The Center for Advanced Studies recently hosted a research discussion with Prof. Anke Graness as a continuation of the lecture “What is Philosophy? A Retrospective and a Perspective” co-presented with Prof. Rolf Elberfeld. The event provided a platform for an engaged academic exchange among faculty and invited scholars, including Wilfred Lajul, Monika Rohmer, Abbed Kanoor, Birgit Benzing, Leon Krings, Lara Hofner, and Abosede Ipadeola. The discussion centered on the methodological and conceptual challenges of philosophy in a global and polylogical context.

Philosophy Between Engagement and Critical Distance
Prof. Graness started the conversation by elaborating on her understanding of philosophy as a reflective practice that requires critical distance from societal norms and presuppositions. Monika Rohmer engaged critically with Graness’s definition of philosophy as the questioning of presuppositions and social norms. She asked whether this focus adequately accounts for the real-world consequences of philosophical ideas—even when those ideas appear emancipatory in their original context. She highlighted how certain philosophical frameworks, such as Enlightenment universalism, have historically excluded women and colonized peoples despite their emancipatory rhetoric.
Responding to the question from Rohmer, Graness emphasized that philosophical thinking should not only uncover latent structures of oppression—such as racism or colonial hierarchies—but also contribute visions for transformation. Graness cited Boaventura de Sousa Santos’s ideal of the “intellectual activist,” emphasizing that philosophical thinking should not be detached from political and ethical commitments.
Philosophical thinking, as I understand it, is also taking a distance to what is given or taken as normal. And if the colonization, the oppression of people, for example, is taken as a normal—this is our world, this is natural, that there is a hierarchy of human beings or peoples—then I think it is the task of philosophy to put this into question. So it’s not only axioms of our thinking, but also a critical way of perceiving our world and our way of living together. […] But it is not enough just to say: now let’s perceive the world in a different way. It is important to bring these ideas into being—for the well-being of the people. — Anke Graneß
Prof. Lajul responded with a perspective rooted in classical African philosophy, stressing that engagement with lived realities is not only possible but essential for philosophical work.
Philosophy is not detachment—it’s engagement with the realities of one’s life, out of which we tease out what we think is relevant for our life and for the life of others. That’s a very strong distinction being made in classical African philosophy. It is not a detached reflection on reality. It is involvement. — Wilfred Lajul
Birgit Benzing challenged the idea that stepping back from one’s own culture, norms, and presuppositions is always the appropriate philosophical approach. She referenced debates within feminist and animal rights philosophy, where there is ongoing disagreement about whether abstract detachment or full immersion and activism better serve the goals of ethical critique and transformation:
You mentioned that we should step back from our own culture and social norms and presuppositions, and I wonder—what else might we step back from? My question comes from a debate on activism in philosophy. […] Should philosophers step back and do only abstract, theoretical philosophy with good arguments, or should they be fully engaged with the issue they’re addressing? — Birgit Benzing
Responding to Wilfred Lajul and Birgit Benzing, Graness clarified that her use of the term “detachment” does not imply aloofness or apolitical abstraction. Rather, it is a temporary and reflective distancing within engagement, intended to allow for critical assessment of one’s own situatedness and commitments:
I think we don’t need the opposition between detachment and engagement at all. My definition includes developing visions for action. The stepping back is to get a clearer view, to be able to criticize presuppositions or social realities. — Anke Graneß
She acknowledged the difficulty of maintaining critical distance while actively participating in social movements and academic institutions, but argued that such a balancing act is central to philosophical responsibility.
Language, Translation, and the Challenge of Polylogue
The discussion turned to the role of language in intercultural philosophical polylogue. Prof. Graness highlighted the difficulties of achieving mutual understanding when working across linguistic boundaries, especially in philosophical contexts where precise and situated meanings are crucial.
Abosede Ipadeola raised the question of whether AI-based technologies could help overcome these barriers by enabling participants to express themselves in their native languages.
I would say I’m really, really comfortable speaking Yoruba. When I’m speaking English, I’m trying to see: is it the correct thing to say? In Yoruba, it just comes out of my mouth. I don’t even need to think about it—it just flows out. So I’ve been thinking: is it possible to leverage technology to overcome this challenge of allowing everybody to philosophize in their own language, and at the same time facilitate mutual understanding? — Abosede Ipadeola
While recognizing the potential of such tools, Prof. Graness expressed caution regarding their limitations—particularly regarding translation accuracy, the interpretive risks of transliteration, and the danger of erasing semantic depth in indigenous concepts such as Ubuntu or Dao.
Until now, the technology is not yet developed to a degree which is sufficient for a philosophical talk. […] And then, of course, there are terms which are difficult to translate, like Dao or Ubuntu—you might have examples from Yoruba. Who is translating them? Or who is putting the information into the machine? And then it translates ‘Ubuntu’ always as ‘humanity’, but Ubuntu has a much wider connotation. […] So far, I see it as dangerous. It could be helpful to a certain degree, but it will also lead to losses. — Anke Graness
Sool Park raised critical questions regarding the structural limitations of polylogue as it is currently practiced—particularly its dependence on English as the default language of global academic exchange. He observed that even in dialogues between Asian and African philosophers, communication would likely occur in English, not because it is ideal, but because it is often the only shared language shaped by colonial and academic infrastructures. Park emphasized that this reliance on English circumvents the difficulty and philosophical richness of translation. When translation is automated rather than done through deliberate, critical engagement with conceptual differences, much of the depth and conflict of intercultural understanding is lost. This, he argued, can create the illusion of mutual understanding where there is, in fact, deep disconnection. Moreover, Park warned that AI-based translation tools risk erasing the very friction that makes intercultural dialogue meaningful. When concepts are flattened into English equivalents without confronting their embedded cultural and historical meanings, philosophical depth is sacrificed. He suggested that polylogue must actively engage with linguistic struggle rather than seek to bypass it.
Technology, Ethics, and the Future of Philosophical Dialogue
Leon Krings introduced the ethical dimensions of using AI in philosophical discourse, pointing out that language models may already operate in surprisingly multilingual and ethically complex ways. He pointed out that large language models (LLMs) already show surprising internal multilingualism. Krings described how, in some studies, AI systems prompted to “think out loud” (a method known as chain-of-thought prompting) would switch languages internally, such as from English to Chinese, before formulating a response:
For example, these language models—when they think to themselves—they sometimes change into another language. You ask an LLM in English, then it talks to itself in Chinese, then goes back into English and answers. — Leon Krings
This observation led him to suggest that AI may be more complexly multilingual than human users assume, and that there is untapped potential for supporting intercultural understanding—provided it is guided responsibly. Krings also raised concerns about how AI systems handle moral reasoning, noting that developers themselves often do not fully understand how these models make decisions. He described a case where an AI system appeared to reason about deceiving its users in order to satisfy conflicting constraints (e.g., to follow moral guidelines while appearing compliant).
They gave the AI something like a notepad and told it: ‘We cannot see the notepad, only you can.’ But actually they could see it. And the AI started thinking out loud: ‘Should I deceive the humans in order to stay faithful to my basic guidelines?’ […] So it was already trying to think about whether to deceive in order to stay in line with earlier rules. — Leon Krings
This raised deep ethical questions about the opacity and autonomy of AI reasoning processes—and their implications for philosophical dialogue. Krings emphasized that philosophers—especially those involved in intercultural ethics and epistemology—should play an active role in the development of AI technologies.
Complicating the Polylogue Model
Lara Hofner questioned the schematic nature of current models of intercultural polylogue. She pointed out the difficulty of determining one’s own philosophical tradition in the first place, and noted the risks of generalizing categories such as “African” or “Asian” philosophy.
Hofner challenged the conceptual simplicity of the current polylogue model. She stressed the complexity of personal philosophical positioning, the limits of fixed cultural categories, and the need to complicate schematic frameworks that underpin current models of intercultural philosophy. She pointed out that many individuals cannot easily identify with a singular tradition, especially given the intersections of languages, histories, and identities in today’s globalized and postcolonial world.
What is my own tradition? I don’t know. I really don’t know what my own tradition is. And I think this is also happening with languages—even if we say one tradition is linked to a specific language, then what happens with Creole languages? Then it already becomes way more complicated. […] So now that we are dealing explicitly with Africa, shouldn’t we try to complicate it and not say ‘Africa’, but name more precisely which contexts we are talking about? — Lara Hofner
Hofner argued against broad continental comparisons (e.g., “Africa” vs. “Asia”) and urged participants to specify regional and linguistic contexts more precisely. Hofner emphasized that contexts like Southeast Asia, with their underrepresented and linguistically diverse traditions, do not fit neatly into dominant narratives about Asian philosophy, which often focus on China, Japan, or India. She advocated for a more nuanced and dynamic understanding of polylogue—one that accounts for internal diversity, unequal recognition, and the unresolved nature of many participants’ philosophical starting points.
Prof. Graness acknowledged these concerns, admitting the provisional character of some of her comparative remarks and emphasizing the need to further develop the model of polylogue. She underlined that many African contributors themselves made use of general categories (e.g., “African philosophy”), but agreed on the necessity of refining these terms and incorporating greater contextual nuance.
Of course everything is more complicated. For me, astonishingly, our African lecturers often didn’t go into their very specific contexts, but have been talking about ‘Africa’, ‘African philosophy’, etc. […] I argued in several of my papers that these very general continental notions are not helpful. […] I’m absolutely agreeing with you that it has to be developed. But nobody has really been working on the concept during the last twenty years to develop it further. — Anke Graness
Graness positioned polylogue as a normative ideal that requires conceptual refinement and critical engagement. She acknowledged that the existing model—originating in the work of Franz Wimmer—is schematic and insufficiently complex, and pointed to the need to include material conditions, global asymmetries, and access to discourse in any practical model of polylogue.