From Non-alignment to Neutrality

Austria's Transformation during the First East-West Détente, 1953–1958

✣ **Michael Gehler**

Introduction

After 1945, Austria was in an intermediate position in several respects, a position that resulted not only from the country's geographical location but also from its status in the conflict between East and West. Austria had not been "defeated" during World War II because it had ceased to exist as a state from 1938 to 1945. The Moscow Declaration of 1943 referred to it as a "liberated" country that was to be extricated from the German Reichsverband and reestablished with its own statehood. In the view of the Allies, Austria was neither a classic enemy (only Great Britain remained in a state of war with it until 1947) nor an ally, let alone a victorious power. When Austria came up as a matter for negotiation in the late 1940s and early 1950s, it usually was overshadowed by the German issue. Even the former enemy countries of the Allied Powers–Hitler's allies and satellites (Italy, Finland, Romania, Bulgaria, and Hungary)–received more attention. At the Paris Conference of 1946, the Austrian question was not even on the agenda. The state treaty negotiations did not even begin until 1947, when the peace treaties were about to be signed. What Austrian political representatives had demanded in vain after the end of the First World War—namely, a state treaty and not a peace treaty—was not initially granted after World War II. The phrasing used in the internal papers of the Western powers, oscillating between "Austrian State Treaty" and "Peace Treaty," did nothing to provide a sense of security.[1]

1. Günter Bischof, "Between Responsibility and Rehabilitation: Austria in International Politics, 1940–1950," Ph.D. diss., Harvard University, 1989.

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From the late 1940s until 1953, Austria received aid from the Marshall Plan as a single country, including the Soviet occupation zone.[2] The European Recovery Program (ERP) allowed for a Western *orientation* of the economy, but Austrian leaders avoided *integration* into the West as long as their country was under the control of the Occupying Powers. The Austrian government did not pursue separate negotiations with the Western powers and kept its distance from military alliances and political organizations. Formal membership in the Brussels Pact ("Western European Union," or WEU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Council of Europe, and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was infeasible before the withdrawal of the Occupying Powers, even though the government occasionally toyed with the idea.[3] Austria from 1945 was thus a state with no alliances—a state that adhered unofficially to a policy of non-alignment until it made that status official with its declaration of neutrality on 26 October 1955.[4] Given the presence of the Occupying Powers and their desire to avoid the integration of either part of the country with the rival bloc, Austria was basically "neutralized" during the first ten years after the war.

This article focuses on the role of Austria during the first East-West détente from 1953 to 1958, a period in which the country was still formally under occupation, although it dared for the first time to see whether an alliance-free status for itself could convince the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Austrian territory. The article looks at the conclusion of the Austrian State Treaty and the declaration of neutrality in 1955 as well as Austria's position during crises in the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in June 1953, Hungary in October–November 1956, and Lebanon in July–October 1958, all against the backdrop of the neutrality question.

Austria's path to the State Treaty has been recounted in detail by Gerald Stourzh, and its role in the first Cold War has been cogently interpreted by Günter Bischof.[5] However, the interplay between two dimensions of the problem—the *genesis* of neutrality during the initial phase of the Cold War

2. Wilfried Mähr, *Der Marshallplan in Österreich* (Graz, Austria: Styria, 1989); Hannes Hofbauer, *Westwärts: Österreichs Wirtschaft im Wiederaufbau* (Vienna: Verlag für Gesellschaftskritik, 1992); Arno Einwitschläger, *Amerikanische Wirtschaftspolitik in Österreich 1945–1949* (Cologne: Boehlau, 1986); Günter Bischof, "Der Marshallplan und Österreich," *Zeitgeschichte,* Vol. 17, No. 11/12 (November/December 1990), pp. 463–474; and Günter Bischof, "Der Marshall-Plan in Europa 1947–1952," *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* B 22–23/97 (23 May 1997), pp. 3–16.

3. Michael Gehler, *Der lange Weg nach Europa: Österreich vom Ende der Monarchie bis zur EU,* Vol. 1, *Darstellung* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2002), pp. 126–149.

4. Oliver Rathkolb, "Österreich zwischen Neutralität und Allianzfreiheit 1953–2000: Ein Überblick," *Journal of European Integration History,* Vol. 7, No. 2 (2001), pp. 85–125.

5. Gerald Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit: Staatsvertrag, Neutralität und das Ende der Ost-West-Besetzung Österreichs 1945–1955,* 4th Ed. (Cologne: Boehlau, 1998); and Günter Bischof, *Austria in the Cold War, 1945–55: The Leverage of the Weak* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1999).

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(which ended after Josif Stalin's death in 1953), and the *development* of neutrality during international crises—has not yet been thoroughly considered, let alone studied in a systematic manner. This article therefore investigates four major issues: the necessary conditions for Austrian neutrality; key factors within Austria and abroad; the international impact and foreign perception of Austrian neutrality; and the early molding of Austrian neutrality that resulted in its final profile.

To set the stage, I will begin by outlining the main contours of this formative phase of Austria's foreign policy. According to Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber, neutrality in 1946 was still a hollow term, "technically devalued" as a result of the development of the Austrian air force and "as good as senseless" because of the invention of nuclear weapons.[6] As long as the formation of blocs was a question that was still open or not definitively concluded, Gruber believed it was advisable to be reserved about neutrality. With the founding of NATO in April 1949, a fait accompli was achieved in security policy that required Austria to take a clearer position. As the blocs coalesced, Gruber began to change his stance in 1949 and declared that only an unreasonable person could prefer "one-sided partisanship" to neutrality.[7] Neutrality, as he saw it, would have to be armed.[8] He even advocated a neutral but armed Europe that would provide military protection. He rejected any solution that leaned toward a Communist dictatorship or deviated from a democratic constitution. Thus, although it is true, as Stourzh argues, that Austria was caught between East and West, Gruber believed that this situation must not be allowed to affect Austria's domestic political complexion.

Austrian leaders realized, however, that they must take account of the views of third parties. Austria's own conception of neutrality was shaped in deference to the Occupying Powers, and this did not change until Bruno Kreisky came on the scene in the 1970s. Gruber believed that a certain rapprochement between the world powers was necessary for neutrality to be achieved. Austria could not by itself resolve the conflicts of a world that was

6. Speech by Karl Gruber, "Akademische Vereinigung für Außenpolitik im Rahmen der Österreichischen Liga der Vereinten Nationen," at the University of Vienna, 28 March 1946, reprinted as "Österreich in der Welt," *Politische Zeitprobleme,* No. 2 (1946), pp. 1–7; Speech by Karl Gruber at the Austrian National Parliament, Vienna, 20 October 1947, in Institute for Contemporary History, University of Innsbruck (ICH-UI), Karl Gruber Archiv (KGA), Box 5; and Karl Gruber, "Keine Vogel-Strauß-Politik in auswärtigen Fragen," *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna), 22 October 1947, pp. 1–2.

7. Karl Gruber, speech at the "Parteitag der ÖVP-Wien," Vienna, 20 May 1949), in ICH-UI, KGA, Box 5. A copy is also in Österreichisches Staatsarchiv (ÖStA), Archiv der Republik (AdR), Kabinett des Ministers (KdM), Zl.40.148-K/49, Box 11.

8. On the development of neutrality after 1945, see Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit,* pp. 252–282.

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divided. He therefore conceived of neutrality as the "passive" result of the policies of the great powers, rather than an "active" policy of a small state. But eventually, when faced with the West's tendency to reject neutrality outright (much less to provide guarantees of it), he concluded that he was mistaken.

Austria's foreign policy did not develop toward neutrality in a linear fashion. The year 1950, with the outbreak of military conflict in the Far East, brought enormous difficulties for Austria. The Korean War represented not only a turning point in the Cold War but also a change in Austria's policy: a signal to mobilize "all the defense forces of democracy" and an end to the illusion that a democratic state could live "without discipline and sacrifice." Gruber welcomed the U.S. military response to the North Korean attack and the United Nations (UN) Security Council resolution authorizing the U.S. response, which he believed would repulse Communist influence.[9] Only as the end of the Korean War drew near in the spring and summer of 1953 did new prospects for the acceptance of neutrality emerge in Europe. But the involvement of the United States in the Korean War on behalf of the UN also necessitated caution about the neutrality policy. Austrian Chancellor Leopold Figl was intent on gaining UN membership and had already applied to join.[10]

Austria Free from Alliances, 1953–1954

Under Chancellor Julius Raab, a new policy was adopted in April 1953 calling for increased contacts with the Soviet Union. This led to overtures about "an alliance-free status," which was not greatly different from the neutrality that was eventually achieved. Within this context, it is noteworthy that Gruber openly criticized the Finnish example–even though at this point Finland was not yet officially "neutral"–and thus anticipated the pejorative label of "Finlandization."[11] He also referred to Switzerland without making any com-

9. "Das Ende einer Illusion, Rede Grubers am 5. Jahrestag der UN," *Wiener Zeitung* (Vienna), 27 June 1950, pp. 1–2; and Speech by Karl Gruber at the Lower Austrian Framer's Association, Vienna, 9 January 1951, in ICH-UI, KGA, Box 22.

10. Wolfgang Strasser, *Österreich und die Vereinten Nationen: Eine Bestandsaufnahme von 10 Jahren Mitgliedschaft* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1967); and Josef Leidenfrost, "Die UNO als Forum für den österreichischen Staatsvertrag? Vom Wiener Appell 1946 bis zur Brasilien-Initiative 1952," in Emil Brix, Thomas Fröschl, and Josef Leidenfrost, eds., *Geschichte zwischen Freiheit und Ordnung: Gerald Stourzh zum 60: Geburtstag* (Graz, Austria: Styria, 1991), pp. 261–275.

11. Walter Laqueur, *The Political Psychology of Appeasement: Finlandization and Other Unpopular Essays* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Books, 1980), p. 7; Karl Gruber, *Zwischen Befreiung und Freiheit: Der Sonderfall Österreich* (Vienna: Ullstein, 1953), pp. 251–252; and Burkhard Auffermann, "Finnlandisierung: Das abschreckende Beispiel? Zur Problematik eines politischen Kampfbegriffes in der Ära des Kalten Krieges," *Zeitgeschichte,* Vol. 26, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 347–371.

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mitment to embrace its type of neutrality. The major thing he stressed is that neutrality would mean non-participation in military alliances.[12]

The Austrian government's conception of the neutrality option changed relatively little over time. Gruber made clear that he would support neutrality only if it were maintained by sovereign Austrian institutions and would not be subject to binding agreements with other parties. That was why he had doubts about the Finnish example and also believed that the Swiss variation went too far. Austria's neutrality, he argued, ought to be understood only as non-membership in military alliances. Unlike Bruno Kreisky's later views, Gruber regarded neutrality not as something that forms national identity but as an obstacle to further Western orientation and to closer relations with the soon-to-be European Economic Community (EEC). In retrospect, he stated that he had never been wholly convinced of neutrality but had recognized its political value as "a legitimate excuse for a small state."[13]

Austria's embrace of neutrality and non-membership in alliances did not prevent the country from adopting security measures that made it a "secret ally."[14] The "secret" rearmament of Austria in the 1950s, particularly with the help of the Americans in the Western Zone, was kept at a gradual pace by the Austrians to avoid precipitating a break with the Soviet Union. The Austrian government used the step-by-step rearmament of the Western Zone (6,500 men were armed by the end of 1955, including 215 officers) to induce the Occupying Powers to reduce their troop strength and their occupation costs. The partial Western orientation of the country's security policy thus contributed to a gradual emancipation from the occupiers and to the reestablishment of Austrian sovereignty. The well-calculated, "secret" rearmament also was used as a gentle point of pressure on the Soviet Union to move ahead with the state treaty and bring it to a conclusion.

This basic approach—of seeking an alliance-free status combined with "secret" ties with the West—was firmly in place two years before the conclusion of the state treaty. When Gruber met Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at the Bürgenstock near Lucerne on 20 June 1953, he asked the Indian

12. See the retrospective comments by Gruber in 1957 at the U.S. State Department when he was serving as ambassador to Washington, a post he held from 1954 to 1957. Memorandum of Conversation, 18 July 1957, in National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), Record Group (RG) 59, General Records of the Department of State, Central Decimal File, 1955–1959, Box 3578.

13. Karl Gruber, interview by Johannes Kunz, *Zeugen der Zeit,* Oesterreichischer Rundfunk (ORF), 27 March 1991.

14. Gerald Stourzh, "The Origins of Austrian Neutrality," in Alan T. Leonhard, ed., *Neutrality: Changing Concepts and Practices* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1988), pp. 35–57; and Günter Bischof, "Österreich: Ein 'geheimer Verbündeter' des Westens? Wirtschafts und sicherheitspolitische Fragen der Integration aus der Sicht der USA," in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, eds., *Österreich und die europäische Integration 1945–1993* (Vienna: Boehlau, 1993), pp. 425–450.

leader to sound out Moscow about the neutrality option. Soviet officials reacted by dragging their feet. Gruber then decided to follow up on Churchill's initiative of 11 May—of arranging a "Three-Power Summit" between the United States, Great Britain, and the USSR and, if necessary, to make a "lonely pilgrimage" to Moscow for it—and suggested Vienna as the location for a conference.[15]

Vienna would have been a suitable venue for an international conference in the early 1950s, but the suppression of the uprising in the GDR on 17 June 1953 had brought the shadow of the German question back over Austria at the very moment that the Soviet occupation authority had begun encouraging liberalization in its Austrian zone.[16] The Austrian Foreign Ministry closely examined the events of 17 June to see whether they would spur a change of Moscow's attitude toward Austria. To forestall any backsliding, the Austrian foreign minister argued that Austria's position was advantageous for the great powers as well: "They can liquidate their position without danger of an explosion and without having to deal with a loss of their prestige."[17] Austria's policy was one of restraint and "not mixing in." Gruber and others emphasized that West Germany's alliance ties were "exclusively the affair of the Bonn government and had no influence on Austria's foreign policy."[18]

Raab and West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer held opposing views of foreign policy,[19] and each consistently stuck to his own position, leaving little maneuvering room for either. By October 1953, Gruber had con-

15. "Verschlußsache zum 10. Ministerrat," 9 June 1953, in ÖStA, AdR, Ministerrat (MR)-Material 1953. Referring to his London trip and his talks with Malik and Churchill, Gruber says: "Ich bat auch Churchill, wann die Vier-Mächte-Konferenz zustande kommen soll, dass man Wien als Versammlungsort wählen möge. Er war in dieser Beziehung nicht ablehnend, meinte jedoch, daß die Russen Berlin vorziehen würden. Stockholm wurde auch als Treffpunkt angeführt, jedoch findet es keine besondere Zustimmung." See also Rolf Steininger, "Ein vereintes, unabhängiges Deutschland? Winston Churchill, der Kalte Krieg und die deutsche Frage im Jahre 1953," *Militärgeschichtliche Mitteilungen,* Vol. 36, No. 2 (1984), pp. 105–144; and Klaus Larres, *Politik der Illusionen: Churchill, Eisenhower und die deutsche Frage, 1945–1955* (Göttingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck-Ruprecht, 1994), pp. 127–184.

16. Manfried Rauchensteiner, *Der Sonderfall: Die Besatzungszeit in Österreich, 1945 bis 1955* (Graz, Austria: Styria, 1979), pp. 315–318; and Günter Bischof, "A Soviet 'New Look' on the Danube and the Emancipation of Austrian Foreign Policy in 1953: Peaceful Coexistence in Austria after Stalin's Death," in Siegfried Beer et al., eds., *Focus Austria: Vom Vielvölkerreich zum EU-Staat: Festschrift für Alfred Ableitinger zum 65: Geburtstag* (Graz, Austria: Institut für Geschichte der Karl-Franzens-Universität Graz, 2003), pp. 441–466.17. Speech by Karl Gruber at the opening ceremony of the House of Agriculture, Bruck an der Leitha, Austria, 21 June 1953), quoted in Michael Gehler, ed., *Karl Gruber: Reden und Dokumente 1945–1953: Eine Auswahl* (Köln: Boehlau, 1994), p. 432.

18. "Notiz zum österreichisch-deutschen Verhältnis und zur Paktfreiheit wird dem indischen Gesandten in Wien überreicht," 29 June 1953, quoted in Gehler, ed., *Karl Gruber,* p. 433.

19. See Oliver Rathkolb, "Austria's 'Ostpolitik' in the 1950s and 1960s: Honest Broker or Double Agent?" in *Austrian History Yearbook,* Vol. 26 (1995), p. 130; and Josef Foschepoth, *Adenauer und die Deutsche Frage* (Göttingen, West Germany: Vandenhoeck Ruprecht, 1988).

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cluded that if anything could be changed regarding the German question, it would take place *in Austria,* which was serving as a display window.[20]

A temporary ray of hope came at the beginning of 1954, when Austria was admitted to the foreign ministers' conference in Berlin with equal rights as a negotiating partner.[21] The new foreign minister, Leopold Figl, and Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Bruno Kreisky began distancing Austria from its seemingly inescapable dependence on the German question, which itself was gradually being solved through the division into separate German states.[22] But Austria's effort to keep its distance from the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) also had its limits. Raab and Figl realized that the FRG's strictly pro-Western course was beneficial for Austria, and they therefore sought to prevent sharp conflicts with West Germany. At the Berlin Conference in January–February 1954, officials from the two countries agreed to take no action that would be detrimental to the other country.

In February 1954, as public pressure mounted, the Austrian government renewed its push for a rapid conclusion of the state treaty, but progress proved infeasible when Moscow once again argued that Soviet troops must stay in the east of Austria until a peace treaty with Germany was concluded. Vienna rejected this linkage because it would signal less-than-complete sovereignty and because the danger of Soviet infiltration would still exist.[23] Austrian neutrality according to the Swiss model, as U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles proposed to Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov in Berlin, would have entailed full sovereignty, but the proposal met a cool reception in Moscow.[24] Austria's insistence on full sovereignty never wavered, and that position was shared by the West Germans. Kreisky was familiar with Bonn's concerns, and in August 1954 he sought to reassure the FRG that "Austria still does not intend that its autonomous declaration proposing an alliance-free policy would be bound by treaty."[25] A few months later, events did in fact develop in this way.

20. Speech by Karl Gruber, at the Austrian Economic Association in the Club of Economy, Vienna, 1 October 1953, quoted in Gehler, ed., *Karl Gruber,* pp. 445–446.

21. See Gerald Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages 1945–1955: Österreichs Weg zur Neutralität,* 3rd ed. (Graz, Austria: Styria, 1985), pp. 120–125; and Nikolaus Katzer, *"Eine Übung im Kalten Krieg": Die Berliner Außenministerkonferenz von 1954* (Köln: Verlag Wissenschaft und Politik, 1994), pp. 222–223, 266.

22. Michael Gehler, "Österreich, die Bundesrepublik und die deutsche Frage 1945/49–1955: Zur Geschichte der gegenseitigen Wahrnehmungen zwischen Abhängigkeit und gemeinsamen Interessen," *Historische Mitteilungen der Ranke-Gesellschaft,* Vol. 8, No. 2 (1995), pp. 221–264.

23. Stourzh, *Geschichte des Staatsvertrages,* pp. 116–129.

24. Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit,* pp. 309–311.

25. "Carl-Hermann Mueller-Graaf to Auswärtiges Amt/Bonn," 18 August 1954, 211–00/2073/54—Ber. Nr. 450/54, in Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (PA/AA), Berlin, Abteilung (Abt.) 3, Referat 304, 211–00/55, Band (Bd.) 3, Zl. 20732/54.

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An "Austrian Model" for the West or a "Trojan Horse" for Eastern Europe?

Molotov's speech on 8 February 1955 signaled that an opportunity to resolve the Austrian question might finally be in sight. Among other things, he demanded that a four-power conference be convened immediately to discuss both Austria and Germany. According to Hans Wassmund, Soviet leaders were still hopeful of preventing West Germany from entering the WEU and NATO, and they therefore concentrated their efforts on warning about the negative effects of the Treaties of Paris, which would permit German rearmament and entry into the alliances. Ratification of these treaties, Soviet officials argued, would deepen the separation of the German states and keep Germany divided indefinitely.[26]

On the Austrian question, however, the leeway for progress seemed greater. A note from the *Direction Générale politique d'Europe* from the Quai d'Orsay of 12 April suggested that the USSR was now interested in the "neutralization" of Austria:

> A neutralized Austria would pose a constant temptation for West Germany and, as a result, perceptibly weaken Adenauer's position. Austria would find itself in the same position as Switzerland and therefore become a highly important strategic obstacle to the NATO powers by eliminating every possibility to build a "fortress in the Alps," thus severing all supply lines between Italy and West Germany.[27]

From the Soviet point of view, "easing political tensions" could also mean the "prevention" or at least "delay" of German rearmament and entry into NATO. From Moscow's perspective, the "neutralization" of Germany and the "easing political tensions" in Europe were complementary.[28]

In the spring of 1955, the Western media began to discuss the idea of a belt of neutral states in Europe, which the Soviet Union seemed to have in mind. Without the integration of a united Germany into such a zone, it would remain only a patchwork. The British ambassador in Vienna reported on Moscow's apparent aims:

26. Hans Wassmund, *Kontinuität im Wandel, Bestimmungsfaktoren sowjetischer Deutschlandpolitik in der Nach-Stalin-Zeit* (Köln: Boehlau, 1974), p. 79.

27. "Note Direction Générale Politique Europe/S/Direction d'Europe Orientale, Attitude soviétique à l'égard de la question autrichienne depuis la Conférence de Berlin," 12 April 1955, in Ministère des Affaires Étrangères (MAE), Paris, Série Europe 1944–1960, Vol. 289, Folio (Fol.) 248–249.

28. Compare similar thoughts in William Hayter's telegram to the Foreign Office (FO), 19 April 1955, in United Kingdom, The National Archives (UKNA), Foreign Office Files (FO) 371/117790, RR 1071/158.

> The basic Soviet objective appears to be the creation of a belt of neutral states consisting of Sweden, Germany, Austria and Yugoslavia. In view of the apparent situation in which Germany would be the only missing link, this chain must have a great attraction for the Soviets. We therefore consider it possible that the Soviets are prepared to conclude the Austrian treaty if the neutralization, or something closely approaching neutralization, of Austria can be achieved. Prevention of German rearmament is probably still the primary aim and they may consider that the neutralization of Austria would contribute to it.[29]

The traditional Soviet objective of "neutralizing" Germany (i.e., turning it into a neutral state) and the new effort to ease political tensions in Europe thus seemed compatible. But regardless of Soviet views of the German question, what was decisive for Austria in its bid for neutrality was its willingness to achieve a bilateral agreement with the Soviet Union and to issue a unilateral declaration in this regard. In April 1955 an Austrian delegation went to Moscow and agreed on a future policy of neutrality.

This agreement, from Moscow's perspective, may have been directed at least as much at Germany as at Austria. Austrian officials who accompanied Chancellor Raab to Moscow confidentially informed the French ambassador in Vienna, François Seydoux, about statements by Soviet officials that if West Germany remained outside NATO, the Soviet Union would be prepared to make generous proposals in favor of reunification.[30] Adenauer believed that these plans existed and that they could be presented to him during his stay in Moscow, but he was wary of "the danger that lay in this proposal" and was unwilling to agree to such considerations.[31] Austrian Foreign Minister Figl had gotten the impression from his talks with Vladimir Semyonov of the Soviet Foreign Ministry

> that the whole Russian change of tactics [vis-à-vis Austria] was aimed at creating a precedent and example for Germany; that the Russians already had proposals on Germany ready; and that these proposals (which might include an invitation to Adenauer and Ollenhauer to make a joint visit to Moscow) would

29. Germany is not included in the belt of states concept in Wallinger to FO, 23 March 1955, in UKNA, FO 371/117786, RR 1071/55. The same is true of Stourzh, "The Origins of Austrian Neutrality," p. 52.

30. François Seydoux to MAE, Telegram, Vienna, 18 June 1955, in MAE, Série Europe 1944–1960, EU 6–8–8, Vol. 256, Fol. 185.

31. See Leopold Figl's message to Hanns Seidel in Heinrich Krone's diary notation of 30 June 1955, quoted in Rudolf Morsey and Konrad Repgen, eds., *Untersuchungen und Dokumente zur Ostpolitik und Biographie* (Mainz: Matthias Grüne Wald-Verlag, 1974), pp. 139–140; and Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit,* p. 477 n. 373.

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> probably be made even if there were a hitch over the conclusion of the Austrian Treaty.[32]

The Belgian foreign minister, Paul-Henri Spaak, was one of the most important exponents of NATO. He still regarded the German question "as the central European problem" and believed "that the neutralization of Austria would not trigger a sudden change of direction in Germany's policy, especially because Federal Chancellor Adenauer, who seemed to control the situation, firmly rejected reunification of Germany at the price of neutralization." Nevertheless, Spaak feared

> that the "Austrian example" could have a magnetic influence on almost all classes of the German population over time, if it really turned out that the West was not able to carry out a non-violent reunification of Germany . . . within the framework and under continuation of the current European policy of integration.[33]

Thus, as Spaak saw it, the best thing was for the West to reject any attempt by Moscow to lure Germany away via concessions on Austria.

Officials in the West were initially divided in their views of Austrian neutrality. In a speech in Iowa that became famous for its firm stance against neutralism, John Foster Dulles deemed such a status reprehensible and "immoral."[34] Although Dulles and Eisenhower would have welcomed neutrality for Eastern Europe, they were wary of applying it to countries not already within the Soviet bloc.

Elsewhere in the West, however, the view was less hostile. According to Seydoux, French officials hoped that if Austria gained Moscow's formal acceptance of its independence and sovereignty, this would strengthen Austria's position toward Eastern Europe. Austria's neutrality could even serve as a Trojan horse for establishing a foothold in the East-bloc countries. A Danube Confederation would offer Austria the possibility to play a more important part.

32. Geoffrey Wallinger to FO, Telegram No. 88, 18 April 1955, in UKNA, FO 371/117789, RR 1071/149.

33. Fuchs to Figl, "Internationale Rückwirkungen des österreichischen Staatsvertrages. Gespräch mit Außenminister Spaak" (Confidential Report), 16 May 1955, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol 1955, Staatsvertrag 5, Zl. 322336-pol/55 (GZl. 322.128-pol/55). See also Manfried Rauchensteiner, "Staatsvertrag und bewaffnete Macht," in Alois Mock, Ludwig Steiner, and Andreas Khol, eds., *Neue Fakten zu Staatsvertrag und Neutralität* (Vienna: Vereinigung für politische Bildung-Politische Akademie, 1980), p. 153.

34. Michael Ruddy, "European Integration, the Neutrals, and the U.S. Security Interests: From the Marshall Plan to the Rome Treaties," in Michael Gehler and Rolf Steininger, eds., *The Neutrals and the European Integration, 1945–1995* (Cologne: Boehlau, 2000), pp. 14–15.

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Seydoux concluded that if Austria remained loyal to the Western powers, its neutrality would prove beneficial.[35]

The FRG's Disinclination to Follow the Austrian "Example"

The Austrians wanted not only an end to the foreign occupation but a barrier against a future *Anschluss.* Neutrality would be a self-imposed guarantee of independence from Germany. Austrian officials did not want to see Germany itself become neutral because they feared that this would leave open the possibility of an *Anschluss* of two neutral states. Raab reportedly told the British ambassador to Vienna, Geoffrey Wallinger, that Austrian neutrality would provide a definitive answer to the *Anschluss* question. A neutral Germany, he stressed, was no longer plausible, and thus a new *Anschluss* was impossible. Like the Swiss, Raab regarded neutrality as conducive to the strengthening of Austrian national sentiment.[36] But domestic and foreign opponents of Austrian neutrality, including Adenauer, were wont to equate neutrality with neutralism or neutralization, a second-class status that would be unlikely to foster a stronger national identity.

Austria's decision to accept the Soviet invitation was surprising and came too fast for many Western leaders, who were suspicious of Raab's "neutralism." The Austrian delegation knew that Western governments would agree to neutrality only if it did not become a "model" or precedent for Germany. This was the view of Kreisky and Vice Chancellor Adolf Schärf (both of whom were Social Democrats) more so than of Raab and Figl (both of whom belonged to the People's Party). Official announcements by Vienna that excluded the possibility of creating an "example" for Germany must be seen in this context.[37]

The West German government, for its part, categorically rejected any comparison with Austria.[38] But the Four-Power arrangement that lasted in

35. François Seydoux to MAE, Telegram, Vienna, 4 July 1955, in MAE, Série Europe 1944–1960, EU 6–8–7, Vol. 270, Fol. 205–206.

36. Lalouette to Pinay, Vienna, 4 June 1955, in MAE, Série Europe 1944–1960, EU 6–9–1, Vol. 293, Fol. 099. See also "Delegation at the London Working Group to the Department of State," 28 April 1955, in U.S. Department of State, *Foreign Relations of the United States,* 1955–1957, Vol. V, pp. 153–154 (hereinafter referred to as *FRUS,* with appropriate year and volume numbers).

37. This point has not been taken into consideration by Stourzh. See Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit,* pp. 468–472; and François Seydoux to MAE, Vienna, 8 November 1955, in MAE, Série Europe 1944–1960, EU 6–8–8, Vol. 256, Fol. 243.

38. "Bonn weist erneut Vergleiche zurück: Österreich kein Modellfall für die Bundesrepublik," *Frank-*

Austria until 1955 remained a thorn in Adenauer's side. He did not distinguish "neutrality" from "neutralization," which he equated with "Sovietization." It is therefore not surprising that Austrian officials informed him belatedly about the development of bilateral Austrian-Soviet contacts in the spring of 1955, and that he misjudged their prospects of success.[39] His misjudgment stemmed from his fears of possible repercussions in the FRG.[40]

Adenauer's assumption that "neutralization of Germany would be one of the most dangerous threats and imply Sovietization" was purely speculative. The two separate and heavily-armed German states of different ideological orientations were presumably no less a threat to peace than a neutral and united Germany would have been. With the world's highest density of nuclear weapons, the two states ensured the continuation of the Cold War.

Raab's policy reinforced Adenauer's deep aversion to "neutralism."[41] Despite Austria's success, the West German chancellor dismissed neutrality as a possible solution for the German question. His negative view of it accounted for the displeasure he expressed about the treatment of German assets in the state treaty (the new article 22), which was unexpectedly unfavorable for Bonn. The issue was merely a pretext but not the real reason for his concern and anger.[42] Austria's impending neutrality heightened Adenauer's "neutralization trauma" and strengthened the FRG's willingness to accept partial state freedom and national division.

Adenauer's desire for integration into the West was a further reason that the Western powers were disinclined to reconsider their German policy, let alone seek an Austrian-style solution for Germany that looked dangerous and unpredictable. As early as March 1955, they had, to the disappointment of

furter Allgemeine Zeitung, 20 April 1955, p. 3. See also excerpts from Karl Willy Beer, "Österreich ist nicht Deutschland," *Deutsche Korrespondenz,* 7 April 1955, in UKNA, FO 371/117789, RR 1071/145, pp. 9–10. See also "La R. D. A. n'est pas l'Autriche," in Edgar Faure, *Mémoires II: Si tel doit être mon destin ce soir* (Paris: Plon, 1984), p. 319.

39. Rotter to Figl, "Gespäch mit Bundeskanzler Dr. Adenauer," 28 February 1955, in "Österreichische Vertretung Bonn" (Confidential Report), in ÖStA, Zl. 23-pol/55, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol 1955, Staatsvertrag 1 A, Zl. 320.227-pol/55.

40. Rotter to Figl, "Bundeskanzler Adenauer zur österreichischen Frage," 28 April 1955, in ÖStA, Zl.52-pol/55, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol 1955, Staatsvertrag 1 A, Zl. 321.761-pol/55 (GZl. 320.227-pol/55).

41. See Rathkolb, "Austria's 'Ostpolitik' in the 1950s and 1960s," pp. 129–145.

42. Adenauer was irritated about the disputes regarding German assets and Austria's neutrality option. See Michael Gehler, "State Treaty and Neutrality: The Austrian Solution in 1955 as a 'Model' for Germany?" in Anton Pelinka and Günter Bischof, eds., *Austria in the Nineteen Fifties* (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1994), pp. 39–78, esp. 60; and Michael Gehler, "'Österreichische Schweinerei': Reaktionen des deutschen Bundeskanzlers Adenauer auf Staatsvertrag und Neutralität 1955," *Salzburger Nachrichten* (Salzburg), 1 July 1995, p. 2; and Stourzh, *Um Einheit und Freiheit,* p. 533 n. 134.

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Moscow, rejected Soviet Prime Minister Nikolai Bulganin's proposal to hold a Foreign Ministers' Conference in Vienna, mainly because they wanted to avoid any discussion of the German question.[43] Adenauer himself urged the Western powers to maintain and continue a "policy of strength," and he sought to dispel any notion of reunification through neutrality.[44] When he learned that Eisenhower, at a press conference on 18 May, had not excluded this possibility and had even emphasized the advantages of creating a zone of neutralized states, the West German chancellor and his aides were reportedly "flooded by a wave of pessimism." Adenauer warned Eisenhower that he must "avoid falling into their [the Soviet Union's] trap."[45]

Adenauer believed the main problem was not the reactions of the German public but the irresolute stance of Western governments, "which he thought were too eager for appeasement." On 24 May, Adenauer conferred with the West German ambassadors in Washington, London, and Paris and told them he was against all forms of "neutralism." The "paradoxical thing" was that after the FRG had joined NATO, Adenauer was no longer concerned about the Social Democratic opposition, which had rejected ideas of "neutralization." Instead, he feared that officials in the West would waver and make unwise concessions.[46]

His calculations in this regard were borne out. In the Bundestag, the Austrian "example" did not cause any substantial opposition to the government's aim of seeking closer cooperation with the West. Although the West German public did increasingly believe that Adenauer should see what was on offer

43. See Moscow's reaction, as recorded by Roger Lalouette in a note to Antoine Pinay, Vienna, 6 April 1955, in Commission de publication des documents diplomatiques Français, *Documents Diplomatiques Français,* Vol. 1 (Paris: Imprimerie Nationale, 1955), pp. 407–408.

44. On 17 May Eisenhower warned of false hopes that the world's problems could be solved quickly. He also emphasized "the biggest diplomatic defeat the Russians have seen since the end of the war" (referring to the state treaty). The Soviet Union, he argued, had retreated for the first time, a fact of considerable importance for the morale of the rest of the Eastern European countries. "The policy of strength which has been pursued in accordance with our allies begins to be profitable." Quoted in *Archiv der Gegenwart* (Bonn: Heinrich Siegler, 1955), p. 5178 (hereinafter referred to as *AdG,* with year of publication). On 18 May Eisenhower was not expressly negative about the creation of a bloc of neutral states in Central Europe. In response to a qusetion from a *Le monde* reporter, Eisenhower added that it would be necessary to draw a distinction between the armed neutrality of Switzerland, the neutrality that Austria would soon choose, and a military vacuum. See *AdG,* 1955, p. 5178; and Andreas Hillgruber, *Alliierte Pläne für eine "Neutralisierung" Deutschlands, 1945–1955* (Opladen, West Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), p. 25; and Josef Rupieper, *Der besetzte Verbündete: Die amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik, 1949–1955* (Opladen, Germany: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1991), pp. 419–420. Eisenhower's attitude toward Austrian neutrality was more favorable than Dulles's. See Oliver Rathkolb, *Washington ruft Wien: US-Gro\\1,223\\machtpolitik und Österreich 1953–1963* (Vienna: Boehlau, 1997), pp. 44–60.

45. Andre François-Poncet to Pinay, Bonn, 20 May 1955, in *DDF* (1955), Vol. 1, Doc. 290, pp. 672–673.

46. Ibid.

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from the USSR—a factor that contributed to his decision to travel to Moscow—this pressure was easily contained.[47]

How, then, is the Austrian State Treaty of 1955 to be interpreted? In Adenauer's view, it was a victory for the Soviet Union, and to a large extent this is correct: Austrian neutrality marked a success for Soviet policy insofar as it led to the withdrawal of NATO foces from western Austria. The wider application of the Austrian "model" would have brought into question all West European steps toward integration and would have endangered any further progress. But, as it turned out, Austria remained Western-oriented in its economic relations, and Soviet attempts to promote the neutralization of Germany failed. Viewed from this longer-term perspective, the state treaty was a compromise solution.[48]

If Soviet leaders had moved a year or two earlier on Austria, they might have been able to gain greater credibility for their policy toward Germany. Austria might then have served as a genuine "example" for what could be done with a united Germany.[49] In that sense, Austria was as important as Adenauer in complicating Soviet *Deutschlandpolitik.*

Austria and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis

Neutrality is not necessarily an export item, but something reserved for a few states. The Germans were not the only ones who had to learn this lesson in the Cold War; the Hungarians learned it as well. The signing of the Austrian State Treaty, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the declaration of permanent neutrality led to a surge of "Austria euphoria" in Hungary that had not been seen since 1945. The original inter-Allied agreements, which had been reached in the context of the peace treaties of 1947, provided that once Soviet troops withdrew from Austria, a withdrawal from Hungary would also take place.[50] But the signing of the Warsaw Pact on 14 May 1955 created a new reality, enabling the Soviet Union to keep its troops in Hungary indefinitely—

47. See Josef Foschepoth, "Adenauers Moskaureise 1955," in *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte,* Vol. 22/86 (31 May 1986), pp. 30–46.

48. Vojtech Mastny, "Kremlin Politics and the Austrian Settlement," *Problems of Communism,* Vol. 31, No. 4 (July August 1982), pp. 50–51.

49. I am preparing a monograph on the subject of Austria as a "model" for Germany in 1955.

50. For this, see Mihály Fülöp, *La paix inachevée: Le Conseil des Ministres des Affaires Étrangères et le traité de paix avec la Hongrie, 1947* (Budapest: Association des Sciences Historiques de Hongrie, 1998).

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all the more reason for Austria's achievement to be admired by many Hungarians.[51]

Austria's initial embrace of the option of non-membership in alliances was accompanied by the first signs of a reduction of tensions in its relations with Hungary, well before progress on the state treaty began. As early as 1953, talks on compensation for seized Austrian assets were initiated between Vienna and Budapest, although the discussions had to be interrupted later that year.[52] Bilateral trade, which had plummeted in the period from 1937 to 1946 (when the percentage of Austria's total exports going to Hungary dropped from 15 percent to 2.7 percent, and its imports from Hungary decreased from 16 percent to 3.2 percent), also picked up sharply. Beginning in 1947, and especially in 1948 when an initial trade agreement was signed, trade between the two countries by 1955 rose from 70.7 million Austrian schillings to 894.4 million. By 1956 the volume of trade exceeded one billion schillings.[53] The precipitous increase in bilateral trade helped to diminish political tensions long before neutrality was achieved. Neutrality alone would not have engendered these improvements.

The easing of political tensions between the two countries was evident when Hungary endorsed Austria's neutrality in an "extremely rapid and especially festive form." On 24 November 1955, Hungary and nine other countries were the first to take this step, and Hungary was the first Communist state to do so. The official declaration about this matter was published in Hungary's national law gazette.[54] One wonders whether some in Budapest already saw Austria as a model for Hungary.

After the failure of the Geneva summit and the Geneva Conference of Foreign Ministers in the summer and fall of 1955,[55] many Hungarians were disappointed by the lack of further progress in reducing tensions in central Europe. A deep hopelessness set in because the "roll-back" policy of the Eisenhower-Dulles administration turned out to be substanceless propaganda.[56]

51. Braunias to Figl, "Ungarn und die Sowjetunion," 6 January 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn-2, Zl. 511.192-Pol/56.

52. Report Zl. 21-pol/56, Braunias to Figl, "Zur Normalisierung der österreichisch-ungarischen Beziehungen," 21 January 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 2, Zl. 511.368-pol/56 (GZl. 511.049-pol/56).

53. Peter Haslinger, *Hundert Jahre Nachbarschaft: Die Beziehungen zwischen Österreich und Ungarn, 1895–1994* (Frankfurt am Main: Lang, 1996), pp. 239–240.

54. Report Zl. 21-pol/56.

55. Günter Bischof and Saki Dockrill, eds., *Cold War Respite: The Geneva Summit of 1955* (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2000).

56. Report Zl. 10-Pol/56, Braunias to Figl, "Zwischen Verzweiflung und Hoffnung," 7 January 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3, Zl. 511.190-pol/56; and cf. Manfried Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei: Die Große Koalition in Österreich, 1945–1966* (Vienna: Styria, 1987), p. 336.

The relationship between the Austrian solution of 1955 and the revolutionary events in Hungary in 1956 seemingly bore out the Trojan horse thesis of neutrality. But it is worth noting that Austria itself was disinclined to serve as an "example" for other countries and wanted to decide itself about the applicability of its status, rather than leave it to be judged by others. Austrian leaders earlier had declined to portray neutrality as a solution for Germany, and they found themselves in an even more difficult situation when the revolution erupted in Hungary barely a year after Austria had become neutral. By this point, the Austrians had not yet determined what leeway their neutral status gave them. The Hungarian crisis forced Austria to speed up its effort to figure out what neutrality meant and how it was to be handled in practice.

After the revolution began and Soviet troops intervened on 23–24 October, Raab, after an extraordinary session of the government on 28 October, felt compelled to issue an unequivocal appeal to the USSR:

> The Austrian government . . . requests the government of the USSR to cooperate in halting military clashes and putting an end to the bloodshed. . . . The Austrian government favors a normalization of conditions in Hungary with the goal that through the reestablishment of liberty in accordance with human rights, European peace will be strengthened and ensured.[57]

In a series of cables, the Austrian government informed its envoys in Paris, London, and Washington about the extremely difficult situation in which Austria found itself:

> It is likely that larger units of Hungarian freedom troops will make it to Austria. As far as possible, all provisions have been made on the Austrian side for the prompt admission of groups that lay down their arms and for the granting of asylum. Please bring this to the attention of the government of the country in which you are stationed and propose that they take whatever action is necessary to move these groups to other Western countries without delay.[58]

Austrian leaders generally acted in conformity with international legal conceptions of neutrality, which permitted humanitarian aid, military self-defense, and political negotiation. They also upheld the country's pro-Western orientation, with a democratic state under the rule of law. The federal government ordered seven measures immediately and referred to them later on when the Soviet Union accused Austria of an alleged violation of neu-

57. "Telegramm in claris und Verbalnote" and "Lage in Ungarn, Appell an die Sowjetregierung," 28 October 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3, Akt Zl. 519.625-pol/56 (GZl. 511.049-pol/56); Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei,* p. 341; and Rathkolb, "Austria's 'Ostpolitik' in the 1950s and 1960s," pp. 137–138.

58. "Telegramm in Ziffern," 28 October 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3, Akt Zl. 519.625-pol/56 (GZl. 511.049-pol/56).

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trality: (1) the establishment of a prohibited zone, to which entry was forbidden; (2) inspection of the prohibited zone by the Austrian defense minister and by military attachés of the great powers; (3) the requirement that Ferenc Nagy (an exiled Hungarian leader) leave Austria; (4) a moratorium on the issuance of visas to foreign passport holders (émigrés); (5) increased control of the country's western border; (6) the prohibition of political activity among refugees and exiles; and (7) the disarming and internment of those who were armed.[59]

On 28 October, Figl expressed great concern to the Soviet ambassador, Sergei Lapin, that the fighting would persist and that Hungarian units would flee to Austrian territory. Figl said that if Soviet units were to come across the border, they must first lay down their weapons. The Soviet government would have to order its troops to respect neutral ground. Lapin reponded that the USSR "has no intention of jeopardizing Austrian neutrality," but he added that Soviet troops had "taken steps in Hungary" in accordance with the Warsaw Pact and at the request of the legal Hungarian government.[60]

Throughout the crisis, Austrian officials were careful not to give any pretext to Moscow to violate Austria's neutrality. Plans to debate Hungary in the parliament were put on hold, although Raab did repeat his call for an end to the fighting. The Suez crisis, which had escalated with the outbreak of fighting on 29 October, complicated the international situation even further.[61] Austrian leaders were determined to ensure their country's security through strict observance of neutrality. On 30 October, the political department of the foreign ministry recommended:

> Our protection lies in our neutrality. The political department takes the liberty once again to warn against declarations by Parliament that could create the impression in Moscow that our neutrality has been swept away by the uprising in Hungary. . . . Our task now will be to continue our assistance, but quietly.[62]

59. "Depesche des BKA/AA," Zl. 50981, and "Abschrift für Abt. Pol." concerning "Behauptete Verletzung der Neutralität durch Österreich; Information der Botschaft Moskau," in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 C.

60. "Vertraulicher Aktenvermerk," Platzer, 28 October 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 C, Zl. 519.701-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56).

61. See Csaba Békés, "The 1956 Hungarian Revolution and World Politics," Working Paper No. 16, Cold War International History Project, Washington, DC, September 1996; Winfried Heinemann and Norbert Wiggershaus, eds., *Das internationale Krisenjahr 1956: Polen, Ungarn, Suez* (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1999); and Wolfram Kaiser, "Die internationale Politik während des Ungarnaufstands 1956: Neue Forschungsergebnisse," *Deutschland Archiv,* Vol. 30, No. 1 (January 1997), pp. 130–133.

62. Information for the "Herrn Bundesminister" concerning "Beabsichtigte Ungarndebatte im Parlament," 30 October 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3, Zl. 519.696-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56).

These actions, in time of crisis, were simultaneously the birth and christening of Austrian neutrality.

Despite voting for the UN resolution of 4 November calling on the Soviet Union to withdraw its troops from Hungary, the Austrian government remained extremely cautious in its response to the crisis.[63] Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Valerian Zorin reminded the Austrians that in these times, "it is of the utmost importance that Austria maintain its neutrality as scrupulously as possible. The smallest deviation, the slightest inattention, would be 'exploited not by us, but by others who would see it as the abandonment of neutrality.'"[64]

These Soviet warnings provoked responses from the West. Although U.S. officials had refrained from providing any guarantee of Austria's neutrality to avoid creating a precedent that would antagonize the West Germans, they were quick to counter Soviet allegations that the United States had assisted the Hungarian rebels from Austrian territory. In a formal statement, the Eisenhower administration declared "that the violation of the territorial integrity and internal sovereignty of Austria would of course signify a serious threat to peace." Austrian newspapers construed this as a declaration by the U.S. president that a violation of Austria's integrity was a casus belli, an interpretation that went well beyond the text of the declaration (and the administration's intent), as was accurately noted by the Austrian foreign ministry.[65]

Austria: Officially Neutral, but "Not Neutral at Heart"

The outbreak of unrest in Hungary and the Soviet crackdown took Austria's political and military leaders by surprise. Austria was not prepared to resist an attack against its territory. The Austrian armed forces had not been set up until early 1956, and the first conscripts (*Präsenzdiener*) had not begun serving until October. Military officials lacked the experience and knowledge to deal with problems caused by an uprising in a neighboring country. During the first stage of the crisis, Austrian troops even lacked ammunition. The command structure was unclear, and units received conflicting orders. The Austrian defense minister, Ferdinand Graf, at times acted on his own and at other times asked the government what to do. No liaison existed between the chan-

63. Haslinger, *Hundert Jahre Nachbarschaft,* pp. 243–244.

64. Bischoff, "Depesche," Zl. 20862, 18 November 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 C, Zl. 520.644-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56).

65. "Amtsvermerk," 26 November 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 C, Zl. 520.881-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56); and Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei,* p. 347.

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cellor's office and the head of the military. After the Soviet invasion on 4 November, the Austrian defense ministry gave orders to fire if Soviet troops crossed into Austria, but the reality was that Austria's military was too weak to protect the borders or to maintain control of the country's airspace. Fortunately, no real danger arose, and Soviet troops kept their distance from Austrian territory. Only a few minor border violations took place. In April 1957, the so-called *Sicherungseinsatz* (security deployment) came to an end.[66]

On one hand, the shortage of military equipment and the dearth of security precautions necessitated an even more precise adherence to the legal rules of neutrality. On the other hand, the events in Hungary suggested that neutrality was a credible option and offered a certain guarantee of protection. Excessive conclusions were subsequently derived from this latter point. Under Bruno Kreisky in the 1970s, the Austrian government regarded a policy of neutrality as the best security policy. The army continued to eke out a shadow existence. The only thing it could really do was offer "good services"—providing aid to refugees and carrying out humanitarian measures.

During the Hungarian revolution, the Austrian government organized comprehensive shipments of aid and the transport of medical supplies. When the Austrian representative in Budapest, Walter Peinsipp, reestablished telephone contact with Vienna on 30 October, he stated that the distribution of aid by the embassy meant "real propaganda for Austria."[67]

The extent to which Austria's understanding of neutrality was still undeveloped in the autumn of 1956—a year after the official declaration—became apparent when the country applied for membership in the ECSC, a supranational organization that required a partial relinquishing of national sovereignty. The ECSC founding states were all NATO members on the verge of developing an economic community with a common trade policy. Swiss neutrality ruled out belonging to a customs union or other coalition, whereas Austria, despite its neutrality—according to the Moscow Memorandum, following the Swiss pattern—wanted to become a full member of the ECSC. The Hungarian crisis put an end to these efforts, forcing the Austrian government to withdraw its application for membership, which had already been announced by Raab and Figl in October.[68] Soviet officials later admonished Vienna to uphold its neutrality and warned against participation in the Com-

66. Norbert Sinn, *Schutz der Grenzen: Der Sicherungseinsatz des Österreichischen Bundesheeres an der Staatsgrenze zu Ungarn im Oktober und November 1956* (Graz, Austria: Austria Medien Service, 1996), pp. 37–40, 65–69; and Klaus Eisterer, "Die Schweiz und die österreichische Neutralität 1955/56," in Thomas Albrich et al., eds., *Österreich in den Fünfzigern* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 1995), pp. 299–332, 317–319.

67. Amtsvermerk, 30 October 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3, Zl. 519.722-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56).

68. See Thomas Angerer, "Integrität vor Integration: Österreich und 'Europa' aus französischer Sicht

munity.[69] Until November 1956, the Austrian government had not determined the bounds of its maneuvering room and was using the ECSC application to push to the furthest limit.[70] Although Figl acknowledged the impact of Moscow's reservations, he also emphasized the high prices for steel in the ECSC—20 to 30 percent above the highly subsidized domestic prices, which favored the finished-goods industry—as having allegedly contributed to the decision to back off. Presumably, though, he had been well aware of these prices before submitting the membership application. Hence, any misgivings about this matter most likely were less important than the Soviet objections.[71]

Austrian leaders had found that their maneuvering room was very limited in the face of Moscow's stern accusations about an alleged violation of neutrality vis-à-vis the Hungarian revolution. Furthermore, any attempt by Vienna to push its ECSC application request would have been grist for the mill for domestic critics of Austrian neutrality, something that had to be avoided at all costs. The fundamental decision to relinquish ambitions of ECSC membership not only meant non-participation in the EEC (a status that lasted until 1995) but facilitated a shift toward "permanent" neutrality. The renunciation of integration was compelled by external and internal circumstances, but only over time was the renunciation of supranational integration fully internalized.

Despite assurances by the Austrian government, the Hungarian leaders who were installed by Soviet troops accused Austria of having smuggled arms, ammunition, and "Horthy fascists" under the cover of the Red Cross.[72] They also alleged that Austrian radio broadcasts and press reports and the activities of its political parties had violated the country's neutral status. Ambassador Peinsipp reported to the Austrian Foreign Ministry that "the broadcasts of Radio Vienna have been anything but helpful during these times," although he preferred to speak about this orally.[73]

International neutrality may have meant the renunciation of suprana-

1949–1960," in Gehler and Steininger, eds., *Österreich und die europäische Integration 1945–1993,* pp. 178–200, esp. pp. 193–194.

69. *AdG,* 1957, pp. 6256–6257.

70. Fritz Weber, "Austria: A Special Case in European Economic Integration?" in Richard T. Griffiths, ed., *Explorations in OEEC History* (Paris: OECD Historical Series, 1997), pp. 49–59, esp. p. 55.

71. Thomas Angerer, "Exklusivität und Selbstausschließung: Integrationsgeschichtliche Überlegungen zur Erweiterungsfrage am Beispiel Frankreichs und Österreichs," in "L'Élargissement de l'Union Européenne: Actes du colloque franco-autrichien organisé les 13 et 14 juin 1997 par l'Institut Culturel Autrichien et l'Institut Pierre-Renouvin," *Revue d'Europe Centrale,* Vol. 6, No. 1 (July 1998), pp. 25–54, esp. pp. 41–46.

72. "Telephongespräch mit der Gesandtschaft Budapest seit der zweiten russischen Intervention," 14 November 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 A, Zl. 520.419-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56).

73. Ibid.

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tional integration, but it did not mean appeasement of the new Soviet-backed regime in Hungary. After Soviet trooops crushed the Hungarian uprising and dislodged Imre Nagy—on 1 November he had even proclaimed full democracy, withdrawal from the Warsaw Pact, and neutrality analogous to the Austrian "example"—Peinsipp "urgently" warned the Austrian government "not to display a friendly attitude" toward the regime of János Kádár because it would "in no way be understood" by the population. The envoy called for a "vigorous protest to be lodged as forcefully as possible against the accusations put forth against Austria."[74]

Austria's neutrality was closely connected with the UN—in contrast to that of Switzerland—and the Austrian government suggested that the aid effort be overseen by a UN coordination committee. Austrian leaders wanted to be represented on the committee, lest they give credence to the allegations that Austria was smuggling arms to Hungary under the cover of the Red Cross. The Austrian foreign ministry declared that countries that did not belong to any military alliances, such as Sweden, Austria, Burma, and Yugoslavia, should "help Hungary out of the chaos that today represents a certain threat for all neighboring nations."[75] Austria's readiness for peacekeeping with neutral and non-aligned countries had its roots here.

The process of reducing tensions between Austria and Hungary, which had begun in 1953, was interrupted by the revolution, the Soviet interventions, and the installation of Kádár's regime. Neutrality proved to have a destabilizing effect on Communist rule. Austria's neutrality was still too new to be evaluated reliably, let alone to be recommended to others. Austria was in fact not an "example," as the Hungarians had learned.[76] The nonexportability of Austrian neutrality was closely linked to the consolidation of the Iron Curtain and, with it, political defeat for Central Europe in 1956.

The Effects of the Hungarian Crisis and Mikoyan's Visit

Thomas Schlesinger and Manfried Rauchensteiner are right in arguing that the events in Hungary in 1956 were the real test of Austrian neutrality on the

74. Amtsvermerk, "Lage in Budapest," 15 November 1956, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 A, Zl. 520.439-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56).

75. "Derzeitige Lage Ungarns; Information an den Herrn Bundesminister," 17 November 1956, Telegramm Zl. 58045, in ÖStA, AdR, BKA/AA, II-pol, Ungarn 3 A, Zl. 520.595-pol/56 (GZl. 511.190-pol/56).

76. Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei,* pp. 337, 351–352. See also Catherine C. Nielsen, "Neutrality versus Neutralism: Austrian Neutrality and the 1956 Hungarian Crisis," in Erwin A. Schmidl, ed., *Die Ungarnkrise 1956 und Österreich* (Vienna: Boehlau, 2003), pp. 215–234.

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first anniversary of the end of the occupation.[77] From the time the Hungarian revolution began, the Austrian government took pains not to overstep the bounds of neutrality in any way that could be interpreted as an attempt to influence or stimulate the unrest. Vienna was in a difficult position and under enormous pressure to prevent a violation of its neutrality and a Soviet intervention. Because of the existing tensions stemming from Austria's application for ECSC membership, Vienna did not want to provoke additional troubles with the USSR.[78]

Austria as a new member of the UN and a neutral state in Europe tried what it could to meliorate the Hungarian crisis. The UN General Assembly adopted an Austrian resolution to provide humanitarian aid to Hungary and to enjoin all parties involved to cooperate with UN efforts to promote peace and ease suffering there. With regard to the waves of refugees—the total figure as of September 1957 was 170,000–180,000—Austria emulated the Swiss practice of giving humanitarian, social, medical, and moral support. Massive shipments of medicine, food, and clothing were organized via the Austrian embassy in Budapest.[79]

The fact that the position of the neutrals was to have the most varied effects was shown by the apparent confirmation of the Trojan-horse thesis in Central and Eastern Europe: The concept of neutralizing Europe, which had been recommended by Soviet foreign ministry officials in 1955, produced negative effects for Moscow's foreign policy. When Imre Nagy, under the pressure of the revolution, actually pursued neutrality for Hungary in 1956, the concept was seen in Moscow as a dire threat. The Austrian government had sensed the impact of its neutrality on Central and Eastern Europe and had been wary of "exporting" it. As in the case of the German question in 1955, Austrian leaders carefully avoided recommending the "Austrian solution" for Hungary in the autumn of 1956. Austria's neutrality was too young and too little rooted in the political culture to serve as a well-developed export good.

The only exception came in January 1957 when Raab said in a radio address that

> Hungary borders directly on Austria, and any form of neutrality would surely be gladly accepted by the Hungarian people. However, the creation of a neutral

77. Thomas O. Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe: The Domestic Roots of a Foreign Policy* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1972), pp. 34–52; and Manfried Rauchensteiner, *Spätherbst 1956: Die Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand, Eine Veröffentlichung des Heeresgeschichtlichen Museums* (Vienna: Bundesverlag, 1981).

78. Compare Angerer, "Integrität vor Integration," pp. 193–194; and Angerer, "Exklusivität und Selbstausschließung," pp. 41–46.

79. Eduard Stanek, *Verfolgt, Verjagt, Vertrieben: Flüchtlinge in Österreich* (Vienna: Europaverlag, 1985), pp. 60–78.

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> state on both sides of the ideological line of demarcation, which was referred to in Churchill's speech at the time as an "Iron Curtain," would certainly contribute considerably to a general calming in Central Europe, all the more so because such an arrangement would mean that no one would feel his security was threatened.[80]

When Soviet Deputy Prime Minister Anastas Mikoyan visited Austria in April 1957, he referred to Raab's radio speech. [81] Mikoyan stated that Austria's neutrality was a "special case" and "under current circumstances is not replicable."[82] Soviet leaders clearly had learned their lesson from the Hungarian events.

What other effects did the Hungarian crisis have on Austria and, in particular, on its neutrality?[83] Opposition to strengthening the Austrian army was weakened—the need for an active defense force was confirmed. Yet, ironically, the size and strength of the Austrian armed forces remained modest. Armed neutrality never really took hold the way it did in Switzerland, where the army was much stronger and more capable of repelling a potential aggressor.

The Hungarian crisis did bring a reduction of tensions in the coalition government. The two main parties, the Social Democrats and the People's Party, agreed on the essentials of neutrality, a situation that persisted until the country joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. By contrast, the Austrian Communist party found its position undermined by the events in Hungary. In 1959 the Communists failed to win a single seat in the parliament. Although the Communists were the most vehement and convinced advocates of neutrality (and remain so even today), their political marginalization had little or no effect on the country's neutral status.

Austria's spiritual, cultural, and economic orientation was toward the West, but the Hungarian crisis established limits by reinforcing Austria's neutrality both domestically and internationally. The crisis made clear that Austria's status had to be taken seriously by other countries. Consequently, for the first time, Austrian officials gave higher priority to neutrality than to integration, establishing a course that would last for four decades. Until the EU membership debate in the early 1990s, supranational integration was seen as incompatible with permanent neutrality.

The only exception was that neutrality did not prevent Austria from seeking greater engagement with the UN. No contradiction was seen between

80. Radio address by Julius Raab, 20 January 1957, quoted in Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei,* p. 352; and Rauchensteiner, *Spätherbst 1956,* p. 107.

81. Rauchensteiner, *Die Zwei,* pp. 338–339.

82. Rauchensteiner, *Spätherbst 1956,* p. 108.

83. For this, see Schlesinger, *Austrian Neutrality in Postwar Europe,* pp. 51–52.

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permanent neutrality and supranational UN membership, in part because the Soviet Union also belonged to the UN. After 1956, Austria emphasized a global foreign policy over a regional one. The world was more important for Austria than Europe was. The Cold War in Europe set strict limits on the actions of a neutral state, whereas the global scene permitted greater leeway. Moreover, the policies required for the UN were inherently less demanding than those of European regional integration. Austria could therefore play an active role at the UN from the start.

Neutrality is not just an abstract and sterile term; it inevitably became bound up with Austrians' national identity. National self-confidence and pride were enhanced by Austria's management of the Hungarian crisis. The year 1956 was second only to 1955 as a milestone in Austria's postwar nation-building process.

The Prospect of a Broad Free Trade Area

In subsequent years, Austria continued to pursue a mixed policy regarding the problem of European integration. In January 1957 the coalition government welcomed Britain's proposal for a broad Free Trade Area (FTA) that would include all former ERP states.[84] The inclusivity of the membership had the advantage of preventing any objections Moscow might have on account of Austrian neutrality. On 29 January 1957 the Austrian Council of Ministers approved Vienna's participation in the proposed FTA. The short path to neutrality that was offered in 1953–1955 thus continued along a much more roundabout path to EU membership in 1955–1995. Having achieved neutrality and the end of foreign occupation, Austria voluntarily renounced integration for the time being and set itself on the "long path toward Europe."[85]

The Austrian ambassador to London, Johannes von Schwarzenberg, approached the British Foreign Office about Selwyn Lloyd's proposal for a "Grand Design" vis-à-vis Europe and gave the impression that, within the constraints of neutrality, Austria would be prepared "to go a long way into Europe." The Austrians, he said, would be particularly interested in the FTA. Schwarzenberg seemed to hanker after a European organization that could accommodate a reunified Germany outside NATO. He argued that neutralist forces were bound to increase in Germany and that it might be wise "to anticipate their victory." Schwarzenberg's idea was to fortify the Grand Design and

84. Wolfram Kaiser, *Using Europe, Abusing the Europeans: Britain and European Integration, 1945–63* (Houndmills, UK: Macmillan, 1999), pp. 61–87.

85. Gehler, *Der lange Weg,* Vol. 1. See also Angerer, "Integrität vor Integration," pp. 178–200.

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scale back NATO to the point where they coincided and could be consolidated.[86] Neutrality in this "negative" sense was a means toward reducing the potential for confrontation, that is, in limiting NATO's influence on the continent. On the other hand, free trade and neutrality in the "positive" sense would be binding elements and concrete contributions to the unification of Germany and Europe.

Austria's neutrality is inseparably linked with one political figure: Bruno Kreisky. He took international law as his tenet and argued that the obligations of a neutral state precluded any commitments that might be binding in wartime. This led to the complicated question of how much sovereignty Austria ought to surrender in the interests of European integration. According to Kreisky, the advent of the Common Market had given a certain urgency to integration. No neutral country, he stressed, could join the Common Market without careful examination. (The need to give the "military alliance" of six member-states a sound economic basis was one of the considerations that led to the formation of the Common Market.) For Kreisky, it was clear that for the time being the FTA represented the furthest appropriate degree of integration for Austria. The extent to which the seventeen potential members of this organization were required to surrender sovereignty was fully compatible with neutrality.[87]

The reality of the continuing East-West conflict remained decisive in shaping Austria's neutrality. Kreisky emphasized that neutrality was often misunderstood and sometimes despised because it was equated with cowardice and selfishness. In Austria's case, however, it was no more than facing geographic realities. Neutrality would remain as decisive in the future as it had been in the past, setting limits on Austria's choices. In particular, neutrality was a means for the USSR to restrict Austria's efforts at integration. The Soviet embassy lost no opportunity to lobby the Austrians against joining the Common Market.

The 1958 Lebanon Crisis

The Lebanon crisis underscored the ambivalent and problematic nature of Austria's neutrality and highlighted the country's inability to defend its territory and airspace. On 16–18 July 1958, roughly 100 U.S. C-119 military transport and cargo planes flew over Tyrol en route from Fürstenfeldbruck in Bavaria to Turkey. The problem of unauthorized flights over Austrian terri-

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86. P. F. Hancock, "The Grand Design," 27 March 1957, in UKNA, FO 371/130287, RR 1072/1.
87. R. P. Heppel to Foreign Office, 27 June 1958, in UKNA, FO 371/136640, RR 2231/2.

tory was not a new one. In accordance with an Austrian Council of Ministers resolution, permission for hundreds of U.S. overflights from 1955 on had been routinely granted in advance by a lower-level official in the Austrian Department of Civil Aviation. Austria merely wanted to know the number of aircraft and the approximate time they would fly over the Innsbruck corridor. But in early 1956 the Soviet press sharply attacked the United States for overflights that infringed on Austrian neutrality. U.S. Ambassador Llewellyn Thompson contacted Figl, who emphasized that Austria wanted to avoid any formal agreement on the matter. After a lengthy discussion, Figl said that Austria would temporarily maintain the existing U.S.-Austrian arrangement, which functioned to the satisfaction of both sides: The U.S. air attaché in Vienna would receive overflight requests from the U.S. Air Forces in Europe (USAFE) command by telephone or telex and would ask permission, which as a rule would be granted immediately.

Afterward, however, Thompson advised Secretary of State Dulles not to push any further in seeking changes to the procedures and to keep the overflights to a minimum. Thompson emphasized that the Austrians were anxious to maintain their neutrality and that if overflights were necessary, they should occur at a high altitude and under weather conditions that would keep them from being detected from the ground.[88] In March 1956, Thompson informed Figl about an increase in the number of overflights. Figl did not protest but said he hoped there would not be so many, at least not until after the election. This modus vivendi lasted for another two years.[89]

By July 1958, however, the neutrality that had legally come into force for Austria in October 1955 had gradually altered the situation. On 14 July the Austrian Foreign Ministry, responding to a request by the U.S. ambassador, gave oral permission for overflights by thirty-two C-119 aircraft. That same day, the United States decided to intervene militarily in Lebanon and to evacuate U.S. citizens. On 16 July the USAFE command in Wiesbaden, which mistakenly assumed that the U.S. State Department had already gained permission from Vienna for C-119 overflights, gave the takeoff orders. But the Austrian government did not actually grant written permission until 17 July for the evacuation measures to proceed over Austrian territory with thirty-two roundtrip flights. Innsbruck air traffic control erroneously reported on 16 July that 150 to 200 transport planes were flying over Austria at an altitude of 23,000 to 30,000 feet, and the Innsbruck office of the Austrian Communist Party immediately disclosed this information to the press, which published it

88. Walter Blasi, "Die Libanonkrise 1958 und die US-Überflüge," in Erwin A. Schmidl, ed., *Österreich: Im frühen Kalten Krieg 1945–1958: Spione, Partisanen, Kriegspläne* (Vienna: Boehlau, 2000), pp. 239–259, esp. p. 245.

89. Ibid., pp. 245–246.

on 17 July. Figl had already complained to the U.S. embassy on the 16th that far more than the agreed-upon thirty-two transport planes were taking part in the operation and that U.S. fighter aircraft in military formation had been flying over Innsbruck in both directions.

Many Austrians could see the flights from the ground, and a political uproar ensued after the press published the errant number of overflights. The Austrian government felt it had no choice but to issue a press statement.[90] Once again, however, Austrian leaders sought to walk a tightrope. On one hand they were obliged to stick to neutrality. On the other hand they did not want a falling out with the Americans. What made the situation even more delicate was Raab's impending visit to Moscow, where he hoped to achieve an easing of economic conditions (petroleum imports).[91]

Neutrality in this instance provided a cover for safeguarding broader interests. Essentially, the Austrian government played a double game during the crisis. To assuage Soviet concerns, the government felt obliged to lodge an official protest with the United States. At the same time, Figl unofficially reassured the Americans and asked for their understanding, emphasizing that the statement was in fact not a protest. But this attempt to play both ends against the middle did not prove particularly successful. Although Moscow sought to exploit the matter for its own ends and to compel the Austrians to tighten their neutrality, the Soviet reaction had been expected all along. What was not expected was the negative reaction of U.S. officials, who cast suspicion on Austria's efforts to improve Austro-Soviet relations. The United States itself was not above playing both ends against the middle, but it seemed unwilling to permit a small state caught in a dilemma to do the same.

The acuity of Austria's dilemma became evident when the Austrian ambassador in Washington, Wilfried Platzer, was instructed to lodge a protest regarding the overflights and, at the same time, to ask for U.S. assistance in evacuating Austrians from the threatened part of the Middle East. Not surprisingly, the protests were unsuccessful. Further overflights took place on 17 July. After Austrian and foreign journalists raised the issue, Defense Minister Graf ordered the transfer of Austrian aircraft and anti-aircraft batteries to the provinces of Tyrol and Vorarlberg. In the end, however, the transfer did not take place. Austrian officials assured the U.S. ambassador, Henry Freeman Matthews, that the announced actions were meant to be only "pro actis." Matthews, for his part, informed the State Department that the Austrians

90. Blasi, "Die Libanonkrise 1958 und die US-Überflüge," pp. 247–248. See also "Austrian Note on Overflights," Confidential Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 26 September 1958, in NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1955–1959, Box 3578.

91. On Raab's Moscow Trip, see Confidential Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 17 July 1958, in NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1955–1959, Box 3578.

were not in a position to grant permission. At the same time, he stressed that, thanks to his help, the overflights could continue on 17 and 18 July (without permission). Despite this concession from Vienna, Matthews depicted Raab as a consistent champion of rapprochement with the USSR and the most ardent defender of neutrality.[92]

On 19 July the U.S. State Department issued a press statement requested by Ambassador Platzer declaring that the U.S. Air Force in the future would respect Austrian air sovereignty. But U.S. officials declined to issue a formal statement of regret over the violations. On 21 July, the day that Raab began his visit to the Soviet Union, Moscow sent a diplomatic note to Washington protesting the "premeditated, intentional violations of Austria's neutrality." Austrian officials accompanying Raab were relieved that the Soviet government did not accuse Austria of tolerating the overflights or of succumbing to a one-sided Western orientation. Raab and Figl attempted to extract advantages from the situation. They disregarded the suggestion by Defense Undersecretary Karl Stephani that Austria purchase missiles to defend its airspace, and they rebuffed Moscow's attempts to use the Lebanon crisis to bring the Austrians closer to the USSR. Soviet leaders had praised Raab as a great statesman and defender of neutrality, and they said the Soviet air force could help Austria in the event of further overflights. Raab promptly declined, arguing that such actions would contravene the military clauses in the state treaty. Raab emphasized that Austria alone had the right to determine how far its neutrality ranged, and he rejected Soviet efforts to insert a passage in the final communiqué declaring that the Soviet Union was prepared to defend Austrian neutrality.[93]

The Austrian government's response during these initial days was in line with its effort to strike a balance between the two superpowers. What remained was the inability of Austria's air force to protect its airspace, particularly after Vienna indicated that it would take a firmer line on overflights. As a result of the Lebanon crisis, the Austrians considered buying Swedish-made "Draken" aircraft (though no such purchase took place until thirty years later, in 1987).[94] On 7 October 1958, Austria issued overflight permission within the context of the withdrawal from Lebanon that had been unanimously authorized by the UN General Assembly on 21 August.[95] Afterward, the Aus-

92. Blasi, "Die Libanonkrise 1958 und die US-Überflüge," pp. 248–249.

93. Ibid., pp. 250–252. See also "Violation of Austrian Air Space," Confidential Department of State Memorandum of Conversation, 17 July 1958, in NARA, RG 59, Central Decimal File 1955–1959, Box 3578.

94. Blasi, "Die Libanonkrise 1958 und die US-Überflüge," pp. 252–253.

95. Ibid., pp. 255.

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trian government warned the United States that, in the future, Vienna would be obliged to react to violations of its airspace.

Austria's conduct during the Lebanon crisis showed several things: Neutrality enabled the country to appear more self-confident and sovereign toward the former occupying powers. Austria even attempted to play the superpowers off against each other and to gain advantages from the situation for itself. The crisis reinforced the UN orientation of Austria's neutrality, which shifted closer to the Swiss model via the adoption of a stronger position on U.S. overflights. This stance gave Austria's policy greater credibility, but the crisis also exposed a degree of military weakness that cast doubt on the viability of Austrian neutrality.

Adherence to the Danube Convention and the Failure of the FTA

When Raab visited the USSR in July 1958, he announced that Austria would adhere to the Belgrade Danube Convention of 1948. Upon returning to Vienna, Raab declared that the Austrian delegation had taken this action "on its own initiative" and that the government had been considering the step "for some time." U.S. officials responded unfavorably, arguing that Raab took this step without consulting with the United States, Britain, and France, "whose ambassadors in Vienna had been assured by Foreign Minister Figl some months earlier that the Austrian government did not intend to adhere to the Convention."[96] With this action, Raab moved closer to a policy of equidistance, and his and Kreisky's attitude came under ever-greater suspicion in Washington. For the most part, these suspicions were unfounded. Raab was not a neutralist, and neither was Kreisky. Although Raab sometimes had reservations about the Americans and did not really trust them—although there was no doubt about his anti-Communist and pro-Western outlook—Kreisky was an Atlanticist. But both of them regarded the decision to join the Danube Convention as a sovereign act and an opportunity to demonstrate Austria's independence.

In general, the Austrian government had used neutrality after 1955 to gain a certain degree of independence in deciding how far to proceed with integration into the West. But it was clear that, as Ambassador Matthews reported to the State Department in March 1958, Austria had no intention of joining the ECSC, the Common Market, the European Atomic Energy Com-

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96. "Annex A: Additional Major Developments Not Covered in the Report," in *FRUS,* 1958–1960, Vol. IX, pp. 779–781.

munity (EURATOM), or any other organization associated with security questions. The Austrian foreign ministry explained this position by claiming that the necessary partial delegation of sovereignty to a central organization would be incompatible with Austria's neutrality. A more probable explanation for Matthews, however, was that membership in such groupings would almost inevitably align Austria too closely with the Western alliance. Hence Austria, he argued, would cooperate "only in the looser and more general European organizations" such as the Organization for European Economic Cooperation and the Council of Europe, as well as the proposed FTA. According to Matthews, Austria's attitude toward European integration was not solely dictated by political considerations. Economic factors played a large part too. But in his view "the vehicle of neutrality was a convenient one for Austria to use in explaining its actions in such affairs, and the Austrian Foreign Ministry in particular has shown no hesitation in using the policy of neutrality to hide behind when its purposes are thereby served."[97]

During the negotiations on the FTA, Austria's interest in integration paralleled British interests to a large degree. An intergovernmental committee that had been set up in 1957 to negotiate the FTA (the "Maudling Committee") ended in failure in November 1958. Antagonism between France and Britain as well as Adenauer's reservations prevented a breakthrough. Britain's request that agriculture be excluded from the FTA was rejected by France, Italy, and the Netherlands, all of which depended on agricultural exports. London's biggest opponent was France, but the main British goals were a special relationship with the United States and the attainment of a nuclear power status with America's assistance.[98]

In late 1958, the British, Danish, Norwegian, Austrian, Swedish, and Swiss governments announced the start of a series of conferences that led to the founding of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) in January 1960.[99] The Austrian government preferred EFTA membership in the 1960s for ideological as well as political reasons.[100] Socialists like Kreisky and Bruno Pittermann regarded Western integration as incompatible with Austria's neu-

97. Freeman Matthews to Department of State, "Recent thoughts on Austrian neutrality," 11 March 1958, in NARA, RG 59 663.0021/3–1158, NND 881403.

98. Gabrielle Brenke, "Europakonzeptionen im Widerstreit. Die Freihandelszonen-Verhandlungen 1956–1958," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* Vol. 42 (1994), pp. 595–633.

99. Jean Komaromi, "Allgemeine Fragen der Europäischen Freihandelsassoziation (EFTA): Geschichte—Wesen—Ziele," in Hans Mayrzedt and Hans-Christoph Binswanger, eds., *Die Neutralität in der Europäischen Integration* (Vienna: Braumüller, 1970), pp. 109–145; and Mikael af Malmborg and Jonny Laursen, "The Creation of EFTA," in Thorsten B. Olesen, ed., *Interdependence versus Integration: Denmark, Scandinavia and Western Europe, 1945–1960* (Odense, Denmark: Odense University Press, 1995), pp. 197–212.

100. Felix Butschek, "EC Membership and the 'Velvet' Revolution: The Impact of Recent Political Changes on Austria's Economic Position in Europe," in Günter Bischof and Anton Pelinka, eds., *Aus-*

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trality.[101] Kreisky viewed EFTA membership as the only way to maintain neutrality and sovereign treaty-making power. But in fact EFTA was designed to help remove trade barriers between "the Six" and the "non-Six." Many of those involved, especially key figures in the Austrian People's Party, hoped for an eventual linkage between EFTA and the EEC.[102] Austria's membership in EFTA and non-membership in the EEC—through sovereign acts of the government—gave a clearer sense of the limits of Austria's integration policy.

When Nikita Khrushchev visited Austria on 8 July 1960, he stated that the USSR would not stand idly by if Austria's neutrality were violated. The Soviet Union, he declared, would assess the circumstances and take appropriate action.[103] Austrian leaders reacted immediately and even more unambiguously than during the Lebanon crisis. They formally rejected Khrushchev's concept of neutrality, which, they said, ran counter to Austria's policy of keeping out of all military alliances and preserving its neutrality through its own means. The government affirmed that Austria had the "unlimited and sovereign right" to decide for itself whether its neutrality was threatened and what countermeasure to take.[104]

Conclusion

From 1953 to 1958, Austria did not embrace a neutralist position. Instead, it shifted gradually from the minimum option of non-membership in alliances (in 1953–1954) to the slightly more ambitious idea of "permanent neutrality" (1955). From 1955 to 1958, Austria searched for a form of neutrality that was practicable both domestically and internationally. Austria's neutrality was less a product of the Stalinist phase of the Cold War (1947–1953) than a result of the "thaw" after Stalin's death (1953–1955), and it took shape against the backdrop of the increasing division of Germany, the growing integration among West European countries, and the crises in the GDR in 1953, Hungary in 1956, and Lebanon in 1958.

tria in the New Europe: Contemporary Austrian Studies, Vol. 1 (New Brunswick, NJ: Transactions, 1993), pp. 62–106, esp. pp. 66, 68.

101. Oliver Rathkolb, "Austria and European Integration after World War II: Austria in the New Europe," in Bischof and Pelinka, eds., *Austria in the New Europe,* pp. 49–50, 54–55.

102. Gehler, *Der lange Weg,* pp. 188–192.

103. J. Bowker to FO, 13 July 1960, in UKNA, FO 371/153178, RR 1072/1. On Khrushchev's visit, see Martin Kofler, "Eine 'Art Nabel der Welt': Österreich und der Chruschtschow-Besuch 1960," *Zeitgeschichte,* Vol. 26, No. 6 (November/December 1999), pp. 397–416; and Martin Kofler, *Kennedy und Österreich: Neutralität im Kalten Krieg* (Innsbruck: Studienverlag, 2003).q

104. "Austria Corrects Mr. Khrushchev: Wrong Presumptions on Neutrality," *The Times* (London), 13 July 1960, p. 11.

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Initially, Austria's neutrality was conceived in purely military terms as an alliance-free status that nevertheless was Western oriented. This neutrality was voluntary and was circumscribed only by the persistent demands of the USSR, which did not prevent Austria from joining the UN in December 1955 and the Council of Europe in April 1956. In October 1956 Austria even announced its interest in joining the ECSC.

But the situation changed as a result of the Hungarian crisis in October–November 1956, which was a turning point in Austria's conception of neutrality. From that point forward, Austria's Western orientation was increasingly limited to the domestic sphere, and its participation in the ECSC was no longer broached. When Raab briefly made overtures to the EEC in the spring of 1958, Vice Chancellor Pittermann reminded him of Vienna's adherence to the Swiss model of neutrality. Austria, like Switzerland, had joined the project to form an FTA, but it subsequently kept its distance from both the EEC and EURATOM.

During the Lebanon crisis, Austria modified its liberal policy regarding U.S. overflights and thus shifted partway toward a Swiss model of neutrality. Nonetheless, some important differences between the Swiss and Austrian models remained. In particular, Austria's status was determined mainly by its location on the dividing line of the East-West conflict and by its recent adoption of neutrality. When the EFTA was formed in 1960, Austria proceeded further along the Swiss path.

During the initial phase of the Cold War (1947–1953), neutrality for Central and West European countries was neither attractive nor especially credible either to a country's own people or to foreign powers. Austria, Finland, and Sweden were hesitant to adopt such initiatives. But when Moscow expressed greater interest in establishing neutrality for states that separated the superpowers' spheres of influence, the countries in question were willing to take a more forthright stance.

A neutral status for Austria proved easier to achieve during the easing of tensions in 1953–1958 than it would have been at the height of the Cold War. Austria took advantage of a one-time opportunity to regain freedom of action through Swiss-style neutrality (and as a result of this, Switzerland's own neutrality received indirect acknowledgment from the USSR). The domestic complexion of both countries was distinctly Western oriented. From 1955 to 1958, the Soviet Union succeeded in keeping Austria on its path of neutrality, but the further application of "permanent" neutrality remained a matter of political judgment.

Throughout this period, Austria's policy oscillated between two conflicting elements: a Western external orientation that could have led to Western integration; and stalling tactics and obstacles both within the coun-

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try and abroad (on the part of the USSR). Despite open sympathies for the West, Austria stuck to its line and treated its status as exclusive, rather than a model for Germany or other countries. Only Raab spoke in favor of the possible extension of the Austrian "model"—in 1957 with respect to Hungary and in 1958 with respect to the German question.[105] In both cases, political realities worked against the application of the "Austria solution" to either Hungary or Germany.

During the first few years after the signing of the Austrian State Treaty, Austrian leaders were neither wholehearted nor completely convinced about their neutrality. This lack of conviction led to inconsistencies, disloyalties, double games, and a dubious political morality, all of which affected the country's precarious position between East and West. But in this phase of emergence from foreign occupation, Austria began to understand the value of neutrality in not having to comply with every foreign demand and in making its own decisions about foreign policy. Neutrality paved the way for Austria's national self-assertion and a remarkably successful project of nation building.

105. Matthias Pape, "Die Deutschlandinitiative des österreichischen Bundeskanzlers Julius Raab im Frühjahr 1958," *Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte,* Vol. 48, No. 2 (April 2000), pp. 281–318. For a recent depiction of Austria as a forerunner for the FRG's *Ostpolitik,* see André Biever, "L'Autriche et les origines de l'Ostpolitik de la République fédérale d'Allemagne, 1958–1969," *Relations Internationales,* No. 114 (Summer 2003), pp. 213–230.