Suffering as a Common Ground for Philosophizing

Suffering and Philosophical Traditions

Prof. Elberfeld initiated the discussion by examining how suffering relates to philosophical traditions. He argued that traditions are often invented constructs and that rigidly clinging to them can generate conflict and thus suffering.

Traditions themselves are a cause of suffering, tied to the creation of fixed categories and so-called ‘cultures’ as conceptualizations of these traditions. The tradition which we consider as our own is something invented in the contemporary world. An invented tradition and another invented tradition then try to convince each other that the respective own tradition is the better one, and these fights over truth become one of the most fundamental causes of suffering within philosophy.
— Rolf Elberfeld

Anke Graness responded sympathetically to this approach, agreeing that we should abandon such rigid notions of tradition. However, she cautioned that it is very difficult to escape our own cultural semantics and contexts. Graness insisted that an awareness of one’s epistemological and cultural situatedness is crucial for any meaningful philosophical discourse, even one grounded in shared suffering.

My perception of what suffering is is, of course, shaped by the context where I’m coming from—my language and shared epistemological resources. I am really very much convinced we have to start with an awareness of our situatedness, because all this is shaping our ideas significantly.
— Anke Graness

Suffering as a Common Ground for Philosophizing

Building on these points, Elberfeld suggested that recognizing suffering as a shared human experience could foster a common ground for philosophical dialogue rooted in compassion and trust. In contrast to approaches that begin with theoretical curiosity or claims of universal reason, he proposed beginning with the humble fact of our shared vulnerability. This, he argued, creates an emotional basis for mutual understanding that can ground and inform more analytic debates.

If human beings come together and share from the beginning how they are suffering, this creates a feeling which binds people together. I think this shared experience brings us together on a very basic, emotional level, creating compassion and mutual trust.
— Rolf Elberfeld

Sool Park supported this perspective, drawing a connection to literary traditions where common experiences of pain provide a foundation for understanding. Park noted that unlike in the field of philosophy, world literature readily creates a global conversation because it taps into universally shared emotions like suffering.

This is exactly the reason why world literature works as a system, but not world philosophy. Because literature is almost always based on pain or the perception of beauty—which could be understood as a kind of sensitivity to pain. So I think a common ground created by shared experiences of pain is universal and a great point to start.
— Sool Park

Park cited Richard Rorty’s pragmatism and the idea of solidarity through pain, underscoring that Elberfeld’s approach gives philosophy a pragmatic dimension grounded in real human concerns. This focus, Park observed, gives philosophy a real function and meaning in the world.

Cultural and Contextual Differences

The conversation then turned to how culture and context mediate the experience of suffering. Monika Rohmer expanded on the theme of cultural differences in understanding and expressing suffering by raising questions about the efficacy of language in genuinely sharing experiences of suffering. She suggested that words often fall short: true empathy might require other modes of connection such as physical presence or touch. Her observation also pushed the group to consider non-anthropocentric perspectives, since the initial discussion had centered almost exclusively on human suffering despite Elberfeld’s broader interest in “life in relationships,” which could include animals and nature.

What is the role of language in your approach? Because often enough, language is not the adequate tool for sharing suffering. It’s more the sensation of touch, the presence of being there – forms of connection that are expressed in modes other than language.
— Monika Rohmer

This line of inquiry prompted Elberfeld to reflect on the limits and therapeutic possibilities of language. He acknowledged that language can both alleviate and exacerbate suffering. On one hand, philosophical language (as in Buddhist traditions or Wittgenstein’s approach) can bring awareness to suffering and help to heal it by reframing our understanding. On the other hand, language can cause suffering – for example, through harmful labels or rigid identities imposed on people.

Language can be a medicine – a therapeutic tool to bring awareness to suffering and help address it, but suffering is also caused by language itself.
— Rolf Elberfeld

Elberfeld advocated using language in a mindful, healing way, rather than as a tool of domination.

The Phenomenology of Suffering

Shifting to a methodological perspective, Elberfeld described his approach as a “transformative phenomenology of suffering.” Rather than asking the abstract question “what is suffering?,” the focus of this approach lies on how suffering is felt and lived through. This approach resists defining suffering once and for all; instead, it involves careful description of diverse experiences of suffering, allowing those experiences to inform philosophical insight. By treating suffering as a concrete phenomenon and starting point, Elberfeld aims at aligning philosophy more with lived experience.

My question is not what is suffering, but how is suffering felt by people? Suffering is a phenomenon which is already there, and starting from this fact we can then attempt to describe what suffering is.
— Rolf Elberfeld

From this phenomenological perspective, participant Abosede Ipadeola offered a personal reflection. She shared her experience of falling seriously ill during the COVID lockdown shortly after arriving in Germany. Before that, she had always been exceptionally healthy; during her illness, however, she found she could no longer imagine what it felt like to be healthy.

When I was ill during the COVID lockdown, at one point I was trying to imagine how it feels to be healthy, and I just couldn’t imagine it. I realized that it is really difficult to understand how other people feel when we have not experienced something similar ourselves.
— Abosede Ipadeola

This example highlighted the limits of empathy and imagination: no matter how hard we try, truly understanding another’s pain may be impossible without having suffered a similar way oneself. Ipadeola’s story led the group to consider the importance of vulnerability in philosophy and the possibility to define a common ground not by the actuality of pain, but by the universal potential to suffer.

Conflict, Cooperation, and Ethical Dimensions

Prof. Wilfred Lajul contributed a nuanced, intercultural view on the persistence of suffering. He began by acknowledging the multiplicity of forms of suffering – physical, psychological, and spiritual – and described their profound societal implications. Lajul noted that in many African contexts, even in the absence of war or overt violence, people endure intense psychological suffering from systemic issues like corruption and social injustice.

There are basically three types of suffering — physical, psychological, and spiritual. Psychological suffering, for example, is widespread in places where people suffer silently due to corruption and manipulation, even if there are no guns being fired.
— Wilfred Lajul

He also pointed out that even animals feel physical pain, bringing up a broader ethical and ecological scope. Lajul questioned whether suffering can ever be fully resolved. If humanity were to overcome one source of suffering, would not simply new forms arise? He cited an African proverb about hunters uniting to kill a buffalo and then fighting over the meat to illustrate how solving one problem can create another. His insight was that suffering might be an inherent part of the human condition, always demanding our attention even as we make progress.

Elberfeld concurred that suffering cannot be completely eliminated, cautioning against any utopian vision of a world without suffering. In fact, he suggested that the very wish for a perfect, pain-free world can itself lead to the most intricate frustrations and conflicts. Instead, Elberfeld emphasized that philosophy’s ethical task is to deal with suffering in the here and now, in all its finite and concrete situations.

We must deal with suffering in finite situations realistically rather than aiming for utopian solutions. Our task is to face concrete sufferings as they come. Ethical engagement with suffering is an ongoing and necessary task.
— Rolf Elberfeld

Suffering, in this view, calls for continuous ethical engagement – caring for others, addressing injustices, and sharing burdens – rather than a one-time solution. He gave a concrete example: in family life, when members openly share their troubles and acknowledge each other’s suffering, family life becomes more compassionate and cooperative. Philosophy, by analogy, should focus on fostering such understanding and solidarity in the real world.

Lajul agreed with Elberfeld, but added another dimension: human progress also depends on cooperation through positive conditions, not only on bonding over suffering. While conflict and shared struggles can induce deep reflection, as Kant suggested with his idea of conflict driving reason, Lajul reminded the group that people also solve problems and advance society through voluntary collaboration and goodwill. In his view, a philosophy centered on suffering should not ignore human beings’ capacity to work together creatively outside of conflict. Elberfeld welcomed this addendum, acknowledging that he does not deny the positive side of human cooperation, but simply aims to decenter it as an absolute starting point in favor of a more humility- and vulnerability-based starting point.

Reorienting Philosophical Knowledge

At this juncture, the discussion – led by a question from Abbed Kanoor – turned to the epistemological stakes of Elberfeld’s proposal. Kanoor inquired how Elberfeld’s stance toward suffering relates to the role of knowledge in philosophy: Can we address suffering philosophically without engaging in forms of knowledge? Mustn’t even a compassionate, suffering-oriented philosophy still develop and use knowledge, albeit differently? This question prompted a clarification from Elberfeld about his aims.

Elberfeld stressed that his critique of classical epistemology is not aimed at knowledge per se, but at a narrow conception of knowledge that has dominated Western philosophy. He is not advocating ignorance or the abandonment of reason. Rather, he is calling for a reorientation of knowledge, one that redirects our intellectual efforts toward ethical ends.

I am absolutely not against knowledge itself, but I am orienting the production of knowledge in a different direction — towards ethically addressing real-world suffering.
— Rolf Elberfeld

In practice, this means valuing knowledge that helps alleviate suffering and enrich life, and being skeptical of knowledge pursued as an end in itself or used to assert superiority. He cited examples of “transformative” philosophies that emphasize learning how to live and die well, or cultivating compassion, in contrast to purely theoretical systems. Elberfeld saw his stance in alignment with Renaissance humanist critiques of scholasticism such as Petrarch’s early humanist turn to moral improvement over logical pedantry, as well as with non-Western traditions that tie knowledge to wisdom and compassion.

The Concept of Truth and Its Challenges

The participants turned to a closer examination of how differing conceptions of truth can lead to philosophical conflict, especially across cultures. Multiple viewpoints emerged in the dialogue, noting that Western philosophy has defined truth in various ways – e.g. as correspondence to facts, as coherence within a system of beliefs, or as pragmatic usefulness. Wilfred Lajul observed that misunderstandings often arise in intercultural philosophy when Western thinkers judged African philosophical ideas according to a coherence theory of truth, expecting African thought to neatly cohere with their own frameworks rather than seeking to understand it on its own terms. Such differences in epistemology underscore how easily the quest for absolute truth can become a power struggle.

Elberfeld highlighted that the competition between differing truth-claims has historically produced considerable suffering. When philosophers or traditions insist on the absolute truth of their own system, dialogue turns into a battle for dominance. He advocated a more relational approach that recognizes our shared human fallibility and vulnerability. Instead of each side claiming infallible truth, we should acknowledge how much we do not know and how much we share the condition of not having final answers. This humility, grounded in the awareness of suffering and finitude, could mitigate conflict and make philosophical exchange more compassionate. Prioritizing shared vulnerability over assertions of superiority might reduce the suffering that arises from intellectual dogmatism.

The competition of different truth claims inevitably produces suffering. Recognizing our shared vulnerabilities and suffering can help us address – and perhaps reduce – these conflicts.
— Rolf Elberfeld

Contributions from African Philosophy

Throughout the talk, Elberfeld and the other participants often returned to the importance of intercultural dialogue in philosophy. In particular, Elberfeld underscored crucial contributions of African philosophical traditions, especially regarding the theme of suffering. He noted that one significant starting point for many African philosophies is the lived experience of suffering under colonial and postcolonial conditions. This has given African thinkers (and thinkers from other marginalized traditions) a particular perspective on what philosophizing means, in contrast not only to the Western tradition but possibly also to other traditions that are already more readily integrated into the standard academic curriculum.