and to implement the reduction in customs duties as stipulated in the treaty beginning on the 1st of January 1959. Against the background of the agreement reached between Adenauer and de Gaulle and the further relationship between the two statesmen in the years 1958-1961, it was remarkable that in France, Jean Monnet with his circle and de Gaulle with his circle concluded a media-rhetoric armistice and began to cooperate about the question of political union. Thus a network confidants of Adenauer's such as Monnet already had direct access to the president; even though this was not so astonishing, since he had in fact been an employee of de Gaulle's in the National Liberation Committee in Algeria during the

¹¹⁹ Doc. 40: "Brief Adenauers an Heinrich von Brentano, 30th January 1958", in R. Morsey, H.-P. Schwarz (eds.), *Adenauer. Briefe 1957-1959*, Paderborn, München, Wien, Zürich, Schöningh, 2000, pp. 51-52.

¹²⁰ Doc. 89: "Brief Adenauers an Heinrich Krone, 22. Mai 1958", in R. Morsey R., H.-P. Schwarz (eds.), *Adenauer. Briefe 1957-1959*, p. 100.

began only with economic matters but which then developed into a political issue, and I consider it to be a certainty that that will also arrive here”¹²⁵. This was an indirect allusion to Bismarck: it is well known that it was out of the German Customs Union (“Deutscher Zollverein”) that the North German Confederation (“Norddeutscher Band”) developed in 1867, which went on to form the basis for the founding of the Empire in 1871.

Adenauer also profited from the cooperation of the circles of Monnet and de Gaulle, which had grown closer since the summer of 1959, particularly since they were concerned with the creation of a closer union between (West) Germany and France, which would form the precondition for a European Union. However, in September 1959, Adenauer made clear to the board of the CDU that this project should not be sacrificed to an association between Britain and the EEC. In contrast to Monnet, de Gaulle remained distanced and sceptical with respect to the USA, particularly since in November 1958, Eisenhower rejected the atomic force project that was desired trilaterally. It was against this background that a closer French-German union project was further worked on, specifically with a binational council of ministers which was to be led in half-year alternations by de Gaulle and Adenauer, a German-French parliament within the European Parliament, and a referendum for the confirmation of the policy of the general and the chancellor. A European political confederation was supposed to grow out of this political union. Within this context, Monnet cooperated with undersecretary Karl Carstens of the Foreign Ministry and Germany’s ambassador to NATO, Herbert Blankenhorn, an early networker of Adenauer’s in the Geneva Circle. As expected, these German-French tendencies towards directorship met with resistance among the other EEC partners, especially from the Dutch, who pleaded for the admission of the British¹²⁶.

With respect to those who did not share his view regarding the priority of the political purpose of European unification, Adenauer remained mistrustful to the highest degree, and from time to time he was determined to clamp down on any criticism of the state of integration with reference to his policymaking power. “I consider it [...] to be absolutely necessary to prevent under all circumstances that opposing opinions from the cabinet reach the public,” the chancellor wrote in

¹²⁵ Doc. 10: “Informationsgespräch Adenauers mit Kurt Lachmann, Felix von Eckardt, Fritz Hilgendorf und Theodor-Paul Ziethe, 12. Oktober 1959”, in R. Morsey, H.-P. Schwarz (eds.), *Adenauers Teegespräche 1959-1961*, Berlin, Siedler, 1988, pp. 133-134.

¹²⁶ M. Segers, “Preparing Europe”, pp. 10-12.

Adenauer's vision of a Europe policy was never free of ambivalence. Contradictions opened up mainly with regards to positioning in the feud that had been intensifying since the beginning of the 1960s between, on the one hand, Christian Democrats and first EEC President Hallstein and, on the other hand, French President de Gaulle. Hallstein, who was focused on the organisation of an independent European policy and with dealing with the EEC Council of Ministers as well as the governments of the nation states from a confidently offensive position, had distinguished himself mainly through his efforts to force the process of the creation of the common market, to ensure against animosities between nation states, and thus to drive forward the integration process in its central form¹³¹. De Gaulle, who was officially regarded as a sceptic of integration and Europe, but who actually understood how to exchange with Monnet from 1959 to 1961, had viewed the Treaties of Rome primarily as treaties for economics and trade, as well as a possibility for modernising the French economy and freeing it from isolation. In the end, his objective for France remained the *Grande Nation* with a sovereign position in Europe.

In the conflict between the president of the EEC Commission and the French president, Adenauer demonstrated that what primarily concerned him was France as an alliance partner. When asked about the existing contrast, the chancellor suddenly demonstrated himself to the *New York Times* journalist Flora Lewis Gruson as a practitioner of *realpolitik* and hardly showed his visionary side. According to Adenauer, he was in "the middle" between de Gaulle and Hallstein. The president of the commission wanted

[...] to do everything as quickly as possible, and I am of the opinion that things have to be left to develop, that with such a difficult issue as the complete integration of Europe, it is necessary to proceed really cautiously [...] I am in favour of very much building upon that which has already been achieved so that no disappointments occur; otherwise, if disappointments do occur, things will not move forward. You know the Italian saying: 'The one who goes cautiously arrives safely'¹³².

On the whole, it can hardly be refuted that especially in the last years of his period as chancellor (1961-1963), exclusive bilateralism with Paris had gained priority status for Adenauer with respect to general

¹³¹ K.-H Narjes, "Walter Hallstein in der Frühphase der EWG", in W. Loth, W. Wallace, W. Wessels (eds.), *Walter Hallstein: Der vergessene Europäer?*, Bonn, Europas Union, 1995, pp. 139-163, here pp. 139-147.

¹³² Doc. 27: "Informationsgespräch mit Flora Lewis Gruson, Günter Diehl, Fritz Hilgendorf und Hermann Kusterer, 28. Juli 1960", in R. Morsey, H.-P. Schwarz (eds.), *Adenauers Teegespräche 1959-1961*, p. 307.

The hopes for "Europe" that were strongly supported in the Federal Republic of Germany were to experience disillusionment and disappointment with every step towards progress: although the Common Assembly of the European Coal and Steel Community was in fact called the "European Parliament" from 1958, it was only directly elected in 1979 and for a long time was granted only modest responsibilities. The governments of the member states were represented in the EEC Council of Ministers. Ministers met depending upon their department according to orders from Adenauer, who was only marginally interested in the technical details of integration material. Decisions lay with the Council of the EEC, where majority decisions were to only enter into force after a transition period, a principle which French president Charles de Gaulle torpedoed with his "empty chair policy" in 1965-1966¹³⁴.

The body for initiatives and the guardian of treaties was the EEC Commission, whose appointed members belonged to the respective governments. As a result of the incessant resistance by de Gaulle and his idea of the "Europe of fatherlands", EEC Commission President Hallstein (in office 1958-1967) was weakened. The dream of a European federal state was not to be fulfilled¹³⁵.

By 1967, Hallstein, worn out and exhausted, resigned his position as president of the EEC Commission. With de Gaulle, Adenauer had not only arranged his own political and personal relationship, but also intensified it. In the wake of the disappointment about the "passively tolerated position" (Rolf Steininger) of the Anglo-American powers against the background of the Berlin crisis in 1958-1961¹³⁶, the chancellor moved step by step ever closer to the French president and his policy, which culminated in the signing of the so called Treaty of Friendship, or Elysée Treaty, between Germany and France on the 22nd of January 1963.

With his distinct Western policy and his government style, Adenauer shaped an era from 1949 to 1963. The chancellor was not only responsible for creating, but also for realising, bearing and consolidating the new West German state that achieved its sovereignty in a step-by-step man-

¹³⁴ P. Bajon, *Europapolitik "am Abgrund". Die Krise des "leeren Stuhls" 1965-66*, Stuttgart, Steiner, 2012 as well as *Id.*, "De Gaulle finds his 'Master'. Gerhard Schröder's 'Fairly Audacious Politics in the European Crisis of 1965-66'", in *Journal of European Integration History* 2, 2012, pp. 253-269.

¹³⁵ W. Hallstein, *Der unvollendete Bundesstaat: europäische Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse*, Düsseldorf, Econ, 1969.

¹³⁶ R. Steininger, *Berlinkrise und Mauerbau 1958 bis 1963: mit einem Kapitel zum Mauerfall 1989*, München, Olzog, 2009.

another way, if the division of Germany was almost the precondition for Adenauer's policy for Western European integration with the ECSC and the EEC, then Kohl managed a double trick. Not only did he consistently follow through with the project of "German unity" up to the reunification of the entire state, he was also capable of combining the national issue by way of the solution for German unity being connected to the further development of European integration. The reunification of Germany with the German monetary union was linked to the European Union (EU) and the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU)¹³⁹.

Despite all his criticisms, it cannot be overlooked that with his policy of integration with the West, Adenauer created the basis that would become the fundamental basic conditions (the German Constitution) of the country at the time and the preconditions (membership in NATO and the EEC) for German reunification. These were the foundations that set the country on course for integration with the West in the 1950s. In that respect, the founding chancellor of the West German partial state is immortalised in the forms and methods of the creation of German unity in 1990. Whether he actually also wanted everything to happen the way it did – a united, "east of the Elbe" Germany with Berlin as its capital and a strong Protestant component – is of course another story. The Berlin republic, in comparison with the Bonn republic, is to a large extent indeed a new chapter in history.

¹³⁹ M. Gehler, *Deutschland. Von der Teilung zur Einigung. 1945 bis heute*, Wien, Köln, Weimar, Böhlau, 2010, p. 382.