Dr. Leeten emphasized that skepticism, rather than a position of radical doubt, is best understood as an ethos of epistemic humility and moderation—an approach that encourages critical reflection while acknowledging the limitations of human knowledge. This ethos of epistemic moderation, he suggested, serves as an antidote to dogmatism and ideological rigidity, and acknowledges the possibility of being wrong.

Monika Rohmer engaged with this idea by questioning whether skeptical philosophy has democratic potential. She noted that skepticism might serve as a corrective to contemporary political issues, such as the inefficiency of democratic deliberation and the spread of misinformation. She also raised concerns about whether poetry could be considered a legitimate form of skeptical philosophizing, prompting a discussion on the relationship between literature and philosophy.

In response, Dr. Leeten argued that skepticism acknowledges the limits of philosophical reasoning and embraces other intellectual resources, including poetry. He cited historical examples of skeptical thinkers who incorporated literature into their reflections, positioning skeptical inquiry as a flexible and adaptive intellectual practice.

“I would think of skeptical philosophizing more like experimenting with different forms… You are searching, right? That’s what skeptics do. They are searching for the truth, and that means they are also searching for forms, for the right way of doing philosophy.”
— Lars Leeten

Cross-Cultural Connections: Skepticism and Buddhism

A key point of discussion was the relationship between skeptical philosophy and early Buddhist thought. Sool Park raised the hypothesis that skeptical philosophy might be understood as a European counterpart to Buddhist ideas. Dr. Leeten acknowledged the possibility of deep connections but admitted limited expertise in Buddhism. He noted that both traditions share certain epistemological and ethical concerns, such as reducing suffering through the suspension of judgment. He referenced scholarly work on Pyrrho’s encounters with Indian thought, which suggests that early skepticism may have been influenced by Buddhist philosophy.

“I don’t know because I don’t know enough about Buddhism… But when you have this idea of reducing suffering, for instance, that seems to be a Buddhist idea, right? Not knowing what is good, but reducing what is bad… It’s very plausible that there’s a non-European influence. But it would be an interesting question to look at the details.”
— Lars Leeten

Leon Krings contributed to this discussion by drawing parallels between skepticism and Buddhist meditation. He pointed out that many Buddhist meditation practices emphasize the suspension of judgment and the avoidance of rigid categorizations—ideas that resonate strongly with skeptical approaches to knowledge.

“In meditation practices, it is often said: Just observe without judgment. Refrain from thinking ‘this or that,’ don’t categorize, just see how things arise neutrally. That reminds me a lot of skeptical positions.” — Leon Krings

“Skeptical philosophy in the European tradition is mostly a discursive practice. […] However, there is this theory that Pyrrho practiced meditation. Some ancient sources describe him as sometimes sitting there in a strange way, just not reacting. And some scholars think this could mean he was meditating. The problem is that Greek texts don’t really have a concept for meditation, so they wouldn’t describe it that way. But if Pyrrho really did study philosophy in India, as some sources suggest, then of course he would have encountered these practices. It would be strange if he hadn’t. So it’s very plausible, but it hasn’t become part of the skeptical tradition in Europe. That would still be a task—to develop a skeptical practice beyond just discourse.” — Lars Leeten

Krings also noted that to substantiate claims about a historical influence of Buddhism on European skepticism, traces of central Buddhist doctrines like co-dependent origination would have to be shown to exist in skeptical thought. Lars Leeten responded by pointing out that there is an emphasis in skeptical thought on philosophizing from a relational perspective that shows how knowledge always has the character of pros ti (being for something or someone) which resonates with the Buddhist concept of co-dependent arising.

Skepticism in Politics and Democracy

The role of skepticism in politics was another central theme. Leon Krings asked whether skepticism could contribute to the development of a skeptical political philosophy. He highlighted the notion of division of power as a concept that aligns well with skepticism, as both reject absolute epistemic authority.

Dr. Leeten responded by arguing that skepticism naturally aligns with democratic principles, as both promote intellectual humility and shared decision-making. However, he also noted that skeptical philosophy resists offering prescriptive political theories, as doing so would contradict its commitment to epistemic humility.

“Democracy itself seems to be a skeptical endeavor because you divide power… There’s no place for absolute epistemic authority. In a democracy, ideally, everyone has a say and takes part in the discussion.” — Lars Leeten

Abbed Kanoor further explored this theme by questioning how skeptical philosophizing might engage with hypotheses and practical beliefs. He pointed out that even philosophers who are not traditionally labeled as skeptics—such as Ernst Cassirer—often embody a skeptical stance in their willingness to revise their theories in response to criticism. This led to a discussion on how skepticism can function within Wissenschaft (scientific and scholarly inquiry), reinforcing the idea that skeptical philosophy does not reject knowledge but rather insists on its fallibility. Kanoor also raised the Cynics as a group of philosophers that incorporated skeptical aspects in their ethos of philosophy and their cosmopolitan worldview.

“Cosmopolitanism, as proposed by Diogenes, was a critical reaction to Plato’s polis. It’s a rejection of political exclusivity and an embrace of contingency. Would you say that’s a skeptical idea?” — Abbed Kanoor

“Skeptics are often described as ‘nomads’—they don’t have one place where they live, they move around, they search. That’s also a skeptical trait: to recognize that if you had been born elsewhere, you would believe different things. That awareness of contingency is central to skepticism.” — Lars Leeten

Challenges of Skepticism in Academic Institutions

A recurring theme was the tension between skeptical philosophy and academic institutions. Sool Park expressed concerns about whether skepticism can be effectively integrated into the modern academic system, given that universities often reward certainty and authoritative claims. He noted that research proposals must demonstrate clear objectives and outcomes—requirements that seem incompatible with a skeptical approach.

“In academia, isn’t skepticism impossible? If you apply for a research grant and say, ‘We don’t know if this will work,’ you won’t get funding. Isn’t skepticism fundamentally at odds with academic structures?” — Sool Park

Dr. Leeten acknowledged this challenge, pointing out that skepticism has historically been marginalized within institutional philosophy. He noted that skeptical thinkers such as Socrates and Pyrrho often existed outside formal philosophical schools, and skepticism as a tradition has never been fully institutionalized. Nevertheless, he argued that skeptical education remains valuable, particularly in fostering critical thinking and intellectual openness.

“There has always been a tension between skepticism and academic institutions… Socrates didn’t found a school, but Plato did. Pyrrhonism began when Aenesidemus left academia because he wasn’t convinced by academic skepticism anymore. Skepticism has never been strongly institutionalized, and that’s part of it.” — Lars Leeten

Monika Rohmer offered a counterpoint, suggesting that skepticism does not necessarily have to conflict with academic structures. She argued that skeptical approaches can still be cultivated within university teaching, where students can learn about the historical contingency of knowledge and the importance of ongoing inquiry.

“But isn’t the solution to cultivate a skeptical attitude within the limits of what is possible? Accept that you have to write a paper, but formulate your claims more cautiously. Skepticism can be part of university teaching—showing students that what we consider ‘truth’ has changed over time.” — Monika Rohmer

The Role of Humor, Irony, and Perspective-Shifting

One of the more unexpected yet engaging aspects of the discussion centered on the role of humor and irony in skeptical philosophy. Leon Krings asked whether skeptical philosophers have traditionally employed humor as a way of challenging dogmatic thinking. He compared skeptical practices to Zen Buddhist methods, where humor and paradox are often used to shift perspectives.

Dr. Leeten affirmed that humor has played a crucial role in skeptical thought. He cited Montaigne as an example of a philosopher who combined deep intellectual inquiry with a playful, self-reflective style. He also noted that Socrates often used irony to expose the limitations of his interlocutors’ arguments. This aspect of skeptical philosophy, he argued, serves as both a critique of dogmatism and a reminder of the fallibility of human reasoning.

“Humor plays a big role in skepticism. Socratic irony and Montaigne’s playful writing are good examples—but do skeptical thinkers make fun of themselves, as we see with some of the Zen masters?” — Leon Krings

“Absolutely. Skeptics are very earnest about finding the truth—so earnest that they don’t take their own beliefs too seriously. There’s a motif in skeptical philosophy: being serious and yet keeping a sense of humor… Montaigne is full of humor, Socrates was ironic, and Hume talks about the importance of a sense of humor.” — Lars Leeten

Skeptical Philosophizing as a Practical Endeavor

Abosede Ipadeola raised a question about whether skepticism contradicts itself by presenting skepticism itself as a kind of truth. She pointed out that skeptical philosophy calls for intellectual humility, yet it seems to make a confident claim about the dangers of epistemic arrogance. On a pedagogical level, it could also demotivate younger students to give up on the notion of knowledge and truth.

“If we teach skeptical philosophy to children, won’t that demotivate them? Children want certainty, they want to be told ‘this is the goal.’ If we tell them knowledge is uncertain, how do we keep them engaged?” — Abosede Ipadeola

Dr. Leeten responded by drawing on Sextus Empiricus’ analogy of the painter who accidentally achieves the perfect representation of a horse’s mouth by throwing a sponge at his painting. He suggested that skepticism is not a doctrine of absolute doubt but rather an ongoing practice—an approach that emerges through experience rather than rigid theoretical commitments.

“That’s an old objection to skepticism… Sextus Empiricus has a metaphor for it: a painter trying to paint the foam at a horse’s mouth. He tries and fails until, in frustration, he throws his sponge at the canvas—and suddenly it’s perfect. Skepticism doesn’t claim an absolute foundation; it’s a practice that arises from experience. It works not because it’s an absolute truth, but because it avoids dogmatism and its dangers.”

The talk concluded with reflections on how skepticism can be practiced as more than just an intellectual exercise. Dr. Leeten noted that while skeptical philosophy has not historically emphasized bodily practice, there is room to explore structured exercises—such as perspective-shifting dialogues—that could enrich skeptical inquiry. He also emphasized that everyday practice is an important aspect of a skeptical ethos and that it can be a valuable tool for philosophical education.

“Skeptical philosophy doesn’t mean we have to change everyday practices. It’s still completely justified to say, ‘I know this.’ The problem starts when we think about knowledge in absolute terms. Skeptical education wouldn’t tell children they can’t know anything—it would teach them to recognize that they might sometimes be wrong, and that’s okay.” — Lars Leeten